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INTRODUCTION
Over the last 20 years, the study of courts has received considerable attention in the political 
science literature (Tate 1995; Jackson 1992; Harding 2009). In particular, the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), its rise in power and its influence on policy  creation and 
European integration have become the centre of many studies (Weiler 1994, Alter 1996, 
Wincott 1995, 1999, 2000 and others). The role national courts have played in the development 
of the powers of the European Court of Justice through preliminary ruling procedures, as well 
as the impact of international courts on private litigants, have been investigated (Alter 2001; 
Ward 2007). Increasingly there is also a growing field of literature relating to newly created 
courts, especially in Eastern Europe (Harding 2009; Solyom 2009). Much of this literature 
concentrates on the independence of courts and their increased, or decreased, affect on policy-
making. In the field of comparative politics scholars have payed increasing attention to the 
similarities and differences in the development of power-relations between courts and the 
political branches in different national contexts (Vanberg 2000; Stone 1992, Jacob 1996, 
Jackson 1992 and others). Between all these aspects lies one area which has yet received little 
scholarly attention. The quiet changes wrought within the national jurisdictions of the courts 
through EU membership remain, even within jurisdiction let alone in comparison to others, 
have mainly been ignored. In the end, a preliminary  reference is a conscious decision by a court 
to refer to the European Court of Justice. What remains is the question if there are other 
changes brought  on by  EU membership  in the national jurisdictions of the courts when the 
court does not have to make the decision to involve the ECJ? This thesis concentrates on the 
very specialised power of abstract judicial review in its attempt to discover these changes and 
their possible explanations. Before outlining the presented argument, this introduction will 
consider the different definitions of abstract judicial review and the development of this legal 
power in courts in Europe. The argument of the thesis will then be outlined and a rudimentary 
summary  of each sections will be presented. Thirdly, and lastly, this introduction will outline 
the contributions this thesis makes to the literature. 
Many modern democracies have invested their courts with the power of abstract norm review 
(Vanberg 1998:300). Abstract judicial review is the power of a court to decide on the 
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constitutionality of legislation without a concrete case, and thus stands in contrast to concrete 
judicial review, the power of a court to review legislation as it  applies to a particular case. In 
2003, Austrian news-agencies reported that the constitutional court had declared 70% of laws, 
referred to it under abstract  review, unconstitutional in the previous year (Ladstaetter 2003). 
This number presents a significant increase when compared to the 20% observed in the early 
1980s (Stone 1992:62). Other countries, such as Germany, Spain, Italy and Portugal, have also 
noted an increase in abstract judicial review proceedings and subsequent unconstitutionality 
rulings (Magalhaes 2003). Academically, this increase has gone widely  unnoticed (Vanberg 
1998:301). The cause for this omission is the comparative low profile of abstract norm control 
compared to the high profile of concrete review (Stone 1992:62). A further contributing 
element is the interdisciplinary  character of abstract norm review. Its character is neither fully 
political nor fully legal and, therefore, is often ignored by  researchers from both fields. It is 
therefore necessary to take account not only of the scholarly  works produced in context of 
national courts in political science, but also law, economics and sociology, to develop an 
argument. For this purpose a concentration on the jurisdictions of the Austrian, Italian and 
German constitutional courts has been chosen in this thesis due to their high level of 
comparability. 
The argument developed by this thesis is as follows: harmonisation of EU/EC law with national 
law has created an environment in which it is more likely for a law to be declared 
unconstitutional, partially  or as a whole. The reason for this can be found in two distinct 
factors: 
a) the increased difficulty in creating laws that will not contravene any national or EU/EC laws 
leaves judges with the perceived necessity of making clear and strict decisions and 
b) the higher level of complexity of the law-making process also allows for a more reckless 
attitudes of politicians to the necessity  to remain intra vires, within their constitutionally 
given powers. 
Both of these factors then lead to today’s situation in which increased numbers of laws see 
review, with other words are declared unconstitutional by national constitutional courts. 
 A further aspect of the thesis relates to the format of review decisions rendered in the three 
countries by the constitutional courts. All display an increase in laws being declared 
unconstitutional in some form. However, the format these unconstitutionality declarations take 
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differ. In Italy and Germany, the increase can be traced back to a rise in complete 
unconstitutionality rulings. This means that in these two countries there is an increased 
probability  of the court striking down entire norms rather than simply parts thereof. The 
Austrian court, on the other hand, is less likely to rule a norm unconstitutional, if it has the 
opportunity to review it only partially. With other words, the Austrian constitutional court is 
more likely  to declare only parts of legislation as unconstitutional and let the other parts stand 
uncorrected. No conclusive explanation for this development has been found in this thesis. 
However, there are indications that it might correlate with the development of public 
confidence levels in Austria, in comparison to those in Germany and Italy. Public confidence is 
higher in the German and the Italian court and it can be argued that  this might lead to less 
constraint in their decision making.  
1.What is abstract norm review?
As many of the concepts and terms within this thesis have slightly differing meanings in 
different academic disciplines, it is necessary to present a short summary of their development 
within the European academic context, before presenting a detailed outline of the thesis and its 
originality and contribution to the literature.  Norm review, or judicial review as most Anglo-
American academics term it, is the power of a court to decide on the legality of a rule or norm 
which has been referred to the court for that  purpose (Stone Sweet, 2004:9). A legal norm is a 
rule of any kind, passed and enforceable by a public body (e.g. ordinances, statutes, 
administrative rules, common law, precedent and international and supranational treaties) 
(Kalyvas, 2006:575). This legal definition is the most basic way to construe the meaning of 
the term norm. Arguably, its simplicity hides the complexity of the term. Other academic 
disciplines are more aware of the potential intricacies in presenting a definition. For a 
sociologist, a norm is anything which is socially  enforced. This includes enforcement by 
courts and the police, but  also less formal enforceability  by social groups. The difference in 
meaning therefore lies in the enforceability by public bodies, i.e. courts, as well as in the 
perceived source of the norm. A sociological norm need not be based on a piece of legislation, 
it can also be a socially held belief. So for a sociologist, the German custom to clean the 
pavement in front of your house on Saturday morning, is a norm. There is no legal 
requirement  for doing so - however most communities enforce it  through social pressures. In 
the legal definition this would not be a norm, the legal definition denies any  social or ethical 
aspect.
!
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 In philosophy, a norm is commonly  understood as a reason to act, believe or feel - such as 
commands or permissions. Norms are not descriptively true or false, since they do not purport 
to describe anything, but  they prescribe, create or change (Stone Sweet, 2000:8). This 
definition leaves room for both the social and the legal norm, but is too broad for this thesis 
which is only concerned with legally enforced norms. The term norm, as used in this study, 
therefore denotes a rule which commands or permits a certain action and is passed by a public 
body and enforced by a court. This definition is a combination of political, sociological, and 
philosophical concepts to form a legally acceptable rule of how to describe a norm. This 
definition is compatible with the definitions by the courts, the legal definition, without 
denying that each norm has an ethical and social dimension. Most importantly, this definition 
allows for the realisation that each norm is enforced in the social and ideological context of its 
place, time and environment. 
This point can be best illustrated by  an example. In our own jurisdiction, the British Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 (development of the Sexual Offences Act of 1957) lends itself to the 
clarification of the definition. This act, due to its nature in dealing with socially highly 
sensitive and personal matters, is especially well suited to elucidate the distinction between a 
minimalist legal and a more encompassing political definition of a norm as used in this thesis. 
The Act contains 143 parts. Section 1.1 defines rape in a basic way as sexual penetration 
without consent of the partner. Section 1.2, 1.3 (referring to Section 75/76), and 1.4 give 
further insight into the conditions under which penetration is rape, and the possible legal 
consequences of the action. The norm, in this case, is not “Rape is punishable”, but rather the 
Sexual Offences Act contains many norms. Norm 1: Penile penetration without consent  is 
punishable. Norm 2: Penile penetration, in situations where the partner cannot give consent 
(such as unconsciousness, disability....), is punishable as rape (Section 75). Norm 3: Penile 
penetration, or sexual touching, if consent has been obtained by deception regarding nature, 
purpose or identity, is punishable as rape or sexual assault (Section 76). In the legal definition 
of a norm, each of these stand as they are written in black ink on the paper, denying the 
interpretative dimension of each term. Each of these sections is a rule passed and enforceable 
by a public body. However, there is a social and ethical dimension in the interpretation of the 
norm. The legal definition would like us to believe that this is now a rational statement, which 
can be applied directly  to a case without consideration of ethical or social aspects. But each of 
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these norms contain a wide range of differing interpretations, concepts and terms whose 
meaning rests on the social and ideological surrounding of the interpreter. 
The case of Linekar1  illustrates this application of a social dimension to the purely legal 
definition. A prostitute tried to sue for rape as her client had not payed, and furthermore, 
admitted to never having had the intention to pay. It was held that she was not deceived to the 
purpose of the act, because the purpose of the act was sexual gratification, not monetary 
compensation. However, in Piper2 a girl allowed a man to measure her breasts for the purpose 
of measuring her modelling qualities. He was held to have committed sexual assault, as he did 
not have a modelling agency and therefore deceived her. It  can be argued that the two cases 
are inconsistent in their interpretation. In one case it was held that payment for a sexual act is 
not changing the nature of the act, in another, striving for a modelling career did change the 
nature of the act  (Le Roux 1997:13). This illustrates that a norm also has a social and ethical 
dimension, hidden behind the words. This dimension has an impact on the treatment of norms 
by judges and therefore the minimalist legal definition falls short in presenting a 
comprehensive image. To allow for the additional aspect of norms, the legal definition has to 
be adapted. This is easiest  achieved by incorporating the sociological and philosophical 
definitions, as has been done above. A norm is not simply a rule passed and enforced by a 
public body but it  is also recognised that it permits or commands a certain action within 
society by members of the same society. What does it therefore mean if a norm is reviewed?   
Two distinct forms of norm review proceedings can be observed in the design of constitutional 
or supreme courts across the world – concrete and abstract norm review. Concrete norm 
review is based on an actual case and, therefore, is a judgement on the constitutionality of the 
application of a particular law or norm to an individual case (Currie, 1994:162). In this, the 
litigant has to have legal standing. In other words, the litigant’s rights have to have been 
directly  infringed upon before he or she can take the injury up with the appropriate court and 
ask for a ruling on the application of a law leading to the right’s infringement to his or her 
circumstances. The litigant then has to follow the customary  route through the ranks of the 
courts by  means of appeal. The end of this travel through the court system is the highest court 
of the land, most  often the Supreme or Constitutional Court. These courts give a final and 
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1 [1995] 2 Cr App R 49, [1995] Crim LR 320
2 [2007] EWCA Crim 1251
binding decision3. In many most jurisdictions, lower courts can, if they belief there to be a 
constitutional issue, refer the case directly to the constitutional court. In other jurisdictions, 
only constitutional courts  allow for the individual plaintiff to contact the court  without rising 
through the ranks. Concerning the above example of Linaker, this would signify that the 
prostitute would have taken the interpretation of the norm relating to the nature of the sexual 
act to a constitutional court and asked the court to review whether the interpretation by the 
lower court is compatible with the law or constitution4. 
In the case of abstract review a court decides on the text of a law without a concrete case, 
hence without the limitations on concentration on the application to an individual case. Here 
the litigant does not have to have his or her individual rights infringed upon, before he or she 
can ask the constitutional court to decide and, furthermore, the law does not necessarily  have 
to be legally  binding at the time of the case. If it is an individual citizen who asks for the 
ruling5, then the constitutional court does not have to accept the case. Whereas if it is an 
official, such as the head of state, a political institution or a number of parliamentarians, who 
ask for the ruling, the court is constitutionally obliged to consider the case. To apply this to the 
above example, in a different jurisdiction, one allowing for abstract  judicial review, the 
opposition or another public body could have asked the constitutional court to decide on the 
constitutionality of Section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It can then either declare the 
whole section constitutional, leaving it unchanged, or review the whole section, therefore 
voiding it  and necessitating a change of the section by the legislature through new or 
additional legislation. It can also review parts of the norm, for example declare only 
“deception of the nature of the sexual act” as unconstitutional, whilst leaving deceit by identity 
and purpose intact. This is called a partial unconstitutionality ruling. 
The application of the above example to both concrete and abstract judicial review illustrate 
conditions which have to be present in a legal system allowing for judicial review of primary 
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3 The courts can always refer to the highest court directly if they feel it is necessary but it remains the 
choice of the individual judge
4 The UK does not have a constitutional court or judicial review of primary legislation and therefore this 
is only a hypothetical possibility
5 In most countries this is not possible at all but, rather, in many countries abstract norm review is 
limited to officials. However, for the purpose of explaining the difference between abstract and concrete 
judicial review this simplification seems excusable as countries such as Hungary do allow for abstract 
review initiated by individuals. 
legislation, may this review be either abstract or concrete in nature. Supremacy of parliament, 
one of the founding stones of the British constitution, clearly does not allow for judicial 
review of norms directly created by the legislature in a constitutional way. Especially the 
concept of abstract norm review contains the idea that the constitution is sovereign, not  the 
legislature. As a result it  is almost exclusively found in civil law systems with codified 
constitutions. In abstract judicial review, the court is equal to the political branches. 
1.1 Constitutional Courts, Constitutions and abstract judicial review
Therefore, abstract judicial review is an important power for a court to hold within the 
political system. It involves the courts closely with law-making (Shapiro, 2002:185). To look 
at it from a political perspective allows us to see that abstract norm review permits an 
unelected body, a court, to decide if a law, passed by the elected, political body, can stand 
unchallenged and be applied within the state. Furthermore, the court  can make this decision 
before the law is legally  binding or even after – depending on the court model. In this 
function, the court is an important part of the separation of powers model embedded in most 
codified constitutions in liberal democracies in Europe. The court ensures that  the elected 
body adheres to the fundamental rules of the state. Within the perceptions and common 
representations of academic legal scholarship these rules are presented as forming the borders 
of power the public body legitimately holds and the court’s duty and obligation to act as a 
safeguard and to ensure that the public body remains within these borders – that all the norms 
passed by  the public body are intra vires, when passing a decision. The court ensures that the 
use and extent of power by a public body is legitimately within its power to pass (Barnett, 
1999:736).
However, only certain courts have this power of abstract judicial review. The courts in most 
legal systems were created with distinct and differing specialisations. Different species of 
norms are applied by different courts. So for example a court specialising in tax or business 
law decides on different norms than a court specialising in family  law. Trade law is applied in 
Trade courts, such as the Dutch Trade Tribunal. Criminal law in Spain finds its final 
interpretation in the criminal chamber of the Supreme Court. Britain adjudicates employment 
matters in an employment tribunal. Constitutional law is generally  applied in a specialised 
constitutional court, such as the constitutional courts of Italy, Germany, Austria, Spain, Greece 
or Portugal. These constitutional courts make a decision not only as to which legal rules are 
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compatible with the constitution, but also decide applicability between conflicting norms. The 
way the court system has divided the court areas is very much system-specific even if there are 
common traits between individual countries. 
Norm review of legislation therefore takes place at a court specialising in constitutional 
matters. This court weighs whether a norm, passed by a public body, can legally  be applied by 
other courts within the same system. In essence, the constitutional court judges if it was in the 
power of the public body to pass this norm and if the norm was passed in accordance to 
previously  passed norms. If it is not, then the court has to decide which norm is more 
important and therefore if the norm under consideration is unconstitutional.  To do this the 
court requires a guideline what the powers of the public bodies are, and which norms 
supersede other norms. This guideline can be found in the constitution, a set of rules which 
supersedes all other rules (Jacque, 2000:56). This concept forms a distinct difference between 
most common and civil law countries. Civil law countries, based on the philosophical tenets of 
Roman and Napoleonic law, consider legislation as a hierarchy based on natural laws. In this 
view, natural law theory posits the existence of laws which are set by nature. With other 
words, there are laws within nature, which can be discovered, and are therefore valid 
everywhere and to everyone. These laws are above all other laws and any  legislation has to fit 
into the borders these natural rules create. 
The assumption that there are self-evident laws in nature, which simply have to be discovered, 
gives a justification to a hierarchy of laws. From a philosophical point of view the concept of 
inalienable, natural laws embedded in our mere humanity, has been discussed throughout the 
centuries. Aristotle bases them on the idea of natural justice whilst more recent thinkers, such 
as Hegel, root them in their basic “person-ness”. Historically, the idea of natural law and rights 
finds its expression in a wide range of system and occurrences. When the Romans and later, in 
the 18th and 19th century, other European rulers codified laws into constitutions, they used the 
argument of natural laws and rights. The first successful attempt, and the one still forming the 
basis of most legal systems in Europe, was the Napoleonic Code of 1804. In Civil Law 
countries, the constitutions are the highest level of laws. Any rule passed has to conform with 
the rules contained in the constitution. If the rule does not conform to the constitution then it 
was obviously passed without a public body having the right to pass it, as nothing can be 
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passed to counter the rules contained in the constitution6. It therefore was ultra vires, outside 
of the power of the public body to pass the law. If it  is ultra vires then it can be declared as 
either wholly or partially unconstitutional by the constitutional court under abstract norm 
review. 
One of the most significant and extensive impacts on constitutions in the last 50 years has 
been membership  of the European Union. Scholars have recognised that EC/EU law 
influences national jurisprudence (Craig 2003). Interaction with the European Court of Justice 
changed concrete judicial review and the jurisdictions of national courts (Alter 2001). 
However, the assumption has been, as yet, that  there is no effect on abstract judicial review 
(G1,2,3,5; A 1,2,5,6; I1,2,6,7). This thesis shows that this assumption is not warranted.   
2. Outline of the thesis 
The decision-making patterns in abstract norm review have changed in Austria, as well as Italy 
and Germany. In all three countries the number of laws being declared at least partially 
unconstitutional has increased from approximately 30% to 70%. Chapter I will describe this 
development over the last three decades in detail. Chapter II and III set out the possible 
explanations for the change in decision-making patterns as found in the literature. The 
literature is very  heterogenous and distinctly  split between legal and non-legal scholars. A 
distinction can be drawn when concentrating on the perception of what law is. Legal scholars 
see the law as a closed system, where legal rules exist as they are written down on paper, and 
can be used without true interpretation, Black letter law. Black letter law is the idea that a 
decision can be made only based on the words as they are written in the text of the law. It 
assumes that a judge can come to one true decision if he takes the definitions of each word and 
distills the meaning of the law through this. The only  other aspects with possibility of affecting 
the decision, which exist within this closed system, are precedent and considerations of the 
intent of the law-makers. Black Letter Scholars recognise that, if a law can be defined through 
its letters only, then past decisions have to have meaning, as there is no need to go through the 
same process repeatedly. The necessity to give interpretative value to the intent of the law-
maker is, in this view, just as obvious. The legislature has made the law. Therefore their 
definition of a term has to hold over other definitions, as it was this definition which decided 
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6 I am ignoring the possibility of constitutional amendments here in order to simplify the argument for 
intra vires and ultra vires interpretations. 
the law. So if there ever were any  doubt about the definition of a word used in a law then, and 
only then, considerations of the intentions of the law-maker when making the law can come 
into play. Therefore, when a judge makes a decision, in this view of the law, he enters this 
closed system and acts within it. He makes use of the words as they are written in the 
legislation, possibly precedent and considerations of the intent of the law-maker, to decide a 
case. No outside influences come to weigh on the decision. Political Science, Economics and 
Sociology  scholars describe the law as an open system. They  do not deny  that the text of the 
law, precedent and intent are determining factors but they argue that many other outside 
influences are just as influential. Many scholars argue that judges’ political and professional 
allegiances, pressure by political institutions and power considerations, judgement of the 
viability of the decision, public approval and international considerations all might play a role 
in the decision-making process of the judge.
From these variables identified by the literature it is then possible to crystallise out the most 
probable hypothesis based on court design and the structure of the judicial and political 
systems. This hypothesis can be summarised as follows: European Union membership has 
necessitated an increased levels of academics on the bench of constitutional courts and 
changed, partially  through this alteration in membership  patterns, the style in which courts 
interpret law. It has also changed the way political elites treat the courts. Through lack of 
transparency in a political system in which supranational sources of legislation have to be 
harmonised with national ones, in which new laws now have to be developed, it  has become 
more likely for a new law to be ultra vires and therefore be unconstitutional. This introduces 
the temptation to pass laws which are less well prepared and more in line with what the 
executive wishes to achieve in the hope that it will not be noticed, nor challenged before the 
court. The court reacts in two ways to the problem of a) increased levels of insecurity in the 
legal system and b) higher willingness of political bodies to pass unclear laws by making 
clearer decisions, explaining the increased levels of unconstitutionality rulings. The court also 
employs a more interpretative style in its decisions exemplify clearly teleological reasonings. 
Chapter IV then presents a first exploration of the data which lend credibility to the suggested 
hypothesis. There is no clear single area of law relating to the higher levels of review. Rather 
the change in levels of review is evenly  distributed across all categories. On the other hand, 
statistics on style of decisions, sources of law (national or international) and membership  show 
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a parallel change to the altered decision-making patterns of constitutional courts. However, it 
is not able to exclude without doubt the possible influence of the other variables, such as 
public trust levels and pressure by political institutions. It therefore is still necessary to test 
each variable separately, to ascertain not only the explanatory power of the hypothesis, but 
also the other two variables of public trust and political influence. Public trust, as shown in the 
literature review, has mainly been a normative approach whilst  testing the influence of 
political attitudes and institutions is a common feature of the study of courts. The next  Chapter 
(V) establishes a more detailed image of the influence of Black letter law, and style. This 
chapter supports the findings in Chapter IV regarding the change in style observed in the first 
exploration of the data, and tries to develop possible explanations. Whilst Chapter V therefore 
identifies a change in the style decisions are written in, it also fails to connect the changed 
pattern of decision making with the change in style as a potential cause. They develop 
alongside each other.  
Chapters VI,VII,VIII and IX will then examine the other possible explanations identified by 
the literature, namely political attitudes of judges, influence of political institutions, changes in 
popular opinion or Europeanisation of legal provisions, in more detail. Chapter VI tests the 
influence of attitudes of judges on the decision-making patterns of all three courts. 
Traditionally, attitudes have been measured through party affiliation of judges and their voting 
patterns. In Europe, most appointment procedures to constitutional courts have made it 
impossible for one single political party to dominate the court with its appointments. 
Therefore, an analysis of the courts in order of party affiliation is fruitless. Furthermore, as 
voting records in Europe are secret, it  is impossible to analyse the courts based on voting 
records, as has been performed frequently in the American literature. Other analytical methods 
are possible, however. Indications that professional background, for example the number of 
academics in comparison to professional judges, affect the style and levels of interpretation 
have been identified in Chapter IV and V. Other potential background “attitudes” are 
imaginable: regional loyalties, academic loyalties as well as political loyalties.The following 
hypotheses are therefore tested in Chapter VI:
1. Higher levels of academics change the decision-making patterns of a constitutional court
2. Concentration of regional loyalties on the same court affect  the decision-making patterns of 
the court
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3. Concentration of party  loyalties on the bench affect the decision-making patterns of the 
court
4. Concentration of philosophical stances, expressed through academic loyalties, on the bench 
affects the decision-making patterns of the court. 
None of these hypotheses hold. Quantitative analysis shows that there is no statistical 
correlation between any of the sub-variables and the change in the decision-making patterns. 
Therefore the most likely  variable according to predominance in the literature, and the one 
with the most power to undermine the hypothesis of this thesis has proven to lack explanatory 
power in respect to the change in decision-making pattern. 
With the most likely explanation dismissed, and the assurance that the decision-making 
patterns are not due to a radical development in only one area of law, but are universal 
(Chapter IV), it  is now possible to test the hypothesis of this thesis in Chapters VII, VIII, IX 
directly: Harmonisation of EU law with national law has increased the likelihood of politicians 
using courts for political means and has decreased the quality of legislation being passed. This 
leads to the court being more decisive and definite in its decisions, causing them to increase 
levels of unconstitutionality rulings. This hypothesis can be broken into three main parts:
1. Influence of the ruling elite on the courts in respect to decisions
2. Viability of the court in the face of opposition
3. Influence of the “European” on the courts in respect to format of decisions rendered 
Chapter VI ascertains the link between politicians and the courts by  testing for the likelihood 
of the government seeing its laws overturned and what form these decisions take. The analysis 
emphasises that the courts are today  more likely  to rule a law unconstitutional in Germany  and 
Italy, non-regarding the origin of the law or the challenge to the law. In Austria, on the other 
hand, the current government is less likely to have its laws overturned and if the law sees 
review, the current government is more likely  to face only partial unconstitutionality  rulings. 
Chapter VII tries to explain this difference in behaviour with the use of popular 
constitutionalism. The theory developed in the literature argues that the ability of a court to 
oppose the ruling elite is linked intimately with the level of public trust the court enjoys. It is 
shown here that in Austria the level of trust in the court is decreasing, whilst it is increasing in 
Germany and Italy. It is therefore argued that the increase of unconstitutionality rulings, in 
relation to partial unconstitutionality rulings, is due to the higher level of independence of the 
court in both Germany and Italy. The Austrian court lacks this development, as it did not enjoy 
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the same levels of increased trust over the last  three decades. Chapter VIII then tests the 
influence of the “European” on the decision-making pattern of the court. It  finds that those a 
link to the “European” can be statistically correlated with a higher probability  of a law seeing 
review and even this decision to be rendered as a definite unconstitutionality  ruling, and not a 
partial ruling.
In the end, the argument of this thesis can be summarised as follows: the harmonisation of 
national with EU law has had two main consequences for abstract  review: 1) it has made it 
harder for political institutions to pass constitutional legislation and 2) it has made it easier for 
politicians to transfer vote-costing decisions to the courts. The result is a changed decision-
making pattern of courts. On the one hand more laws see review because these legislations are 
less well designed and on the other hand the court tries to clarify legal rules by increasing 
unconstitutionality rulings vis-a-vis partial unconstitutionality rulings. This decision-making 
pattern clarifies the rules under which new legislation is decided upon as well as sending a 
signal to the political institutions that the courts are unwilling to be forced to make political 
decisions.  
Traditionally, the literature on courts has been open to quantitative and qualitative methods but 
rarely to a combination thereof. Moreover, the literature is firmly  split into political science 
and economics, where quantitative analysis of the voting behaviour of judges is relatively 
common place, and law, where only  recently  empirical methods such as interviews and 
content analysis have been chosen as tools for analysis. This strict separation of methods is 
logical when considering only one possible influence on the decision-making process of the 
court. However, in a comprehensive empirical study such as presented in this thesis a more 
varied approach has to be taken. As a result, a combination of interviews, content analysis and 
statistical analysis, namely correlation analysis, is being employed. All three are logical 
choices for this form of analysis. The mixed methods data, and high levels of nominal data 
combined with interval or ordinal data, requires forms of quantitative analysis minimising the 
difficulties inherent in nominal/ordinal data. Regression analysis therefore is less useful than 
Cramer’s V, Phi or Spearman Rho correlations. Combining these with content analysis and 
interviews circumvents the common problem with quantitative analysis of superficiality and 
possible ignorance of missing variables. The weakness of qualitative content analysis, the 
selectivity of preserved and archived data, does not apply  to court documents as for the time 
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period they are complete. As they are formal and only concentrated with each single case, 
interviews aid in clarifying the larger image and adding a less formal aspect. A detailed 
analysis of the methods and the reason for the choice can be found in Chapter III. 
3. Originality and contribution to the literature
The originality of the thesis is therefore two-fold: in its contribution to the socio-political 
literature and in its contribution to the methodological considerations in the study of courts. 
The Socio-Political literature is wide ranging but also very diverse and specialised regarding 
variables and methods. Little interaction between the fields of study is apparent. Moreover, 
this extreme level of specialisation within the literature also leads to an over-emphasis of 
certain influences, systemic factors and variables in the literature, whilst others are very  rarely 
considered, analysed and discussed. This thesis examines five possible factors within three 
separate systems. Possibly the most significant contribution this thesis presents to the socio-
legal field is its concentration on abstract judicial review. A standard search of a bibliographic 
database such as IBSS, Web of Knowledge or even Google Scholar results in one single article 
on the topic of abstract judicial review from 1998 (Vanberg 1998). In comparison, this a 
search for the more commonly used concrete judicial review returns 474,000 articles. 
3.1 Socio-Political field
Abstract judicial review has been considered either as a negligible power of courts (Stone 
Sweet 2000:64) or as only theoretically  approachable due to scarcity of data. Certain recent 
developments allow for a better and more extensive research of courts - namely the 
publication of all cases online. This makes it possible to research abstract review over large 
time periods and increases the accessible data. It is irrefutable that in many countries abstract 
judicial review is negligible in numbers, but the severity  of the discrepancy in the literature 
might be slightly skewed by the fact that the study of constitutional courts has for a long time 
concentrated on only a small number of courts, among which only Germany had the power of 
abstract judicial review. In Germany abstract judicial review levels are below 5% of the total 
of cases. However, in many other countries, such as for example Italy, the level lies at around 
20%. Even though, the importance of abstract judicial review does not lie in the number of 
cases, or its percentage of the total jurisprudence of the courts, but rather of the types of cases 
reaching the courts under it. In abstract judicial review the court does not decide on the 
application of a law but on the constitutionality of the law itself. As such it is not only the last 
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port of call for oppositions to hinder the promulgation of legislation but it is also the area of 
highest tension between the courts and the political institutions. Across Europe cases relating 
to abortion, euthanasia, special powers of the police such as terrorist laws, church state 
relations, and equal rights find their last challenge under abstract  judicial review alongside 
every  budget and major taxation legislation. So abstract judicial review might be negligible in 
numbers in some countries but its de facto importance lies in the types of cases and conflicts 
in which it is invoked. The scarcity  of literature on the topic seems therefore not only 
surprising but intriguing in its absence. This thesis begins to remedy the scarcity of analysis on 
abstract review by presenting an overall image spanning three decades. 
Furthermore, because analyses of the decision-making processes of courts have been highly 
concentrated on proving the importance of one factor over the other, much possible influence 
by other environmental factors have been neglected. This is especially  true as over 90% of the 
literature on courts has as its research subject the US Supreme Court. Many typically 
European systemic influences are therefore underrepresented or entirely  absent in research 
designs. This thesis further adds to the literature by  considering European courts within their 
systemic surrounding and evaluating the applicability of variables derived from the US 
literature within a European context. This also relates to the influence of EU membership on 
courts. There is a wide and diverse literature on the interaction between national courts and 
their interaction with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as well as on the influence the 
European Court of Justice has on integration (Alter 2001; de Burca 2001, Wincott 2000). 
There is little literature on the influence European Union membership  has on the jurisprudence 
of the courts overall when they do not choose to involve the ECJ. 
The academic scholars considering courts tends to be highly disparate and segregated. There is 
a wide range of research concentrating on the use individual plaintiffs make of International 
and European, as well as national, courts to further their individual goals and how courts make 
use of these cases to increase their own power in respect to political actors (Ward 2007; de 
Burca 1998; Kilpatrick 1998). It has also been researched how principles developed by  the 
ECJ have an impact on national jurisdictions as well as how these principles were developed 
on the European level (Wincott 1999; Slaughter 1998; Tallberg 2000). What has not been 
researched is the way in which national court have reacted within their own jurisprudence. 
Moreover, the impact EU membership has on the actual decision-making process has not been 
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studied either empirically or theoretically in respect to national constitutional courts. This 
thesis provides an insight in these changes.  
3.2 Methodological contributions to the literature
Concerning the methodological considerations the originality  of the thesis lies especially  in its 
mixed methods approach to the study of courts. Quantitative analysis of courts is not unknown 
or uncommon. Most of the literature on the influence political attitudes of judges on their 
voting behaviour is based on quantitative analysis of the votes cast (Segal and Speath 1995, 
2002). Other forms of quantitative analysis, in respect to origin of plaintiff, amicus briefs and 
time periods are also common. All of these are however based on the US Supreme Court. In 
Europe, quantitative analysis is exclusively concentrated on the political side of the 
interactions between courts and political institutions. Collective bargaining and decision 
strategies by political actors trying to avoid the court have been analysed quantitatively  in 
Germany (Vanberg 1998, Vorlaender 2006). However, a comprehensive statistical analysis of 
the abstract judicial review cases does not exist in either Italy, Germany or Austria. Most 
importantly, there is no analysis combining statistical analysis with a thorough textual analysis 
of the cases or interviews. Ordinarily, statistical analysis methods have been chosen to present 
an overall picture of large numbers of cases. Clearly  in these instances content analysis of the 
texts was inefficient. Whereas the relatively small number of cases in abstract judicial review 
(below 2000) does allow for this. As such this thesis can present the first overall image of 
abstract judicial review in Germany, Austria and Italy, and is able to do this without having to 
resort to a sample or exclusively analysing the cases quantitatively.
Moreover, the interviews and content analysis in this thesis extended to considerations of the 
media in form of media reports but also interviews with the media representatives of the courts 
and their view of their role. This was supplemented with taking account of the impression the 
judges, civil servants and politicians have of the role of the media and the media 
representative. Increasingly, the literature has commented on the influence media and public 
image creation have on courts (Kramer 2007) but there has been no empirical data for this 
aspect. No other study  to this date has included views and concerns regarding the media 
representative, the active creation of a public image of the court by the court and the 
interaction between judges and the media. 
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CHAPTER I
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ABSTRACT NORM REVIEW 
IN EUROPE
The purpose of this first  chapter is to present a detailed overview of the development of 
abstract judicial review in Europe. The number of abstract judicial review cases has doubled 
over the last three decades in most European countries. More importantly, the number of times 
a law has been declared unconstitutional have surged. This increase is of historical, 
philosophical and political importance and has, as yet, remained unexplained. The research 
undergone in this thesis offers some possible explanations for the increase in levels of 
unconstitutionality rulings in abstract judicial review proceedings. The exact definition of 
abstract judicial review is dependent on the national context of the constitutional court 
undertaking the proceedings and it therefore needs to be ascertained if these differing legal 
concepts are comparable.  
1.1 The process of abstract judicial review - a definition spanning the different jurisdictions in 
Europe
The purpose of this section is to give a historical as well as philosophical understanding of the 
status of abstract judicial review in Europe before presenting the statistical evidence for a 
change in the position of abstract review in the political system. A theoretical definition of the 
term has already  been presented in the Introduction. However, it remains a necessity  to apply 
the definition to the different jurisdiction and ascertain the comparability. Judicial review is 
the “judicial oversight over the validity of norms” (Creifelds and Meyer-Grossner 1990:801). 
Each court, regional or national, has the duty and power to oversee the legality of norms, as 
long as the norm in question is not the providence of a specific court, for example a tax court. 
This is especially the case in countries with a constitutional court where all cases of 
constitutional validity have to be ultimately decided. The majority  of norms will be dealt with 
by the constitutional court, as the constitutional courts specifically  decide on the compatibility 
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of legal norms with previously passed norms (Jackson and Tate 1992:6). The term abstract 
norm review applies when the court considers a law for its unconstitutionality  without a 
concrete case to base it on. Abstract norm review is always undertaken by  the national 
constitutional court. Over the last three decades constitutional courts have increased the 
number of laws they find unconstitutional (Vanberg 1998). In this chapter the significance and 
the possible consequences of this change in court behaviour will be discussed. 
Abstract judicial review is a characteristic of courts originally  only  found in Europe7. As a 
reaction of the political misuse of courts before the Second World War, constitutional courts 
were endowed with the power to review laws passed by the legislators in the absence of an 
actual case or controversy (Jackson and Tate 1992:7). When this is the case then the court is 
engaging in abstract judicial review. The exact form this review takes differs slightly from 
country  to country (See Appendix 7 for the exact legal provisions governing abstract review). 
In some countries, such as France, abstract judicial review can only  be undertaken by the court 
in a set  period prior to promulgation, a priori (Hirschl 2008:130). In other countries, which 
includes the majority of European states, such as for example Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and Portugal, the constitutional courts review laws at any time after promulgation (Koopmans 
2003). 
The difference in provisions of abstract review across Europe lies in differing philosophical 
views of courts and their position in society  as will be discussed below in relation to the 
importance of abstract review. A comprehensive definition of abstract norm control has to be 
wide enough in its scope to allow for national differences without loosing coherence and 
meaning. Vanberg defines it as the power which “allows certain constitutionally  identified 
actors to initiate judicial review against legislation in the absence of any concrete 
case…”(Vanberg 1998:300). It therefore is the power of the court to judge if a body was 
within its constitutionally given right when it  passed a law. Or, with other words, if a body 
violated the boundaries set by  the constitution when passing a law or regulation. The court 
therefore has to decide if the law is unconstitutional. Cases under abstract judicial review all 
necessarily represent a conflict between political organs, the constitutionally appointed bodies 
who initiate judicial review, as all countries discussed in this thesis, limit the ability  to 
approach the court under abstract review to political institutions. 
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7 For a selection of the legal provisions for abstract norm review in Europe see Appendix 7
In all European countries abstract norm control can be initiated by  the cabinet and the head of 
state such is the case in France. Additionally, most other European countries, for example 
Italy, Spain, Greece and Lithuania, allow parliament and regional units to initiate abstract 
norm review as well. In the minority of countries, groups of parliamentarians, in the case of 
Austria and Germany, and single citizens, in the case of Hungary, also share into the process 
of initiating abstract judicial review (Table 1). The variation in the constitutionally  appointed 
bodies with the power to initiate abstract  review has its roots in the historical and 
philosophical development of abstract review in Europe. An understanding of this 
development also highlights the importance of abstract review for the political process in 
European nations. 
Country Who can initiate abstract 
review?
Can initiate before or after 
promulgation
Austria
Bulgaria
Czech 
Republic
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Federal Government
Federal Parliament
1/3 of Federal Parliament
1/3 of State Parliament
A priori/ a posteriori
President
Government
1/5 of parliament 
A priori/a posterior
President
41 Deputies
10 Senators
A priori/a posterior
President
Prime Minister
President of the Assembly
President of the Senate
60 Members of the Senate
60 Members of the Assembly
A priori
Federal Government
State Government
1/3 of Parliament
1/3 of state Parliaments
A priori/ A posteriori
Anyone including the court A priori/a posterior
President
Government
State parliaments
A priori/a posterior
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Country Who can initiate abstract 
review?
Can initiate before or after 
promulgation
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
President 
Prime Minister
Marshalls
50 Deputies
30 Senators
Local governments
Trade unions
Employersʼ organisations
Occupational organisations
Churches
Religious organisations
Certain lower courts
A priori/a posterior
President
Prime Minister
President of the Assembly
1/10 of national parliament
Presidents of regional 
governments
Presidents of regional 
Assemblies
1/10 of regional assemblies 
A priori/a posterior
President
President of the Assembly 
and the Senate
50 deputies
25 Senators
A priori
President
President of the Duma
1/5 of the federal council
1/5 of the Duma
The court
A priori/a posterior
President
Government
1/5 of deputies
A priori/a posterior
Governments
Local Governments
1/3 of national Parliament
A priori/a posterior
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Country Who can initiate abstract 
review?
Can initiate before or after 
promulgation
Spain President
Government
President of Parliament
50 deputies
50 senators
Local government
Local Assemblies
Defender of the People
A priori/a posterior
Table 1: Table of abstract judicial review proceedings in Europe 
(Disputados 2003; Network 2009; Republica 2008)
A comprehensive definition of the process of abstract judicial review therefore can be 
expressed as follows: abstract judicial review is the power of a court of a country  to examine 
the actions of the legislative and executive bodies of government and to determine if these 
actions are in accordance with the country’s constitution before or after promulgation. These 
actions are examined in the form they take on paper, not in their application to single cases, as 
would be the case with concrete judicial review. Actions judged inconsistent with the 
constitutions are declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. Initiation of abstract 
judicial review proceedings is the right and duty of national political entities. It is therefore an 
integral part of the checks and balances between the political entities of a nations political 
establishment.  
1.2 Development of abstract judicial review 1980-2009
Originally, norm review was considered as a negligible influence on legal norm creation – 
even if today  at least one third of norms see some form of review (Stone Sweet, 2000:64). 
This is because abstract judicial review only composes between 3% (Germany) to 17% (Italy) 
of the court’s jurisdiction. However, under abstract review the most controversial laws are 
being challenged. It is a part of the political process, as only political institutions, 
parliamentarians or heads of state can initiate proceedings. As a result everything from 
abortion, religions in schools and budgets reaches the court through abstract review. Over the 
last three decades three developments in abstract norm review can be observed across Europe:
1. The number of abstract judicial review proceedings have increased by up to 50%
2. The number of laws seeing review has increased by up to 50%
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3. The number of norms being declared void has increased by up to 50%
1.2.1 The development of the number of abstract judicial review proceedings 
It has been noted widely that the number of concrete judicial review has increased all over the 
world (Jackson and Tate 1992; Neal Tate and Vallinder 1995; Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2003). 
This observation also applies to abstract review, even if the development is less uniform across 
the nations of Europe in respect to abstract review proceedings. Whilst the number of concrete 
review cases reaching the courts has increased by 50-200%, the number of abstract review 
proceedings has doubled in the same time period as well. Two trends can be observed across 
the European continent. The former Eastern states initially  saw a high number of abstract 
judicial review cases per year in the early 1990s, just after the formation of these new courts. 
The numbers of abstract judicial review proceedings in this time was higher in the new courts 
than at the courts in the western states. The late 1990s saw a decrease of abstract judicial 
review proceedings in the eastern part of Europe. The cases fell to a level below that  of the 
older courts. Since 2000 the number of cases per year has again steadily increased, but never 
exceeded the levels observed in the older courts. This is partially due to the latter having faced 
a steady increase of abstract  judicial review proceedings spanning the last thirty years, rather 
than the up and down registered by the newer courts (see Table 2). 
 
Country
Development of abstract judicial review proceedings
1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2009
Austria
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Poland
Portugal
Romania
+ - +
N/A - +
N/A - +
+ + +
+ + +
N/A + -
+ + +
N/A - +
+ + +
N/A - +
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Country
Development of abstract judicial review proceedings
1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2009
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
N/A = +
N/A - +
N/A - +
+ + +
Table 2: Development of abstract judicial review proceedings 1980-2009 (Network 2009)
There are various possible explanations for the initially high number of cases of abstract 
judicial review in the Eastern European States. It has been theorised that there are three 
possible reasons for the differing development in Eastern and Western Europe:
1. Laws decided under the previous regime
Due to the circumstances surrounding the court’s creation following a regime change, many 
previously  enacted laws were open to challenge. Moreover, many of the newly passed laws 
were promulgated in an atmosphere of change and by legislators without experience. As a 
result the scope for revision under abstract judicial review is higher. With this theory the 
decreasing numbers of abstract judicial review proceedings in the late 1990s are accounted for. 
Legislators have become more versed in passing laws, and the backlog of old laws has been 
dealt with. This explanation fails, however, to account for the rising numbers of abstract 
judicial review proceedings in Western Europe (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Abstract Judicial review in Italy, Germany and Austria. Trend-lines 
(Regression lines) indicate development over time assuming linear growth (Formula 
contained in Appendix)
2. Adjustment period to the new constitutional situation - the European Union
This is an argument that has been raised especially in relation to Hungary. Here the court itself 
argued that in face of the desired EU membership certain laws and regulations have to be 
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declared unconstitutional as they  contravene EU law, even if they are not against the national 
constitution (Solyom 2003:145). Evidence for this has been found in the theories relating to 
other courts. However, it falls short from explaining the increased levels of abstract judicial 
review proceedings in the Western European states.
3. Legitimacy perception of the courts
It has also been noted that all over Europe the trust in governmental institutions is decreasing 
whilst, at the same time, the trust in the constitutional courts is unwavering8 (Bumin 2007). In 
this theory, the public see the court’s duty in the preservation of democracy and safeguarding 
the core values. The court’s share this view of their own position within the political system. 
As a result courts in the Eastern states take a more active role and are more willing to engage 
in abstract judicial review. This indicates that the increased levels of abstract  review 
proceedings are based on a differing perception of the role of the judge. The argument can be 
made that the perceptions of the court as the ultimate guardian started in the Eastern European 
countries and then spread. If this change in perception took root all over Europe then the 
increase in abstract judicial review proceedings might be explainable Europe-wide. 
As seen from Figure 1, the Italian and German constitutional court have seen a steady  increase 
of cases over the last 30 years. The Austrian court also registers a rise in cases of abstract 
judicial review - but the trend is mainly accounted for by the increasing trend displayed in the 
last ten years. Before that the court’s numbers varied commonly only between zero and three 
cases a year, whilst the last ten years see this number increase to levels between 2 and 29 cases 
annually. Accordingly, the numbers of cases reaching the court in the three countries differ 
extensively. Germany only saw 60 cases within the last  30 years, Austria 112 and Italy 1965. 
The difference between the countries is deceptive, however. In the German and Austrian case, 
the constitutional courts will subsume various cases on the same norm under one decision. 
This makes comparison difficult and requires the separation of cases contained within 
decisions. Only separation will allow for the analysis of abstract review across countries in 
this thesis. The Austrian court saw 173 separate cases reaching the court, leading to the 112 
decisions, within the time period between 1979 - 2008. The German court’s abstract review 
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8 Constitutional courts are often seen as more trustworthy than political institutions, as the population 
perceives them as less influenced by politics. The little information the general public has on the 
workings of constitutional courts might help this perception and preserve the mysticism of independent 
courts. 
cases number 134 if counted separately. This remains to be a large difference to the 1965 cases 
reported by the Italian court. However, it also needs to be considered that the Italian court sees 
a huge number of inadmissible cases and therefore the political culture in Italy  might be more 
confrontational. It might therefore be argued that challenging a law in front of the 
constitutional court is a more common tool used by actors in the Italian political arena. 
Although Figure 1 shows that the increasing trend of abstract judicial review cases holds true 
in Austria and Germany when accounting for the combined cases as well. If the comparatively 
high number of cases in Italy  can been attributed to Italian political institutions being more 
combative in nature (Merryman 1965; Volcansek 2000), then the increase in abstract judicial 
review proceedings in Austria and Germany might hint at  a change in the political culture 
here. In this case the political culture on Austria and Germany would seem to become more 
confrontational accounting for the increase in abstract judicial review cases. 
1.2.2 Developments in the decisions patterns in abstract norm review
The increased numbers of abstract review proceedings across Europe are not  the only change 
in abstract  review patterns observable. Today almost two thirds of abstract  review proceedings 
result in the review of a law, this is an increase from between 20 to 50% all across Europe. 
This development is not limited to Eastern Europe alone but is observable across the whole of 
the continent. In 2005 the Austrian president of the court reported in an interview with the 
newspaper “Der Standard” that the level of unconstitutionality and partial unconstitutionality 
rulings has reached two thirds of all laws (Standard 2005). This is considerably  more than the 
one fifth of laws seeing review which was reported in the 1980s (Stone 1992). Table 3 displays 
the development of abstract judicial review cases, partial and unconstitutional rulings, in 
Austria, Italy and Germany. Clearly  an increased number of laws see review today in 
comparison to the early 1980s. 
1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010
Italy
Austria
Germany
25% 35% 45%
27% 52% 42%
53% 60% 75%
Table 3: Development of percentage of laws reviewed in abstract norm control across the 
time period 1980-2010 
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However, these are not the only  countries displaying a trend towards an increase in levels of 
review brought under abstract norm control proceedings. Figure 2 shows the development in 
Poland, but the same can be observed in Spain and Portugal as well as Latvia and Lithuania. 
This illustrates that a change in the levels of abstract judicial review proceedings reaching 
courts across Europe and the outcome of these proceedings has occurred. Almost two thirds of 
laws reaching the courts see review, either being declared unconstitutional or at  least partially 
unconstitutional. 
Figure 2: Development of review in Poland
1.2.3 There is an increase in norms being declared unconstitutional
Additionally, the pattern of review has altered all over Europe. It  has been widely noted, in 
relation to constitutional courts in general, and the German and Austrian court in particular, 
that the courts are more likely to render partial unconstitutionality  rulings rather than clear 
constitutional or unconstitutionality declarations (Kommers 1997; Landfried 1984, 1988, 
1992). In essence, the theory behind this argument is that the court is unwilling to anger the 
current, or possible future ruling elite, and therefore is more likely  to pass a judgment which 
will leave both sides equally the winner or looser. This is exceptionally important in abstract 
review whereby the simple rules of access determine that the only participating parties are 
political institutions. Therefore, to ensure future viability  of its decisions, the courts are 
expected to render more partial constitutionality rulings than either constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality rulings. Research all over Europe has shown this to be accurate for the 
period between the formation of the courts until the early  1980s (Becker 2000; Beyme 2003; 
Stone Sweet 2000). However, already throughout the 1990s, an increase in unconstitutionality 
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rulings has been marked across Europe (Beatty  2004; Neal Tate and Vallinder 1995; Rogowski 
and Gawron 2002). The courts seem to be more willing to rule a norm unconstitutional in its 
entirety. Fewer conciliatory  rulings, partial rulings, are passed in comparison to the decade 
previously  and more clear rulings, such as declaring a norm unconstitutional or constitutional 
entirely, are passed. 
Examples for this can be found in the distribution of rulings passed by the German court as 
seen in Figure 3 and 4 below.The first graph describes the development of abstract judicial 
review in Germany in terms of absolute numbers combined. The three next graphs, Figure 3 b, 
c and d, present a more detailed picture of the development of different formats of decisions. 
The increase of unconstitutionality rulings is clearly visible in Figure 3c). Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s 13 years register without any  unconstitutionality rulings and at no time does 
the number of unconstitutionality rulings rise above 2 cases per year. In the last decade, on the 
other hand, there are only  three years without any unconstitutionality rulings and each other 
year registers a number of cases between 3 and 8. The low number of cases of abstract judicial 
review in Germany  result in a single case affecting the graphs excessively much. However, as 
the graph denotes a development over thirty years a general increasing trend can be observed. 
In the period before 1980 only  around 16 cases were ruled unconstitutional (Stone 1992:231). 
Since then another 29 cases were ruled unconstitutional, 21 of these in the last ten years. This 
is also evidenced in Figure 3e), the distribution of decisions in percentage between 1980 to 
2008.  
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Figure 3a): Decision-making pattern of abstract judicial review in numbers
Figure 3b): Development of partial unconstitutionality rulings
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Figure 3c): Development of unconstitutionality rulings
Figure 3d): Development of constitutionality rulings
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Development of unconstitutionality rulings in Germany
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Figure 3e) Development if rulings in Germany in % over three decades
Figure 3: Distribution of rulings in Germany in numbers and  %
Figure 4: unconstitutionality rulings in Germany
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In the 1980s the number of partial rulings rendered lies only slightly below the value of the 
constitutional and unconstitutional rulings combined. In the 1990s the court rendered as many 
rulings of declaring a law constitutional as it rendered partial rulings and almost as many 
unconstitutionality rulings. Since the year 2000 the number of unconstitutionality rulings is 
more than twice that of constitutionality and five times that of partial rulings. It is therefore 
not only the case that the number of cases seeing review in Germany has increased from one 
third to two thirds over the last thirty years, but also within these cases seeing review, the 
number of clear unconstitutionality rulings has more than doubled when compared to partial 
rulings. 
The Italian case is even more interesting. In Italy, the image is similar in respect to 
unconstitutionality rulings, though partial rulings have also increased (Figure 5,6). Originally 
the Italian court was not designed to render any partial rulings at all, and until the 1970s it 
typically decided either unconstitutional or constitutional - with the vast majority (70%) being 
constitutional. The idea of a constitutional court being able to render partial rulings was 
inconceivable for the Italian legal elite, as they feared the power this would give the court. 
Nonetheless, Figure 5 shows a decrease of constitutionality rulings and an increase of both 
partial and complete unconstitutionality rulings. Again it is the percentage of laws being 
declared unconstitutional which is most interesting in relation to this inquiry. The development 
is best seen in Figure 5b) and Figure 6 which displays the percentage of laws seeing review, 
rather than the absolute number. The display by percentage is more reliable in this case due to 
the distortion the two outliers in 1988 and 2005 present on the absolute numbers of cases. The 
outlier off 2005 can be linked to the extensive reform of the Italian constitution between 2001 
and 2006. In this time period, the cases increased in number, for the reason that laws were 
taken to the court for clarification purposes. 1988 also saw a reform of the penal codes in Italy 
(Onida 2007). These reforms explain why  the numbers spike in 1988 and 2005 in all graphs. 
What they fail to explain is the general increasing trend of review shown in Figure 6. So Italy 
as well shows an increase of cases seeing review as well as an increase of unconstitutionality 
rulings.
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Figure 5a): Distribution of rulings in numbers across the three decades in Italy
Figure 5b): Distribution of rulings in percentage in Italy
Figure 5: Distributions of rulings in Italy
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Figure 6: Italy unconstitutionality rulings
The picture alters further when turning towards Austria. Here the number of cases being ruled 
unconstitutional is in actuality on the decrease (Figure 7, 8). The graph shows that whilst 
Austria had a relatively  high ratio of straight unconstitutionality rulings in the early  1980s the 
number is on the decrease since then. 
Figure 7: Distribution of rulings in Austria
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Figure 8: Development of rulings in Austria
From the above analysis three main trends become obvious:
1. The number of laws being challenged under abstract review is on the increase
2. The number of laws being ruled unconstitutional in some way is on the increase
3. Less laws which are ruled unconstitutional, and are declared to be only partially 
unconstitutional in Germany and Italy. 
Theories on early court behaviour can provide some explanation for the change in decision 
making patterns. Concerning Eastern Europe it has been argued that the increase in 
unconstitutionality rulings in countries with newly formed constitutional courts can be 
explained through the court’s need to establish itself in the political sphere before it can 
effectively rule laws unconstitutional without political opposition. This leads to courts slowly 
increasing their ratio of unconstitutionality rulings - however, this cannot apply to the German 
and Italian court, the oldest courts in Europe. The number of unconstitutionality rulings are 
increasing, as seen on the example of Germany and Italy, and no theory  can explain this 
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development sufficiently. Moreover, the ratio of laws in abstract norm control seeing any kind 
of review, partial or unconstitutional, is on the increase all across Europe. Combining these 
two premises leads to the assumption that the increase in review of laws has to be mainly 
based on increased levels of norms being declared unconstitutional as a whole rather than in 
part. It is therefore an expression of the courts rendering less conciliatory rulings, at least in 
Germany and Italy. In Austria on the other hand the court seems to render more partial rulings 
and we can therefore assume from these numbers that it has become less confrontational. 
Further research is necessary into the reasons for the changed behaviour of courts as expressed 
through the changes in rations of unconstitutionality and partial unconstitutionality  decisions. 
It therefore needs to be asked:
What causes the changes in the decision patterns of abstract judicial review proceedings?
A question this thesis is attempting to answer. 
Why would the answer to this question be of importance to social life? The importance of 
abstract judicial review is more political than judicial and this might explain why the legal 
scholarship  has not concerned itself extensively with these changes.  In pure numerical terms 
the percentage abstract review comprises of the jurisdiction of the courts is negligible. In 
many countries less than 5% of all cases reaching the courts are under abstract judicial review 
proceedings, the largest percentage of abstract review is Italy  with slightly  over 20% of cases. 
However, the importance of abstract judicial review for the theoretical and practical workings 
of the state cannot be underestimated.
1.3 Political importance of Abstract Judicial Review 
Throughout the 20th century, across Europe courts had been used by  governments to further 
their own policy goals. In Germany and Italy this was the case before the Second World War 
and in Eastern Europe after. When the political institutions were rebuilt after a regime change, 
the creators of the new political systems wanted to ensure that the judiciaries could not be used 
for political means. Abstract  judicial review was designed as an answer to this problem. The 
different approaches to abstract judicial review across Europe are based on the different 
approaches nations took to insulate the courts from political influences. Whereas the idea of 
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abstract judicial review as a power of a court is the natural continuation of the theoretical 
understandings undermining the perception of government in many  continental European 
states. 
Abstract judicial review embodies the idea of checks and balances in a democracy. A law 
passed by the legislative branches has to be weighed against a set of previously established 
conditions before it can be legal. The judges in turn are appointed by the legislative or 
executive powers but these do not retain power over them in their time in office. Certain 
philosophical ideas contain concepts contrary to the understanding of common law, as it exists 
in Great Britain, but which find their antecedents in Roman Law, underpin this relationship 
between political and legal institutions (Merryman 1965). For once it assumes the existence of 
a set of laws which are inviolable and given by nature. It assumes natural law - but not a 
human propensity  to act according to it. There is no understanding that  the human being when 
left alone would automatically follow and support natural law. Rather, natural law has to be 
enshrined into a codified document to which all other laws and regulations are subject: a 
constitution. In consequence, if certain laws stand above others then an independent body 
needs to be charged with the protection of these laws. This body is commonly  a constitutional 
court. To ensure the inviolability of the constitution, Constitutional courts differ from other 
courts in certain ways. They are independent and set apart from all other political and judicial 
institutions. There is no review of their decisions and no body is exempt from these decisions. 
When the first new European constitutions and the political systems where designed after the 
Second World War, the designers of these systems were aware of the dangers inherent in 
giving judges oversight over laws in an abstract way, as well as, applied to a concrete case 
(Murphy and Pritchett  1961). When constitutional courts make decisions they are final and 
binding to all. This ensures the unity  of the legal system – all laws apply to all in the same way 
in the same circumstances (Zoller, 1999:31). To make sure that newly passed laws fit into the 
previously  decided upon laws and do not upset the structure courts are often asked to consider 
laws before they have become legally binding or in their raw form instead of an application of 
a law (Haase, 1989:37). Judges decide if the law can be applied without danger to the system 
or if there needs to be changes to its text or content. In this, abstract norm review, a court can 
substitute its own interpretation of a law for that of the law-maker (Barnett, 2004:911) and can 
be seen as a political institution. So whilst a constitutional court has a position in the political 
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system of most western democracies - the exact definition and  legitimacy of this position is in 
philosophical trouble. If the court is a law-maker when dealing with abstract judicial review 
then it  is so without clear and direct democratic mandates. It therefore is very important to 
understand the mechanisms of abstract judicial review. 
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN
To find an explanation for the change in the decision-making pattern in abstract judicial norm 
control in Europe it is necessary to first explain why Germany, Austria and Italy are 
appropriate choices for a case selection. It is then necessary  to look at the five variables 
identified in the literature review (attitudes, political institutions, public opinion, legal factors 
and Europeanisation) and the methods they employ, and adapt, these methods to the European 
model of courts. 
2.1 Court models across the world
The format of constitutional courts differs in the countries of Europe in important ways, 
however these courts can also be grouped in “families” according to which similarities they 
display  (Shapiro, 2002:342). The different court models allow for differing judicial review 
procedures and only the European model is designed around the power of abstract judicial 
review. This is based on the historical development after the Second World War as abstract 
review was seen as a major safeguard against undemocratic rule. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union many former east block states chose the European court model due to the same 
reasons. Whereas court systems differ further in respect to the possibilities of individual 
complaint procedures, the training of personnel, access to the courts and constitutional 
jurisdiction. 
The courts following the example set  by the Austrian court and its main theoretical founder, 
Hans Kelsen, allow both abstract and concrete norm control to be undertaken in the same 
court. A rule can therefore be judged on its constitutionality before and after it has become 
legally  binding, with a concrete case or without. Any decision over the meaning and scope of a 
constitutional rule has to be taken at the constitutional court; any  high court has to refer any 
case questioning the coherence of the constitutional structure to the constitutional court 
(Koopamns, 2003:64). The French model officially only allows for a priori abstract norm 
review, a decision taken before the rule has become legally binding, and for a long time there 
has been a rivalry for competencies between the constitutional council and the administrative 
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high court of France. Whilst the constitutional council has found a way to include concrete 
rights review into its jurisdiction, the majority  of concrete judicial review occurs at the high 
court. Accordingly, cases of constitutional norm review cannot only be found in one court but 
in both (Jacque, 2000). The American model, on the other hand, only allows for concrete norm 
review, a review of norms where a rule is challenged through a concrete case in a lower court 
and referred to the Supreme Court. This system does not provide for a constitutional court  in 
its own right but gives the Supreme Court constitutional jurisdiction (Duxbury, 1995). It is 
therefore only  the Austro-German model which brings all norm review cases, abstract and 
concrete, together in the same court. 
The feature of the Austro-German model often researched and commented on is individual 
complaint. In an individual complaint any citizen who feels in some way disadvantaged by a 
rule can lodge a complaint with the constitutional court. The court then considers if the 
complaint has reason and needs to be judged upon. It differs from abstract review in so far as 
it relates to rules that are legally binding and is filed by a citizen rather than an official. It is 
different from concrete review by  not being based on a case that has been referred upwards 
from a lower court. Individual complaints are lodged with the Constitutional Court directly 
and only occur in the Austro-German model (Dohr, 2001). 
The court models also differ widely on their training and advancement procedures. Whilst 
selection of justices plays a large and important role in the political arena in all three systems 
the American system is strongest in its controversy on judicial appointments. The Head of 
State suggests the judicial appointment which then has to be accepted by the legislative 
chambers. This often causes extensive political struggles and the outcome is always a judge 
who is, at least somewhat, on the same ideological level as the Head of State. The French 
model is very similar in this aspect as the judges are appointed by the President and the 
Presidents of the two assemblies. In the Austro-German model appointment is undertaken 
through votes in the houses of parliament. As this means that the major parties have toagree to 
pass this hurdle the practice of rotation of appointments has developed. Parties in the German 
Houses of Parliament (including FDP and Greens) take turns in electing a judge with the large 
parties (SPD, CDU-CSU) having more frequent turns than the smaller parties (Meny 
1998:332). Whilst this is a highly politicised process the outcome is a, more or less, politically 
neutral court which is weighed slightly towards the two major parties (Mueller, 1996).   
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Access to the courts is regulated in a wide variety  of ways by different courts. All systems 
allow for governmental institutions and representatives of these institutions to refer a case to 
the court. In Germany, for example, the first case on legalising abortion occurred when one 
third of representatives of the Bundestag sent the law providing for a legalisation of abortion 
to the constitutional court for it to be checked on its compatibility with the German 
constitution. In 1981, the opposition in France referred an election law to the council to have 
its constitutionality  decided (Stone Sweet 2000:106 - 109).  Also the head of the state is, in 
general, able to refer cases to the court. The Hungarian president, for example, did just that 
with the Boskos package and referred the case to the court to decide (Schwartz  2001). 
Concrete review, as already  discussed above, is an original feature of the Austro-German and 
American System. Lower courts refer cases to the constitutional/supreme court and ask the 
court. These cases involve a rule that might be incompatible, in certain interpretations, with 
the rest  of the constitution. The constitutional court therefore ensures the coherence of the 
constitutional structure by deciding on constitutional interpretation or appliance in concrete 
norm control cases (Vorlaender, 2006:13). Citizen direct access to the constitutional courts is 
also possible in most of the Austro-German model. The individual has access to the 
constitutional courts by  way  of an individual complaints procedure. In Italy  and Spain the 
requirements are that the citizen is in some way  disadvantaged by the rule in question whilst 
other countries, such as Austria and Hungary, allow any citizen to lodge such a complaint. 
Austro/German French American Mixed
Separate constitutional 
court (constitutional 
jurisdiction)
X X
Abstract review X X sometimes
Concrete review X X X X
Individual complaint X sometimes
Judges appointed by 
consent
X sometimes
Presidential appointments X X sometimes
Dissent X X sometimes
Table 1: the models in comparison
Taking Europe to span from the United Kingdom to Russia and from Iceland to Cyprus, the 
Austro-German Model can be identified as the predominant constitutional arrangement in 
Europe (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: distribution of constitutional court models in Europe
The change in the ratio of unconstitutionality rulings in abstract judicial review documented in 
Germany, Austria, Italy, Romania, Poland, Spain, Portugal, France and Slovenia is therefore of 
special importance as they are court systems closely related to the majority of court systems in 
Europe. 
In all countries with a court which has the power to undertake abstract norm review this court 
procedure is not seen as a form of litigation. Abstract  norm review procedures therefore do not 
contain litigants and their representatives in the common sense. However, this formality is 
slightly misleading. Whist there are no formal litigants in abstract norm review there is the 
possibility of giving an opinion. This is reserved for all those with the right to start an abstract 
norm control procedure, namely the government, opposition, legislature, heads of state, groups 
of MPs, or a representative (Sachs, 2004:58). The above can be summarised simply as the 
steps through which an abstract norm control case has to pass before the ruling is rendered. 
First, depending on the court system, there is a formal limitation on the period of time after a 
law has been decided upon when an abstract norm procedure can be started in front of the 
constitutional court. In France abstract norm control always takes an a priori form – it 
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passed it (Zoller, 1999:190). In other countries such as Germany, Austria, Poland or Turkey 
there is no limitation on when a law can be challenged through abstract norm control 
procedures.  The second step is the same in all forms of abstract norm control. A party  with 
legal standing, such as the government, parliament or groups of MPs, submits a written 
request to the constitutional court asking it to test the constitutionality of a norm. The court 
then invites the party who requested the procedure to comment before a judgement is handed 
down. Whilst the procedure is free of charge and it  can therefore be argued that financial 
means are not influencing the quality of the legal provisions. The quality  of the comment 
might still be connected to the legal means in question (Dohr, 2001:341). The judgement 
rendered is then binding to all and cannot be overthrown by  another court – as the 
constitutional court is the highest court of the country in constitutional matters. Whilst abstract 
norm control is not  a normal litigation in so far as the applicant is not represented in the 
normal legal form, he or she still hands in a formal opinion and is bound by the decision, as is 
the case in every other form of litigation. However, he or she does not have to pay for the 
procedure or adhere to the strict formalities concerning time periods and formulas of other 
courts (Sachs, 2004).   
2.2 Case Selection
It is impossible to engage in a thorough analysis of all the countries showing a change in the 
ratio of cases seeing review in abstract judicial norm control. Moreover, it has been argued in 
the past that a comparison of court system would be fruitless as they  differ so extensively. The 
above description has shown that this might be the case across court systems but that within 
the same court system many  characteristics are shared or at least comparable. Nevertheless, 
following the argument of incommensurability of different constitutional courts it seems 
necessary  to look for those courts with the highest degree of shared factors. Abstract norm 
control adds another component to this problem as not all court models have formal powers of 
abstract norm control. Those countries with court models with these powers of abstract norm 
control can be split  into a three groups with one allowing for norm control only before a law is 
legally  binding, one group  of countries with abstract norm control only  after a law is legally 
binding and another group which combines both approaches. It is therefore necessary to look 
at the dependent variable, changing decision-making patterns in abstract norm control, and see 
in which countries this variable exists in a comparable format, i.e. either only  before the law is 
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binding, after it is binding or a combination of both. Case selection for this study will come 
from the third group. The reasons for this are twofold: first, whilst it seems prudent to make 
sure it is the same kind of abstract norm control which is being compared, choosing cases 
from the systems which combine the aspects of both a priori and a posteriori allows for some 
tentative conclusions which can be used in the other systems. Second, many  of these countries 
in the third group share common historical characteristics as they are modelled on each other. 
Table 2 shows the list of those countries allowing for both forms of abstract norm review:
Country Review
Austria A priori/a posteriori norm review
Germany A priori/a posteriori norm review
Hungary A priori/a posteriori norm review
Italy A priori/a posteriori norm review
Poland A priori/a posteriori norm review
Russia A priori/a posteriori norm review
Spain A priori/a posteriori norm review
Portugal A priori/a posteriori norm review
Turkey A priori/a posteriori norm review
Table 2: List of countries with similar forms of judicial review
It is then from these countries that a choice has to be made. It  has been argued that in the case 
of limited observations, as in the case of abstract norm review, random selection might 
increase the problem of selection bias rather than solve it  (King, Keohane, Verba 1994:112). It 
will therefore be necessary to use intentional selection according to predetermined guidelines. 
King, Keohane and Verba advise that any selection should allow for variations on the 
dependent variable, in this case abstract norm control, and that selection based on the key 
explanatory  variables does not cause inference problems (1994:129,137). It will therefore be 
necessary  to consider the possible presence of the explanatory  variables identified in the 
literature in Chapter I as legal factors, attitudes of the judges, political institutions, popular 
opinion and Europe in combination with the presence or lack thereof of the dependent 
variable, the increase in unconstitutionality  rulings in abstract judicial review. Area studies 
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lends itself especially to the most similar systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970:330) as 
court systems in Europe allowing for abstract norm control, and especially  those in this list 
above, are not sufficiently different for a most different systems design (Landmann 2003:29). 
The most similar systems design applied to this study therefore requires the choice of 
countries which are closest in their general characteristics, but in which at least one country 
lacks the dependent variable (x), namely variations in abstract norm control, and the 
independent variables (y1, y2). Italy, Spain, Portugal and Germany all show similar variations 
in abstract norm control throughout the 1980s and 1990s, whilst Austria shows an increase in 
review in that time but a decrease of unconstitutionality rulings throughout the time period, 
whilst Hungary and Poland lack the development throughout the 1990s. As court statistics are 
not readily available for Russia or Turkey it is hard to make any  decision on them. The 
independent variables of legal factors (y1), Europe (y2), popular opinion (y4) and political 
institutions (y3) exist in all countries. The influence of attitudes of judges on their decisions 
(y5) has been argued to be absent in Germany Austria and Italy due to the appointment 
procedures in all three countries (Funk 2007; Kommers 2006; Kommers 1997; Onida 2007; 
Volcansek 1990; Volcansek 2000).  When concentrating on the period from 1980 till 2008 it 
then leaves us with two main groups from which to choose:
 
Country Dependent 
variable
Legal 
factors (y1)
Europe 
(y2)
Political 
Institutins 
(y3)
Popular 
Opinion 
(y4)
Attitudes
(y5)
Austria No Yes In 90s 
onward
s
Yes Yes No
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Spain Yes Yes Mid 80s Yes Yes No
Portugal Yes Yes Mid 80s Yes Yes No
Poland Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Hungary No Yes No Yes Yes No
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Turkey Not known Yes No Yes Yes No
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Country Dependent 
variable
Legal 
factors (y1)
Europe 
(y2)
Political 
Institutins 
(y3)
Popular 
Opinion 
(y4)
Attitudes
(y5)
Russia Not known Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Table 3 Independent and Dependent Variables present/absent. Highlighted in turquoise 
are those countries excluded due to time period. Orange excluded due to lack of y2.
Choosing from courts that have been in existence throughout the whole period of study, 1980 
until 2008, is a necessity and therefore excludes Poland, Hungary and Russia. The lack of EU 
membership and therefore the formal influence of EU law excludes Turkey. Of the remaining 
five, Germany, Austria and Italy  are closest in their history. The three courts have all been in 
existence since shortly after the Second World War. It has been argued that a court has to 
establish itself in the regard of the people before it can be truly  effective. If this is the case 
then choosing courts with similar “life experience” seems necessary. Therefore the influence 
of legal factors, Europe, political institutions, popular opinion and attitudes of the judges on 
the decision-making patterns in abstract norm review will be studies on the example of 
Germany, Austria and Italy. The fact  that Germany and Italy are original members of the 
European Union, whilst Austria only joined in 1995 adds another interesting dimension to the 
analysis. 
2.3 Legislative process and judicial process in Germany, Italy and Austria
Germany, Italy  and Austria are the logical choice of case studies when testing the hypothesis 
that harmonisation of national law and EU/EC law leads to the change in decision-making 
pattern of the courts through the affect it has on judicial and political attitudes to the legal 
system. Even so, are the paths a law takes on its way through the political system and the 
judicial system, if it is challenged under abstract judicial review, comparable? On first view, 
the three countries have very similar systems. All three are federal states with two chambers of 
government, extensive committee stage and increasingly strong executives.
 2.3.1 Political Process - proposition to promulgation
In all three countries one chamber is more regionally  dominated whilst the other is organised 
more on party lines, the German and the Austrian Bundesrat  and the Italian Senate. In Austria 
and Italy  legislative proposals can be introduced to either Chamber, whilst in Germany a 
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legislative proposal has to come through the Bundesrat first. Here, therefore is the first 
difference between the country’s systems. However, in all three countries the legislative 
proposal has already gone through an extensive consultation process with interest  groups, 
governmental departments, business and other interested parties. In the three countries, the 
legislative proposal then goes through various readings and an extended committee stage in 
the house in which it was proposed before that house takes a decision. In Germany, the 
national government can then adapt the law according to the propositions of the Bundesrat 
before it is given to the second house, in the other two countries it goes directly to the second 
house where the process is repeated. After both Houses have agreed the law is promulgated. In 
Austria, the Bundesrat retains a constitutional veto in cases of constitutional legislative 
proposals (Meny 1998:187; Hague 2001:218)
Obviously, the odd one out in the decision-making process is Germany. After the legislative 
proposal has passed through the Bundestag, the Bundesrat  sees it  for a second passage. If it 
votes to pass the legislative proposal it becomes law. If it does not, then the law goes into the 
mediation process, involving a joint committee and various further votes. The process seems a 
lot less confrontational than that of the other two countries (Meny 1998194) which might 
explain why Germany has a lower number of abstract review referrals than either. Therefore, 
whilst the overall structural similarities between the three countries are marked there are 
definite differences in the law-making process. However, this affects the number of cases 
reaching the court more than the process of abstract review at the court. 
  2.3.2 Judicial process of abstract judicial review at the court
Abstract judicial review in all three countries can be initiated by political institutions, regional 
and national, some judicial institutions and in Germany and Austria a percentage of parliament 
independently. The courts do not act under the adversarial system but rather have the right  to 
their own fact finding (Harding 2009). To safeguard the independence of the judges, they 
deliberate and vote on a decision in secret but hearings in court  before deliberations can be 
public. We do know that judges have specialities and that they are assigned responsibility over 
cases according to these. The appointed judges then prepares the decision text, following 
deliberations, and circulates it. His or her colleagues then have a possibility to comment before 
the decision is published. In many instances, the decision is the announced in a public hearing. 
This process is approximately the same in all three countries, with the only exception of 
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Germany allowing for dissenting comments by other judges being published in the case 
materials. The actual voting pattern of each judge is secret and therefore we do not know if a 
dissenting comment indeed is the result of a judge dissenting with the whole decision and has 
decided to vote against the decision or not. Aside from the above considerations, the path a 
law takes through the abstract review process is broadly the same in all three countries. 
The literature on constitutional courts is very diverse and nationally  based. For a long time it 
was considered that  a comparison of courts is simply not possible as the national legal cultures 
and the legal frameworks surrounding courts are simply too diverse (Koopmans 2003::4). 
Nevertheless the last 20 years have seen some attempts at  comparing courts - with most work 
being done in the comparison of court systems. Relatively little work is based on the decision 
making patterns of courts outside the US and even less on abstract judicial review, a form of 
judicial review common in Europe (Neal Tate and Vallinder 1995). To date only three 
scholarly articles concentrating on abstract review have been published and both concentrate 
on the German court alone (Manow and Burkhart  2007; Vanberg 2000; Vanberg 1998). Over 
95% of all other work on courts has been based on the US Supreme Court, sometimes in 
comparison to the Australian, Canadian or Israeli courts (Jackson and Tate 1992::10). 
However, abstract judicial review has changed over the last  three decades and it remains to be 
seen if the variables tested on the American court model can suggest an explanation for the 
reasons behind this change. In this chapter, I will give an overview of the current state of the 
literature on the influences on constitutional court judges in their decision-making before 
describing the methods appropriate to study the changed decision-making pattern in abstract 
norm review in Austria, Italy and Germany in the next Chapter.
2.4 Literature Review
What influences the judge in making a decision? In the literature, five distinct answers to this 
question can be identified. 
1) The judge is influenced solely  the legal variables - by precedent, the Black Letter of the 
Law and the intent of the law-maker (Dworkin 1977, 1998; Hart 1997; Posner 2003, 2008; 
Whittington 2000)
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2) The judge is influenced solely  by  his or her own political or ideological conviction (Epstein 
et al. 1998; Epstein and Segal 2007; Howard and Segal 2004; Schubert 1965, 1970; Segal 
and Cover 1989; Segal et al. 1995; Segal and Spaeth 1995, 1996, 2004; Segal and Spaeth 
2002; Spaeth and Segal 2001b)
3) The judge is influenced solely by the will of the other political actors (Dahl 1957; 
Maltzman et al. 2000; Whittington 2005)
4) The judge is influenced solely by the will of the people (Kramer 2004, 2007)
Increasingly a fifth influence is identified, but empirical evidence remains scarce.
5) The judge is influenced by European considerations (Friedman 2005)
The arguments for all the above propositions face some common problems. First, they have in 
their majority  only been tested on the US Supreme Court. Second, they often have not 
considered other areas of influence apart from their own proposition systematically. 
Furthermore, systematic empirical evidence for the influence of either of the variables on the 
decision-making of judges is still rare. This chapter will outline and debate each school of 
thought in turn.
2.4.1 Legal model
The oldest and most prevalent school of thought argues for the judges’ decision to be only 
influenced by legal factors. The judge therefore weighs the exact word of the law as written in 
a legal document, precedent and possibly  the intent of the law-maker, past and present, and 
then draws a decision to the case from these materials. This is often called the legal model of 
decision-making and dominates law schools in the US and Europe. Outside legal 
establishments it has faced much critique as unrealistic, improbable and illogical over the 
years. However, it has the merit that no scholar denies the influence of the legal variables, 
word of the law, precedent and intent, as a whole. Scholars are merely in doubt if the legal 
variables are the deciding influence on the judge’s decision. 
The legal model’s basis lies on the assumption that law is a closed system and that the only 
possible influences on a decision taken by a judge can therefore be found within that  system. 
For legalism, or the legal model, the influence on the judge’s decision-making are threefold, 
the plain text of the law, stare decisis and potentially  the original intentions of the law-makers 
(Maltzman et.al 2000:4). Each of these terms faces its own difficulties beginning with the 
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problem that there is little agreement in the literature how to define each (Farber 1988:1086). 
Its main weakness remains that most of the writings in this school of thought are more 
concentrated on theoretical considerations of what the judge should do (Cross 1997::252; 
Graber 1993; Graber 2005a, 2005b; Keck 2004::288). The projects testing the legal model’s 
variables empirically  are rare - to date they  still number below ten and are almost entirely 
limited to the political science literature. This is based on the difficulty  how to reliably 
measure the adherence of judges to the plain text of the law, precedent or the intent of the law-
makers. 
Legalism argues that the decisions of the judge are influenced solely by the letter of the law, 
his or her considerations of precedent and the intentions of those having framed the law. 
Frank B. Cross wrote, after attempting to narrow down a definition of the legal model, that it 
“remains ill defined, characterised by various, often contradicting theories” (Cross, 1997:262). 
Whereas “what typically connects these variants together is the belief that, in one form or 
another, the decisions of the Court are substantially influenced by the facts of the case in light 
of the plain meaning of statutes and the constitution, the intent of the Framers and/or 
precedent” (Segal 2002:48). There are few writers who see the judge as a pure legalist, 
believing that a judge only makes use of the text of the of the law to come to a conclusion 
when considering a case. However, most  take the position that the text of the law is the 
starting point and main influence on the decision taken by the judge. Richard Posner (2008:7) 
describes a legalist judge as deciding “cases by applying pre-existing rules or, in some 
versions of legalism, by employing allegedly distinctive modes of legal reasoning, such as 
'legal reasoning by analogy’. They do not legislate, do not exercise discretion other than in 
ministerial matters (such as scheduling), have no truck with policy, and do not look outside 
conventional legal texts - mainly statutes, constitutional provisions, and precedent 
(authoritative judicial decisions) - for guidance in deciding new cases. For legalists, the law is 
an autonomous domain of knowledge and technique. Some legalists are even suspicious of 
precedent as a source of law, because it is infected by judicial creativity.” Legalists main 
assumption is that the text of the law and rational reasoning based on this text are sufficient to 
come to a judgement in all cases (Sherman 2004:26). Furthermore, that all judges schooled in 
the same forms of reasoning in law schools, using the same basis for their decisions, the text 
of the law, will come to the same conclusions (Dworkin 1986). When looking at the United 
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States Supreme Court, Justice Scalia is often identified as one of the main proponents of this 
understanding of how decisions are, and should be, made (Scalia 1989). 
The philosophical basis legalism has rests with legal positivism or the pure theory of law as it 
has been developed by Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, H.L. Hart and Hans Kelsen. Their 
understanding of laws is that there is no necessary connection between the conditions under 
which laws are valid and applicable and justice but rather that  laws are man made and the 
validity  of their application depends on the legitimacy of the ones making these laws or the 
threats with which they  can enforce them (Austin 2000; Bentham 1988; Hart 1997). With 
other words there is no underlying truth and good in the world to be defended by law. Laws 
are not based on some underlying rights and obligations conferred on us through the simple 
fact that we are human. Laws are simply  words written with the purpose of ordering and 
governing a group of humans. Without rules we are unable to interact and would isolate 
ourselves from others out of fear. Rules give us the safety to live among others within a 
society. However, the decision what form this interaction will take and therefore the rules 
necessary  to order the interaction are not based on anything but the legitimacy and the power 
to enforce them of those passing them. In the case of a monarchy the legitimacy lies with the 
monarch who claims to be given his power by God and has the state power to enforce them. In 
a democracy the legitimacy rests with the will of the people and their elected representatives. 
At some point in the history of each nation with a constitution, representatives of the people 
have come together to write a document setting out the basic rights and obligations of each 
citizen. These representatives have written the rules to govern interaction between citizens and 
these rules are legitimate only because the people in some form have empowered the 
representatives to do so. It is the obligation of the judge to ensure that these rules are being 
observed and his decisions are only  legitimate if he bases his decision on the laws and 
enforces the will of the representatives of the people. The question remains how exactly  a 
judge enforces the law through employing the law. Cannot two judges come to contradictory 
decisions? Whose decision is then the legitimate one? Eminent scholars of the 18th and 19th 
century such as Blackthorn and Langdell argued that there is a determinacy  in law which 
causes judges to come to the same result if they employ the right reasoning (Grey  1983, 
Kennedy 1983, Lyons 1980).  Reasoning inherent in and taught by the legal profession 
through years of education. Each case can be solved by presenting it  as a syllogism employing 
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simple logic (Bork 1990:162). Doubt was cast on this view of the law and its applicability or 
even relationship to reality in the beginning and middle of the 20th century. 
In practice legalists describe the decision making process of the judge as follows. When a 
judge decides on a case he or she should look at the plain text of the law, The Black Letter 
meaning, as guidance. Many laws however employ vague or indeterminate language and 
therefore cannot be applied directly to each case without interpretation of the words. Because 
the judge has been trained for years in the legal reasoning any  judge will be able to use legal 
reasoning and come to the right  judgment based on these words (Dworkin 1978:110-115). If 
all judges would be perfect and therefore employ the perfect reasoning, having attained the 
skills perfectly throughout the training in law, then this would be enough to ensure that each 
judge comes to the same decision and is only employing the plain text of the law (Schauer 
1988:509). Only, judges are human, and therefore the human judge might need some more 
guidance than often vague or contradictory information provided by the different codes of law 
at his or her disposal. As a result precedent (stare decisis which is the past decisions of other 
judges) can serve as guidance for the human judge. These past judges have faced the same 
dilemma and have employed the same reasoning skills so it  is permissible to make use of their 
results (Whittington 1999:12). To ensure not to use guidance from a judge who has been 
unable to employ his reasoning skills satisfactorily  it is necessary to consider established and 
recognised precedent as more important than decisions rendered only last week. Also 
precedent from a court higher than that of the judge in question has more authoritative 
meaning than precedent from equal level. This is based on the assumption of seniority. Judges 
on higher courts have accumulated more years of experience and therefore perfected their 
reasoning skills more effectively. By this argument therefore the Supreme Court  will render 
the most authoritative precedent but is also free to divert from all precedents but its own 
(Dworkin 1986). This is a substantial problem when studying the Supreme Court, or any  High 
Court in the world. 
Stare decisis and Black Letter of the Law has been considered in combination as the 
cornerstone of the legal model by  most. In recent years those voices who argue that there 
should be another consideration possible for the judge have become louder. The originalists 
within the legal model have argued that as Supreme Court precedent is authoritative over all 
others to protect the constitution the judges on the Supreme Court should consider the intent of 
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those who originally  wrote the constitution, the framers, as a deciding factor in their reading of 
the law. The judges of the Supreme Court draw their legitimacy from the constitution which 
draws its legitimacy from democracy and the will of the majority. Therefore the judge only 
renders legitimate judgments if he or she preserves the intentions of those who wrote the 
constitution - or, to follow the argument through, the will of those passing laws today. 
Problematic remains the impossibility  to define the actual will of the policy-maker. Typically 
there is a group of policy-makers and their decisions are compromises between them. The 
vagueness of many laws and the indeterminate nature of the words employed hide the various 
intents and disagreements. The argument has come full circle. Laws are written in a vague 
general language with not even the policy-makers agreeing on what exactly  is meant in each 
case. How can the judge employing his or her reasoning skills therefore find the RIGHT 
answer? However, the theoretical principle of law as a closed system stands as: Judges 
applying their in education and practice acquired reasoning skills to the plain meaning of the 
law, the meaning of the Black Letter, and the precedent authoritative to them should therefore 
be able to produce the same judgements without controversy among themselves.
Clearly, much of this literature is based on the question how a judge should act to render a 
legitimate judgment. It  has been argued for a long time that empirically  testing the variables of 
precedent, Black Letter of the Law and original intent of the framers, is impossible and 
therefore that  this has to remain a theoretical discussion (Segal 2008:21). Some few attempts, 
however, have been made to assess the influence of plain text, precedent and original intent on 
today’s judgments empirically. Most empirical evidence brought forward here is the public 
interviews of judges and their endorsement of the legal model within. It is recognised that this 
is a problematic measure to use. In 2002 Howard and Segal tested the influence of plain text 
and original intent by assessing which arguments used by the parties in the case finds weight 
in the judgment. They find less than one third of cases including successful references to plain 
text or original intent (2002:127). In 1996 Segal and Spaeth had found that Supreme Court 
judges are not influenced by precedent (1996: 987). Their results have not gone unchallenged. 
Others have argued that  there is at least some influence visible if legally  recognisable 
mitigating circumstances were taken into account (Segal 1986, Johnson 1987). The legal 
model has therefore developed over decades from a purely prescriptive theory to an attempt to 
include empirical data into a descriptive account. 
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The legal model has been questioned not only  because of its concentration on theoretical 
discussion rather than on empirical research but also on it empirical foundations. Law as a 
closed system has been drawn into doubt by scholars, mainly in political science and 
economics. It has been argued that outside influences such as the judges private opinions, 
political influences, public considerations and philosophical considerations influence the judge 
in his or her decision and therefore the law as a closed system is a misrepresentation of reality. 
On the one hand institutional reasons such as the viability of the court force it to consider 
outside factors and the reception of its decisions on the other hand the indeterminacy and the 
wide range of precedent allow the judge to be selective and choose his or her preferential 
decision. However, the answer of the legal model to the original question of what influences 
the decision-making of a judge is simple. If law is a closed system then the answer has to be 
found purely within the bounds law presents. The answer therefore remains: the Black Letter 
of the Law, Precedent  and the Intent of the Law-maker. For the remainder of this chapter I will 
consider what other possible answers there can be to the question what influences the judge in 
his or her decision-making if we consider the law as an open system. I will discuss the 
literature on the influence of the attitudes of the judges, the power of other political 
institutions, public considerations for the judge and the influence of European factors.
2.4.2. Attitudes
The attitudinal model finds its beginning in the legal realist school which saw law not as an 
internally closed system, as the legal models purports it  to be, but as a sphere open to outside 
influence (Hammond, 2005:1). Attitudinalists try to answer the question of how different 
judges can derive different rulings form the same information with the claim that it is solely 
the political opinions and ideology of the judges themselves which denote the strongest 
influence on the decision (Friedmann 2005:263).
“Working with an identical set of facts, and with roughly  comparable training in 
the law, they (judges) come to different conclusions. If our thesis is correct, 
these divisions of opinion grow out of the conscious or unconscious preferences 
and prejudices of the justices …” (Pritchett 1948:890).
From Pritchett onwards there have been various attempts to explain Supreme Court decision 
making quantitatively with the political affiliations of judges. The attitudinal model exists in 
two slightly distinct ways. On the one hand, judges are seen as coming to a case with 
preconceived political opinions measured on their party  affiliation and will vote according to 
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party  lines (Segal, 2002). On the other hand judges are seen to have a policy  preference in 
each case independently  and vote according to this policy  preference (Knight, 1996). What 
both strands have in common is the assumption that a judge first derives the judgement and 
then justifies it with the legal rules at his or her disposal. Most recently this has been analysed 
with rational choice methods in a multistage game (Hammond, 2005).    
Glendon Schubert was among the first  to provide a detailed model of judicial decision making 
based on their preferences and attitudes (Schubert, 1962; 1963). He attempts to predict the 
variance in the voting behaviour of Judges by  linking them to ideological opinions of different 
judges (Schubert, 1962:90). Segal (1984, 1997) and Segal and Spaeth (1996, 2002) show 
evidence for judges at the US Supreme Court deciding cases according to their personal 
policy preference. 
“Attitudinalists argue that because legal rules governing decision making (e.g. 
precedent, plain meaning) in the cases that come to the Court do not limit 
discretion; because the judges need not respond to public opinion, Congress or 
the President; and because the Supreme Court is the court of last resort, the 
justices, unlike their lower court colleagues, may freely implement their 
personal policy preferences as the attitudinal model specifies” (Segal, 
2002:111).
The main assumption is here that political institutions cannot hold the courts accountable 
effectively and therefore a judge is free to choose his or her decision based on personal 
attitude rather than the necessity to bow to outside pressures. This is where the attitudinalists 
do not differ from the legalists. Their system of law includes the judge’s private opinions and 
political attitudes but no influence of a non-legal entity. 
Attitudinalists share more with the legalists - they also share some of the problems. The first 
lies in the question in how far it is possible to measure the attitudes of judges to certain issues. 
Segal and Spaeth answer this in relating the political party by which a judge was appointed to 
his or her opinions. Whereas it is nevertheless true that highly differing opinions can exist 
within one party  or that  a judge might agree to something in exchange for the agreement to a 
personally more salient issue by another judge. This leaves the question, however, how one 
makes sure that a decision was based on the attitude of the judge rather than on the precedent 
in case of precedent and opinion not differing. Therefore party  affiliation seems difficult as a 
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basis for measurement, as seen on the example of the Burger court reaching liberal results 
(Eskridge 1991). Moreover, when granting that a court is not under the power of the political 
institutions because it is difficult and requires large majorities to reel the court  in then it 
becomes difficult to argue that a judge will follow party opinions, as sanctioning of a judge is 
even more fraught with difficulties. Also, what happens in situations when a judge simply has 
no opinion. 
The strongest criticism facing attitudinalists comes from outside the United States. It has been 
argued that those cases in which the court does not have an opinion or would be unable to 
agree and therefore would not come to a decision can be weeded out through docket control. 
Whilst most high courts around the world have got docket control over concrete review, the 
form of review existing in the United States, they  do not have control over other forms of 
decision making, such as abstract review. Moreover, the appointment procedures in most 
European countries make it  impossible for any  party to dominate the high courts and therefore 
no judge can hope to be able to ensure an outcome. As a result, the institutional settings on 
European courts make it  more likely that judges are engaging in trading among each other to 
come to a compromise and therefore a decision. 
2.4.3.  Political institutions
It has been argued that not only within the court does there have to be compromise but also 
within the wider political system. Political constitutionalists propose a view of the law as a 
system which is open to outside influences. Their argument is that it is unrealistic to imagine 
the court as an enduring and efficient institution without considering the choices it  has to 
make strategically. The argument in its most simple form claims that a constitutional court is 
dependent on the goodwill of the institutions surrounding it. The political institutions 
surrounding the court have the power to replace their interpretation of a law through further 
legislative action. Furthermore they have the theoretical power to curtail the actions of the 
courts through the budget or changes in the constitution. As a result it is necessary for the 
court to compromise in its decisions to ensure the decision’s viability and longevity. Clearly 
the criticisms the courts face in the political realm are an indication that the court is not simply 
the mouthpiece of the political institutions or ruling majority. 
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Political constitutionalists base their analysis on equilibrium analysis and rational choice. 
They  start  with the assumption that each individual wants to increase his or her utility. In the 
instance of judges it is the endurance of their decisions. They  do not want their decisions to be 
overturned by  the political institutions. A further assumption is that a loss will count more 
than a gain. In this instance a judge will perceive and overturned decision as graver than five 
upheld decisions. Following this argument through it also signifies that political institutions 
will consider an overturned law as a failure and will want to avoid this situation. Political 
constitutionalists argue that  as the political institutions have more power over the court than 
vice versa, it is the court which will avoid acting against the will of the ruling majority that 
make up the political institutions. The court will therefore avoid ruling in a way that would 
constitute a loss to the political institutions. However, the legislative process is not as simple - 
there are more than two institutions involved. In most western democracies the legislature 
consists of two political bodies and an executive which has at least  some influence on the 
outcome. Therefore the court needs to consider the utility of various bodies as well as its own 
in the decision of what constitutes a gain or a loss.
Equilibrium analysis suggests a solution to the question where the decision would lie when 
the court has to consider the desires of other political actors in the game. Figure 2 is the 
graphical representation of this decision. If the court would be standing against the political 
institutions as a united front then the court  would have to concede in each decision to avoid 
causing the political institutions to experience a loss. However, when seeing the political 
institutions as separate actors with distinct and often opposing preferences the image changes 
to a court  which can make use of the separate preferences to realise a decision closer to its 
own preferred decision without facing opposition. In the pool of possible decisions there will 
be one decision which will satisfy each legislative body simply because any  other decision 
will constitute a loss for one of the political bodies and would therefore be opposed by that 
political body. This decision lies on the equilibrium point, the point which lies within the 
preferences of all actors leaving no one worse off than the other (at least in their own 
perception). 
!
! 58
  
House preferred point 
Any of these points are 
preferable to the House 
but make the Senate 
worse off than the points 
on the green line 
Any of these 
points are 
preferable to 
the Senate but 
make the 
House worse 
off than the 
points on the 
green line 
Court preferred point 
X 
Senate preferred point 
If the court decides on the green line then neither house will object as any decision closer to it 
preferred outcome will cause the other house to object: prerequisite is perfect information. If the 
court decides on its most preferred point C then both houses will object as well as it is further away 
than point X – the equilibrium.  
Figure 2: The equilibrium point for a court in a game with two legislative bodies
The deciding influence for the judge is therefore not the legal considerations nor his or her 
own political attitudes but rather the reaction he or she will provoke in the political institutions 
with his or her decision. The legal considerations and his or her own political preferences 
might inform the choice of decision the judge would prefer to realise. After having considered 
the most preferred decision, the considerations of the reactions of other players in the game 
will then lead to the decision the judge makes. One of the main pieces of evidence the political 
constitutionalists use against attitudinalism is that in certain cases judges vote atypically. 
Maltzman (2000) uses the correspondence between Justice O’Connor and Brennan in a 
Miranda related case in 1990 as an example for strategic considerations within the court. In all 
previous cases both justices had voted against limiting the protections Miranda awards to the 
suspect in any way. However, in this case Justice Brennan voted for a limitation, arguing that 
this would have allowed him to ensure that the limitation of the rights protected in Miranda 
will be as small as possible (Brennan 1990, O’Connor 1990). Here a judge clearly acted 
strategically  to ensure that the outcome of the case was as close as possible to his policy goal, 
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the preservation of Miranda. The fact that many judges routinely switch their vote in the 
process of decision-making has also been shown and used as an example for strategic 
considerations within the court, as well as concerning the actions of other political branches. 
Other political branches, for example the government through the advocate general or any part 
of the administration through filing an amicus brief, make it clear to the court what side of the 
controversy  they are supporting. Therefore, when the judges make a decision they  are aware of 
when they are opposing the ruling majority - and their votes are cast with that in mind. The 
correspondences and the changing votes might not be conclusive in giving evidence for the 
influence of political branches on the strategy pursued - it could be that the strategy is only 
towards other judges. Yet the unusually high percentage of success of the Advocate General in 
front of the court seems to be an indication for the court being willing to consider the ruling 
alliance in its decisions. Around two thirds of cases brought to the court by the Advocate 
General see review. 
However, political constitutionalism falls short in explaining certain outcomes, as for example 
when the court is clearly  ruling against the ruling majority, no matter what consequences the 
court faces. Another serious objection is that rational choice presupposed an almost perfect 
knowledge for what preferences other actors within the system have. It also still suffers from 
the vagueness of the early work which did not produce clear predictions but identified 
strategies the court might, or might not, pursue. This lack of clear predictions was a result of 
the small amount of data analysed and complied by the early rational choice scholars in 
judicial politics and therefore the limited predictive powers of the early rational choice 
models. The increase in systematic use of statistics as well as qualitative data and the advent 
of equilibrium analysis over the last decade goes far to alleviate this problem. The again, this 
poses another question - does equilibrium analysis become a necessity for the rational choice 
scholar or is it possible to argue for strategic interactions not using this sometimes-crude tool 
(Schwartz 1992)? Most recent analyses seem to indicate this but it  can be argued that the 
necessity to use equilibrium points makes analysis unnecessarily rigid and is unable to account 
for hidden influences. 
One problem remains with this argument. How does the court know what the majority of 
politicians want? It  has been argued that  ‘cheap talk’ is a problem (Epstein and O’Halloran 
!
! 60
1995, Mashaw 1990:282). Many politicians say  something simply  for the purpose of strategy 
and secretly  have other opinions. This might mean that the court might have been able to 
establish an equilibrium point closer to its own preferred decision. However, this does not 
change the viability  of the equilibrium point  fundamentally. It would nevertheless cost the 
member of the political branch if he or she would be fully  in favour of one decision and then 
oppose that decision wholeheartedly. Again not one single actor can upset the equilibrium 
point. So if the majority suddenly  opposes a decision they seemed to favour beforehand then 
that means loss of credibility in the eyes of the voters for either one party or large numbers of 
either party. This might very well mean that even if a party  opposes the decision secretly and 
its support has only been cheap talk that they  will continue to support it to save their 
credibility. It is also possible to assume here that the chance of the court being opposed is 
higher in highly  emotional and politically salient issues and that therefore the court  will be 
more careful in its consideration and choice of the equilibrium point.  
Rational choice scholars face a problem as they often treat the court as a unified actor but 
attitudinalism has presented compelling evidence that it  often is not (Weingast 1992:266). 
Moreover, for the rational choice theorists the court  has to spend a large amounts of its time in 
considering the stances of other political branches to the case. Does the court actually have the 
time to do so? Most constitutional courts are desperately  overworked and are barely able to 
fulfil the requirements of so many cases. Are they likely to spend time in finding out what 
reaction there will be? In abstract judicial review the plaintiff is in some form always part of 
the political branches and therefore it can be argued that here the court is automatically aware 
of the stance each member in the game has. Here however the question is if the rational choice 
constitutionalist is able to adjust to the court decision being seen as a sequence of games, as a 
sequence of decisions that have to be taken. Rational choice scholars have argued that one of 
its main advantages for the study of courts is that it can, in comparison to attitudinalists and 
the adherents of the legal model, explain all interactions of the court rather than just the vote. 
This might be true regarding the US - but, as yet, remains untested in Europe. 
2.4.4 Popular opinion
It has also been argued in recent years that  the courts will defend the opinion of the majority of 
the public as the approval of the general public insulates them against political repercussions. 
To preserve this shield their decisions are made in consideration of what the majority of the 
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public approves of (Caldeira, 1986:1223; Adamany, 1983). Some courts, such as the Mexican 
Supreme Court, even use this and promote public awareness through the media, their own 
websites and news bulletins (Staton, 2006). 
“According to this argument, the Court’s concern for its authority makes it 
reluctant to depart too far or too long in its decisions from prevailing public 
sentiment. This is not to say  that judges “play  the role of Galahad”. Neither is it 
to argue that justices consult opinion polls prior to making decisions or that they 
tailor their judicial philosophies to the latest fluctuations in public opinion in 
specific issues. It is rather to suggest both that  members of the Court are 
political creatures, who are broadly aware of fundamental trends in ideological 
tenor of public opinion, and that at least some justices, consciously or not, may 
adjust their decisions at the margins to accommodate such fundamental 
trends” (Mishler, 1993:89). 
This does not only mean that the Court, just as any public body, reacts to changes in society 
through changing make-up but that judges consciously react to public opinion shifts. The 
change of heart of the Supreme Court towards New Deal legislation and the support  for the 
internment of Japanese-Americans in 1944 are often given as examples for this (Mishler, 
1993:89). Mishler and Sheehan used the Supreme Court database and compared the cases 
within and compared the outcomes to a wide range of data from opinion polls. Their results 
indicate that the Court is highly responsive to majority  public opinion, but they  also report  that 
this is mainly due to a reaction to the changing ideological make-up of the political branches 
even if they found evidence for cases where the court reacted directly to public opinion 
(Mishler, 1993). This has led Norpoth and Segal to argue that it is in fact the political opinions 
of the judges which influence their behaviour rather than their responsiveness to public 
opinion or the will of the political institutions. As the president appoints the judges and 
generally  appoints justices who share his views and as the president is elected by  the people it 
seems, they  argue, logical that the responsiveness to public opinion simply proves that judges 
vote on cases according to their own political preferences rather than considerations of law or 
political institution’s power over them (Norpoth, 1994). In an answer to the criticisms Mishler 
and Sheehan argue that due to a lack of direct evidence and data the criticism misses the mark 
(Mishler, 1994). When testing both models Stimson et. Al. had to agree and disagree with both 
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– but agreed definitely with the observation that there is lack of data for absolutely conclusive 
arguments (Stimson, 1995:556). This resulted in extensive research in both fields.
Problematic here is especially the difficulty of finding a reliable measurement of opinions 
(Mondak, 1997). It  is true that  whilst opinion polls generally rank courts higher in the public 
esteem than other political institutions (Gibson, 1991; 1998) for public support to be an 
influence on judges there is also the necessity that citizens must be able to monitor the court 
and the legislative responses to court rulings (Vanberg, 2001:347-351).  If the citizens cannot 
monitor the responses of the political branch then, consequently, the court is also not protected 
against adverse reactions by the political branches through the citizen’s support. 71% of all 
courts publish their decisions and issue press releases so that the public is aware of what is 
happening in the marble halls. It has been argued that this is an indication for courts using and 
reacting to public opinions (Staton, 2006:98) as any ruling adverse to reigning popular belief 
will cause a backlash on the courts and therefore their willingness to employ these means 
indicates that they seldom stray. However, research in confidence levels into the US Supreme 
Court have shown that there is a limited relationship between individual decisions and the 
attitude towards the institution as a whole (Gibson, 2003:364). 
One way  of arguing that citizens make their opinion known to court  is through pressure 
groups. Interest groups not only turn to the court to win their cases but also to increase 
visibility  for their interests. Also they not only turn to the court in an instance of litigation but 
often file amicus curiae briefs – offering the court  an opinion to the implications of a case 
when they themselves are not  involved as a party  of the case (Epstein, 1991:212). Caldeira 
found that the involvement, in any way, of an interest group in a case increased the likelihood 
of this case being heard by 40-50% (Caldeira, 1988:1122). However, as almost 80% of cases 
were by  1993 connected to interest groups most positions seem to be able to be defended by a 
pressure group and a quantitative comparison using data from Supreme Court and District 
Court indicates that there is hardly any impact by amicus curiae (Songer, 1993:340). 
2.4.5.  European Influence
Recent literature has begun to consider the EU and European law and influence as another 
variable constraining the judges. Even the US Supreme Court has made references to other 
courts in Europe, International and European Norms (Friedmann 2005). Alter has described 
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how lower courts in Europe see the preliminary reference procedures and the European Court 
of Justice as a means to increase their power towards higher courts (Alter, 1998; 2000; 2001). 
However, she concentrates on lower courts and on court activity in general. In a conference 
with the title “Die Stellung der Verfassungsgerichte bei der Integration in die Europäische 
Union” (The position of constitutional courts following integration into the European Union) 
constitutional court  judges and academics came together in 2004 and discussed the influence 
courts can have on the EU and the influence the EU can have on courts. The conference 
resulted in a number of papers which were published by the Zeitschrift für Őffentliches Recht 
in 2005.  
According to various authors membership  of the EU should limit the amount of judicial 
review the constitutional court undertakes on its own as any  EU law will be superior to 
national law and the review of this EU law has to be undertaken on European level (Schaeffer, 
2005:352; Skouris, 2005:328; Craig 2003). Furthermore, Schaeffer goes as far as to state that 
EU integration is not  relevant for national norm control and should have no influence. He tries 
to say  with this not only  that all influence European Integration has on judicial review goes by 
way of preliminary  rulings procedures but furthermore that the picture presented by  judicial 
review in the past is not changed significantly by European Integration (Schaeffer, 2005:386). 
The Italian constitutional court is not that sanguine about the matter, arguing that the question 
of competence is not  solved yet. In concrete judicial review the question might not arise – but 
it does in abstract review and has already in the case of Italy. It is true that  influence is also 
exerted by preliminary  references but only if the constitutional court decides the community 
law to be unclear and therefore has to refer to the ECJ. As the Italian Constitutional Court, as 
well as the German and Polish court, is not that sure of who has final jurisdiction on basic 
constitutional matters this decision might seldom be taken (Onida, 2005:394; Hassemer, 
2005:406; Grzybowski, 2005:532). It is therefore not enough to measure the influence only  as 
exerted by preliminary references but any  case which involves European legal norms. 
Moreover in the case of many European countries it is routine to refer to cases from other 
countries, the ECJ or to European principles in the reasoning pertaining to judicial review 
cases (e.g. Hungary see Harmathy, 2005:320; Germany see Geiger, 1998; Slovenia see 
Ribicic, 2005:411). 
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In the literature there are therefore two separate issues: one, the question if there is a 
“European Influence” and two, what this influence consists of. The first  is the question this 
study is attempting to consider and the second needs to be clarified before even starting. 
Clearly, it  is not enough to see European influence as simply any case which was based on a 
preliminary reference but also needs to be considered as those cases which involved EU norms 
or referred to European norms or values somewhere within the reasoning.  There is no 
consistent empirically researched body of literature concentrating on the influence of EU law 
apart from preliminary  references but there are many references and footnotes observing the 
increase in which the actual court  documents contain the word Europe in any of its 
permutations. However, with so little empirical data on this it is hard to evaluate the actual 
extent. Therefore during this study, the variable European influence will be defined as the 
direct reference to “Europe” within the texts of the cases encompassing both the preliminary 
references as well as nebulous concepts as European norms and ideals. 
2.5 Judicial review in Europe
Most of this literature has been tested on the US American model and then simply applied to 
the European court system.  However, the European court system differs extensively from the 
American system in the forms of judicial review it  allows the Courts to undertake.  Judicial 
review, or norm review how it is termed in legal texts, is the power of a court to decide on the 
legality of a rule or norm which has been referred to the court for that purpose (Stone Sweet, 
2004:9). A legal norm is a rule of any kind passed and enforceable by a public body (e.g. 
ordinances, statutes, administrative rules, common law, precedent and international and 
supranational treaties) (Kalyvas, 2006:575). This meaning of the term “norm” is derived from 
a combination of its meaning in sociology and philosophy. For a sociologist a norm is 
anything which is socially  enforced, which includes enforcement by courts and the police but 
also by social groups. Homosexuality is no longer illegal in Germany however it  is still a 
social norm for one’s sexual partner to be of the opposite sex and those deviating from this 
norm are often punished with social sanctions. In philosophy  a norm is commonly understood 
as a reason to act, believe or feel - such as commands or permissions. Norms are not 
descriptively true or false, since they do not purport to describe anything but they prescribe, 
create or change (Stone Sweet, 2000:8). The term norm, as used in this study, therefore 
denotes a rule which commands or permits a certain action and is passed by a public body and 
enforced by  a court. Norm review therefore signifies the power of a court to decide which of 
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the norms passed by a public body are in the power of that  body to be passed and can therefore 
be enforced by courts generally. 
However, norm review occurs in two different forms – concrete and abstract. Concrete judicial 
review is based on an actual case and therefore is a judgement on the constitutionality  of the 
application of a particular law or norm (Currie, 1994:162). In this, the litigant has to have legal 
standing and the case has to take the customary route of rising through the ranks of courts by 
means of appeal. In other words, the litigant’s rights have to have been directly  infringed upon 
before he or she can take the injury up with the court and ask for a ruling on this application of 
a law to his or her circumstances. After this ruling has passed he or she can then decide to 
appeal to the next higher level of court  till the case ends with judges of the highest  court which 
give a final and binding decision. In the case of abstract review a court decides on the text of a 
law without a concrete case. Here the litigant does not have to have his or her individual rights 
infringed upon before he or she can ask the constitutional court to decide and, furthermore, the 
law does not even have to be legally  binding yet. If it is an individual citizen who asks for the 
ruling, then the constitutional court does not have to comply but if it is an official such as the 
head of state or a certain number of parliamentarians who ask for the ruling the court has to 
consider the case. Abstract judicial review is an important power within the political system as 
it involves the courts closely with law-making (Shapiro, 2002:185). A body whose 
membership is not  based on election, a court, can decide if a law passed by the elected 
political body can stand and be applied. The court can make this decision before the law is 
legally  binding or even after – depending on the court model.  In this function the court is part 
of the separation of powers ideal embedded in most  codified constitutions in liberal 
democracies in Europe. The court ensures that the elected body adheres to the fundamental 
rules of the state. Strictly speaking these rules form the borders of power the public body holds 
and the court ensures that the public body remains within these borders – that all the norms 
passed by the public body are intra vires, within its power to pass (Barnett, 1999:736). The 
United States Court system only  knows concrete judicial review whilst abstract judicial review 
is a common feature of European court systems. 
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
From the literature above five possible reasons for the increased levels of review in abstract 
norm control are identified:
1. Precedent, Black Letter and Intent of the law-makers
2. Political Attitudes of the Judges
3. Influence by political institutions
4. Influence of public attitudes
5. Influence of European Union membership
The wide range of theories and the comparative lack of previous analysis of abstract judicial 
review necessitates an equally  wide range of methods. To consider the possible causes for the 
increased levels of review in Italy, Austria and Germany a combination of statistical analysis, 
interviews and content analysis are most promising. Each of these methods are most 
appropriate to different  variables and each has advantages and disadvantages of their own. 
This chapter will therefore detail the reasons for the choice of methods before discussing each 
method separately in theory and in its application to the hypothesis of the thesis. 
3.1 Choice of methods and form of analysis                                                                                   
Traditionally, the literature on courts has analysed the voting behaviour of judges 
quantitatively, but has eschewed any quantitative analysis in European court where this is not 
possible. The courts themselves publish limited quantitative analysis regarding their workload 
and the average time it  takes for a case to pass through the court proceedings. Measures of 
Association between variables are therefore almost exclusively limited to linear regression 
over time. Little correlation analysis has been undertaken. However, the original text of all the 
cases are accessible online or through special software packages. It is therefore possible to 
code for a wide range of factors such as origin of law, of plaintiff, of judge, in respect to 
region or academic affiliation, time at the court, appointing party, party  in government, 
coalition and so on. The wealth of systemic factors which can be identified through the case 
materials is also of interest: lawyer, region, institution, amicus brief, dissent. There is therefore 
a wealth of possible variables to test for their explanatory power regarding the decision-
making pattern of the three courts. 
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The most usual correlation analysis performed by social scientists today is regression analysis. 
The usefulness of this has already  been drawn into doubt by  seminal works of Verba and King 
in 1986 and 1994 (King 1986; Verba 1994). The argument made here is that in much of the 
quantitative methodology  employed in the social science simply  mechanically follows 
analytical steps without  real understanding or consideration of the appropriateness of the 
measure. This is especially the case with regression analysis (King 1986: 674).
Simple Regression analysis is an excessively  useful tool when predicting future development 
or when extrapolating from a representative sample to the whole population (Wright 1997:90). 
However, simple regression is only one form of correlation analysis. There is a wide range of 
measures of association to choose from. The choice depends on the size and quality of the data 
(Salkind 2010:282). The reason why regression analysis is often held to be more reliable lies 
in a wide range of misperceptions. Regression analysis is not more likely to causation than 
other forms of correlation analysis - to be exact both forms of analysis will only prove the 
likelihood that two or more conditions covary, occur at the same time. Regression analysis is, 
however, often more accurate to extrapolate to the larger population. All the statistical analysis 
in this thesis are based on the entirety  of cases, and most of the analysis is based on nominal 
data or a combination of nominal and ordinal data. The most appropriate measures of 
association in this instance are therefore Spearman’s, Cramer’s V and Phi, depending on the 
combination of data needed for the test. 
One of the often cited disadvantages of quantitative methods remains it’s potential 
superficiality and inflexibility of its analysis. Combining the quantitative side of the analysis 
with qualitative content analysis and interviews. More importantly, this also addresses two 
main criticisms commonly levelled against studies comparing different systems, quantitatively 
or qualitatively. It  has been argued that  a comparative analysis between the systems is difficult 
due to the high variance in legal systems, an accusation that has already  been addressed in the 
last Chapter by the analysis of the systems. However, the more serious argument lies in the 
follow up accusation that law is too case dependent and that therefore a quantitative 
comparative study is unable to account for possible missing variables or system specific 
changes (Holland 2010:156). Therefore it is necessary to supplement the quantitative analysis 
with qualitative content analysis of the texts of the cases. However, this will only  add a deeper 
understanding of the individual cases, for a more general image of the other systemic factors 
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surrounding the courts interviews with judges, civil servants and politicians are employed. 
Below an account of the detailed coding scheme of the quantitative analysis and aspects of the 
qualitative analysis will be detailed. 
3.2. Statistical Analysis
The statistical data drawn from the case materials relating to the increase of review in 
Germany, Austria and Italy is extensive. The text and data relating to abstract norm review is 
readily available on the court websites. The collection of the abstract review case materials is 
purely  a question of identification. The coding within the texts has to be undertaken with 
ultimate care to account for country specific circumstances. Most statistical analysis 
throughout the thesis is a correlation between the different causes identified by the literature 
and the outcome of the case. The decisions rendered in the cases can be coded in four possible 
decisions: constitutional, unconstitutional, partial unconstitutionality and stopped. 
The first  step in a statistical analysis of abstract review is the correct identification and 
codification of relevant cases. In Germany this is made easy by the fact that the court labels all 
cases with a BvF. Cases after 1998 are readily  available online whilst those for the periods 
before can be purchased through a computer programme (Bundesverfassungsgericht 
1952-2002). In Austria, the court denotes these cases with a G, however this also applies to 
direct review. As a result it  is necessary to examine each of the cases for its format in detail. 
Fortunately, all Austrian cases, as well as the Italian cases are readily available through the 
court websites (http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/;http://www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-site/
index.html). Concerning the Italian cases it is also necessary to identify  the abstract review 
cases by examining the whole jurisdiction of the constitutional court as there is no way of 
identifying the cases through their titles or numbers. In Italy this results in 1064 cases over the 
period 1980-2010, in Austria 300 and in Germany 150. 
 After a collection of all the cases it is then possible to code the decision texts with a wide 
range of variables employing qualitative content analysis. By reading each case it  is possible 
to identify the form the decisions takes, who the plaintiff was, what kind of law was 
challenged and where the law originated. It is moreover possible who provided an expert 
opinion, which political or regional institution submitted an opinion or which precedent the 
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court employs. Even the style of the decision can be coded for. The courts themselves have 
coded for decisions and as a safeguard it is possible to compare the decision-making patterns. 
To test any variables against the decision-making pattern it is necessary to first code the 
decisions. Table 6 presents a full coding scheme in a tabular format. For a decision to be coded 
as constitutional the whole norm needs to be considered as within the bounds of the 
constitution. No part must have been revised or considered as unconstitutional by the court. 
However, within this group those cases which were dismissed outright can also be found. 
However, those cases dismissed due to procedural grounds were coded as stopped. In this 
category are also those cases which were withdrawn for any reasons. Whilst interesting, the 
cases which were withdrawn, cannot give an insight into the question what influences the 
judges in their decisions causing increased levels of review. Unconstitutional is any  case 
which has the norm annulled or declared unconstitutional in its entirety. The distinction 
between annulled and declared unconstitutional lies in the time period the norm remains in 
power. A norm being annulled, or declared void, will cease to be legal from this moment on. A 
decision to declare a norm unconstitutional can lead to the norm remaining in power for a 
prescribed period of time to allow the legislature to replace the norm with a constitutional one. 
A partial unconstitutionality ruling denotes the category  of those cases in which a norm is only 
declared unconstitutional in part. Part of the norm is therefore considered as constitutional by 
the court whilst some part  of it, a codicil, a phrase or a word, is declared unconstitutional 
(Table 4). 
Constitutional Unconstitutional Partial Stopped
No part of the 
norm revised
The whole norm 
annulled
Part of a norm 
revised
Withdrawn
No part of the 
norm annulled
The whole norm 
declared 
unconstitutional
Part of a norm 
annulled
Dismissed due to 
procedural reasons
Dismissed Part of a norm 
declared 
unconstitutional
The norm being 
declared 
constitutional in its 
entirety
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 Table 4: coding scheme for “decision rendered”
Other coded variables are self-explanatory  (Table 6 below and Appendices 1,2,3). The party in 
government, the number of precedent used in the case, the party affiliation of the plaintiff are 
all coded without any possible interpretation. However, the variable EU and the variable of 
party  not in government are in need of more differentiated coding schemes. A party not in 
government is not only a party which at the time of decisions is not in government, but state 
coalitions which are made up  of parties not in government, those coalitions where the parties 
in the absolute majority are not in government or a group of parliamentarians which is made 
up to at least 75% by parties not in government (Table 5). The variable EU denotes those cases 
which have any  reference to any EU institution or contract. Moreover, it  also contains those 
cases with a reference to European values, obligations and ideals.
Party Coalition Group of parliamentarians
Any party not in 
government
A coalition made up of 
parties not in government
Parliamentarians from a 
party not in government
Coalitions in which the 
party not in the national 
government has a distinct 
majority
A group of 
parliamentarians at least 
2/3 containing members 
from parties not in 
government
Table 5: coding scheme for “party not in government”
The analysis of the relations between the outcome of cases and the possible causes for the 
decision will be undertaken making use of simple and multiple regressions, cross-tabulations, 
correlations and significance testing. The detailed derivation and explanation of the formulae 
can be found in Appendix 4. Considerations of the uses, advantages and disadvantages of each 
of these statistical analysis are common to all the variables in the analysis and need to be 
considered here.
Class of 
Variable
Coding scheme per class of variables
Germany Italy Austria
Year
Number
These relate to the identification numbers of the cases in the 
courtʼs system. They contain the year, the number of the case 
and in Germany the place where it is save in the court records.
(G1986/345; 2BvF1/2002; 1994/234)
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Class of 
Variable
Coding scheme per class of variables
Germany Italy Austria
Number1
Decision rendered
Kind
Year referred
Year decided
Time at court
Challenged by
Origin
Federal
Regional
Federal/regional 
conflict
Government in 
power at time of 
decision
Government in 
power at time of 
referral
Opposition at 
time of referral
These relate to the identification numbers of the cases in the 
courtʼs system. They contain the year, the number of the case 
and in Germany the place where it is save in the court records.
(G1986/345; 2BvF1/2002; 1994/234)
constitutional, unconstitutional, partial unconstitutional, stopped
financial, environmental, social rights, political rights, education, 
internal security, military, international, democracy, media, 
infrastructure, other (combined categories: rights (social and 
political), Security:(military, internal security))
year in which the case was brought to the court
year in which the case was decided
period of time between referral and decision measured in 
months
identity of the “plaintiff” coded for: identity, party affiliation, 
regional affiliation, institutional affiliation, coalition, governmental 
affiliation, opposition affiliation
origin of the law coded for: party in government when law 
passed, party in government when law proposed, electoral 
promise, coalition, regional, regional government, regional party 
identification. regional party in government (national)
federal law
regional law
yes/no
coded for parties and coalitions 
coded for parties and coalitions 
coded for parties and coalitions 
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Class of 
Variable
Coding scheme per class of variables
Germany Italy Austria
Opposition at 
time of decision
Coalition partner
European 
mention
International 
mention
Number of pages
Number of 
precedent
Dissent
coded for parties and coalitions 
yes/no
yes/no and number thereof
yes/no and number thereof
number of pages (word document, font 12, European standard 
margins DIN4)
number
ratio of decision 
and identity of 
dissenting opinion 
author
not possible not possible
Table 6: coding scheme for all variables
Regression analysis measures if there might be a causal relations between two variables 
through a graph. The perfect  relationship between two variables would be a graph in which an 
increase in one variable will lead to the same increase in the other variable (Reynolds and 
Buttolph Johnson 2008:477). A typical example would be time and age, an increase in time of 
one year is related of an increase in age of one year9. A relationship that creates such a perfect 
regression line is rare and clearly  none of the graphs depicting the development of abstract 
review in the previous chapter is such an example (McLean et al. 1993:89). A regression line 
can therefore be used to measure general development between two variables, how strong the 
relationship  between the two variables is and most often to predict future development (Field 
2005:103). Due to the question this thesis asks the regression analysis here is not attempting 
any future predictions but purely to explain or illustrate past development. This development 
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9 To satisfy the theoretical physicists we are assuming the measurements are taken somewhere on earth, not 
traveling at light-speed or falling into a black hole. 
can be best illustrated by the addition of a trend line to the graphs. The trend line is a linear 
regression line. Any point on this line would be the perfect relationship between the two 
variables. The distance between the actual observations and the trend line shows in how far the 
actual observations differs from the perfect relationship  (Bryman 2008). The direction and 
gradient of the trend line shows the general development of the relationship between the two 
variables. An increasing trend line denotes an increasing trend in the relationship between the 
two variables. 
Regression analysis has two major disadvantages. One outlier, an observation which is 
numerically distant from any of the other data points, throws the analysis and moves the 
regression line, and therefore trend line, considerably, if the number of observations is 
relatively low (Figure 1 in chapter I is a good example). This is a serious problem in social 
sciences as here often the observances are limited. When analysing abstract review 
development over time the observances are only 30, for 30 years, and therefore the 
measurement of strength of relationship  is unreliable. Regression analysis will be used in this 
thesis only to establish general trends of relationship between two variables, for the most part 
for temporal development as in Chapter I. Moreover, it is an analysis only usable when dealing 
with parametric data. With other words, both variables have to be either ratio or interval data. 
As this is often not  the case in social sciences regression is of limited use here. The dependent 
variable in this study, when not used numerically (e.g. 75 occurrences in 2008), is nominal or 
dichotomous as are many of the other variables.  A nominal variable, such as the “decision 
rendered” coded as constitutional, unconstitutional, partial or stopped, is a variable in which 
the values are artificial. The values have no intrinsic numerical meaning apart  from 
distinguishing separate categories from each other. So concerning the dependent variable 
“decision rendered” it means that numbers are arbitrarily  assigned to distinguish the categories 
of:
Constitutional = 1
Unconstitutional = 2
Partial unconstitutionality = 3
Stopped = 4
Re-coding this variable into a dichotomous form puts the emphasis on one category  and codes 
the other categories as “other”, such as constitutional = 1 and other (unconstitutional, partial 
unconstitutionality, stopped) = 2. The format the variables in the analysis take has far reaching 
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influences on the statistical tests employed, such as the strength of the relationship  between 
the variables and the significance of the relationship between the variables. Contingency 
tables, such as cross-tabulations, are useful and most appropriate for the analysis of nominal 
variables. 
The strength of relationships between two variables can be mathematically calculated through 
various correlation coefficients. For all the analyses within this thesis it  first has to be 
ascertained that the relationship between two variables cannot simply  be due to coincidence. 
A statistical significance test, a CHI-Square test, measures the difference between the expected 
values if the relationship would be 100% and the de facto observed values. If the value of the 
CHI-Square test is below 0.05 then it is probable at a 95% level of certainty  that the 
relationship  between two variables is not due to coincidence. It  can therefore be said that the 
relationship  is statistically  significant (Wright 1997:38). Notwithstanding, the strength of the 
relationship  cannot be ascertained with this statistical test. An association coefficient is able to 
supply not only the strength of the relationship but also the direction10. An association 
coefficient of 0 denotes no correlation between the two variables. A perfect association is 
denoted by either a 1 or -1, which in form of a graph would show as the perfect regression 
line. Therefore the closer the association coefficient is to +/- 1 the stronger the relationship 
between the two variables. A positive relationship, so a number between 0 and 1, would mean 
that the increase in one variable results in an increase in the other variable. A negative 
association coefficient, a number between 0 and -1, denotes that the increase in one variable 
results in a decrease in the other variable. Cross-tabulations which measure the statistical 
significance and strength of the relationship between two variables are the most common 
forms of statistical analysis in the social sciences.
It has to be stressed here that statistical analysis can only establish relationships not causality 
(Reynolds and Buttolph Johnson 2008:326). A mathematical analysis of the relationship 
between two variables simply ascertains that an increase or decrease in one variable occurs to 
the same time as a decrease or increase in the other variable. It is still possible that the 
decrease or increase in both variables is de facto caused by a third, unobserved variable:
A affects B
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10 Depending on the nature of the variable the appropriate correlation coefficient is Phi/Cramers V (nominal 
variables), Gamma (ordinal or both dichotomous variables), Spearman Rho (nominal/interval), 
B affects A
OR
C affects both A and B
Whilst it  is possible to use statistical tests to ascertain how much of one variable can be 
explained by the other (an Adjusted R2 test), these tests cannot determine which is the variable 
influencing all others. To make a decision what to test for, which variable to correlate with 
another, data from interviews, content analysis and focus groups can help. 
3.3. Interviews
The advantage of the statistical analysis of abstract judicial review in Germany, Austria and 
Italy is that the difficulties of sampling do not apply. The relative scarcity  of cases (between 
160 in Germany and 1140 in Italy) allows for a statistical analysis of all cases equally without 
having to resort to taking a sample (Silverman 2003). The same does not apply to interviews. 
Not all judges on the bench between 1980 and 2009 are willing to be or can be interviewed. 
Forty interviews have been conducted. 25 of these interviewees were either current or former 
constitutional court judges. The remaining 15 were interviews with politicians, civil servants 
or media representatives working closely with the court. The nature of elite interviews is such 
that it is difficult  to draw a representative sample for interviews but  rather snowball sampling 
is necessary (Smith 1998). This means that only approximately one third of the interviews 
were previously arranged whilst the other interviews were arranged through recommendations 
from judges already interviewed. However, with approximately  two thirds of the courts or 
senates dealing with abstract review having been interviewed and combining the interview 
data with statistical and content analysis the validity and representativeness of the data should 
be assured.
Due to the need to preserve the privacy of the interviewees and make frank statements 
possible the interviews were taken under the promise of confidentiality and anonymity (Mason 
2002; Rubin and Rubin 1995).  Therefore within this thesis the reporting of interview data will 
be coded as to the identity  of the interviewee. Each interviewee has been assigned a letter and 
a number, the letter identifying the country from which he or she stems11. The number was 
assigned randomly with aid of the computer to the different interviewees. Furthermore, the 
very small number of women among the interviewees necessitates the reporting of interview 
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11 A list of the interviews together with the coding scheme will be provided in examination
data as gender neutral. Appendix 5 contains a list of the questions prepared for the semi-
structured interviews undertaken (de Vauss 2002). Therefore within this thesis interviews 
pertaining to the German constitutional court will be identified with the letter G preceding a 
randomly assigned number. The Italian interviewees will be identified through the letter I 
followed by a number and the Austrian interviewees are identified by an A throughout the 
study. In the interest of preserving anonymity and confidentiality  the interviewees were not 
made aware by the researcher of the identity  of any  other interviewees. Whilst  these measures 
might seem excessive the preference evidenced by the majority  of interviewees for this format 
lends support to the research design.
3.4 Content Analysis - Qualitative and Quantitative 
The analysis of the case materials on the other hand combined quantitative and qualitative 
aspects within the same method. This is only possible because of the relatively small number 
of cases under consideration. Even in Italy, which has the largest number of abstract review 
cases in these thirty years, it is still possible to analyse the 1140 cases qualitatively  as well as 
quantitatively. Quantitatively it is therefore possible to code for the occurrence of certain 
terms, such as EU or European values in the analysis of the European connection in Chapter 
IX. The coding scheme in Table 6 relating to the quantitative analysis details many  of the 
coded variables taken from the quantitative content analysis. 
However, the analysis in Chapter V is clearly qualitative in nature. Here the case materials are 
analysed according to the style of the decisions, the symbols contained in the language and the 
level of interpretation. Qualitative content analysis of the written record rarely  needs to be 
defended in the social sciences but we tend to take its advantages and disadvantages too easily 
as proven (Johnson 2008:290). Regarding this study the main advantage is that content 
analysis is the only method with which a comprehensive picture of the entirety of the cases 
can be drawn. Interviews with each person involved in all the cases would be cost and time 
prohibitive. Moreover, the rare data is nonreactive, removing the danger of intentional or 
unintentional bias by subjects. Content analysis of the case materials also allows for 
longitudinal analysis - interviews with those involved in cases 30 years ago is not always 
possible and due to the record keeping requirements of the courts the main disadvantage of 
content analysis, selective bias of accessible records, is no danger. Nether is the problem of 
incompleteness, present in much of content analysis studies. Therefore, content analysis as a 
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method has all the advantages in a study of this kind whilst avoiding the common 
disadvantages. 
3.5. Issues with Mixed Methods
Mixed methods research has been criticised widely  by both positivists and post-structuralists. 
It has been argued that the research paradigms underlying qualitative and quantitative methods 
are so different (Sale et al. 2002). Quantitative research assumes an ontology which excludes 
research in beliefs, values and intentions equal meaning as possible causes for actions as they 
are hard to quantify. Qualitative research strategies on the other hand are aimed especially at 
beliefs, values and intentions as the argument goes that quantification of social phenomena has 
no intrinsic value and are deceptive (Bryman 2008:592). Mixed methods approaches have 
claimed to be able to overcome the disadvantages of both sides. Qualitative methods are 
criticised for being too anecdotal. Interviews, focus groups and even qualitative content 
analysis emphasise small snippets of time, stories told, information that wants to be shared and 
therefore is criticised for giving these too much importance. By underlying the qualitative 
analysis with quantification the anecdotalist tendency of qualitative research can be kept in 
check. Quantitative analysis is often accused of oversimplification of social phenomena and 
the inability  to account for human nature. Inclusion of qualitative research strategies ensures 
that social phenomena which are not quantifiable can be accounted for. Moreover, it allows for 
a certain control of missing variables. Quantitative analysis can only analyse those variables 
coded previously - it cannot discover new possible variables. 
This point is very well illustrated by this thesis as each chapter makes use of a combination of 
both quantitative and qualitative methods. In chapter III the question is asked if the increase in 
review levels is caused by a change in how far precedent is adhered to, the levels of 
interpretation in the case materials or the intent of the law makers. The answer to this question 
is given through statistical analysis and quantitative and qualitative content analysis. Chapter 
IV asks if a change in the composition of the court in relation to the political attitudes of the 
judges on the court causes the increased levels of review in abstract norm control. Interview 
data combined with quantitative analysis of the composition of the court is used to illustrate 
this point. In Chapter V the influence of political institutions on the decision rendered is 
discussed through statistical considerations whilst Chapter VI considers the influence of public 
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opinion through content analysis. Chapter VII then uses all four methods in ascertaining the 
evidence for the influence Europe has on the decision. 
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CHAPTER IV
FIRST EXPLORATIONS OF THE DATA
This Chapter presents a first exploration of the datasets. In this it will show that neither the 
greater number of abstract judicial review cases, nor the higher percentage of 
unconstitutionality rulings can be explained with a change in the types of cases reaching the 
courts. With other words it is not readily visible that an increase in, for example, rights 
legislation accounts for the increased unconstitutionality  rulings or even the increased number 
of abstract review cases. The only kind of cases on the increase are those concerned with the 
environment. However, other statistics prove very interesting. The number of academics, the 
style of decisions and the mention of supranational sources of law, EC law and “European” 
concepts is on the increase in Germany and Italy. This further suggests, following the 
indications drawn from the literature in the last chapter, that  a possible explanation for the 
increased number of unconstitutionality  rulings might be found in these factors rather than in a 
specific category of cases. 
What are case categories? The formalistic separation of the cases into categories by the courts 
themselves has been outlined in detail in the methods section in the last chapter. However, 
some particular points deserve additional notice here. As we have seen the courts themselves 
do not attach any particular legal area to a case, save that of abstract review. As a result the 
separation in cases here is purely artificially  based on the main legal question asked in the 
case. A case questioning the constitutionality of a budget provision, one of the most common 
form of cases, falls into the Finance category. It does not matter if this budget provision related 
to the funding of childcare support, which would make it a case in the Social and Political 
rights category. The law was questioned on its budgetary provisions and therefore is treated 
here as part of the Finance category. Decisions challenging provisions of election law, on the 
other hand, are clearly within the realm of political rights, however a case challenging the 
constitutionality of public finance of party again is classed among the Finance cases. 
Environment cases reach from the constitutionality of building a street to the constitutionality 
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of transport of nuclear waste over German soil. However, a case on the constitutionality  of 
protest regarding nuclear waste would be found in the political and social rights category. A 
challenge to the public funding of a certain environmental project, on the other hand, is a 
financial case again. As a result it becomes clear why  Finance and Social/Political Rights cases 
dominate the statistics, closely  followed by environment cases (see below). The education 
category is a slight anomaly as it only is of real importance in Austria and Germany where the 
organisation of universities has been questioned often recently. However, it  also contains cases 
relating to the mandatory teaching of religion in schools. One could have argued these to be 
cases under the Political/Social Rights category. The challenge in the case, however, rests on 
legal provision related to education and therefore was classed as an education category case. 
4.1. Distribution of cases in kind 1980-2009
A first exploration of cases allows for an overview of the kind of cases reaching the 
constitutional courts in the three countries. The most common source of cases are those 
originating in the area of environment, finances and rights. In all three countries these areas 
account for the highest number of cases. The next largest number of cases are those concerned 
with issues of democracy, those cases which in some form challenge any  part of democratic 
elections. Education, issues concerning the media and security concerns are also areas 
common to all three countries (Figure 1,2,3). Cases originating in concerns relating to 
infrastructural (traffic) concerns and administrative matters are limited to Austria and Italy  but 
missing in Germany (Figure 1,3). Only  the Italian Constitutional Court had to review cases in 
the area of Criminal Law over the last three decades (Figure 3). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of 
cases sorted into subject 
matter 1980-2008 in Austria
Figure 2: Distribution of cases 
sorted into subject matter 
1980-2008 in Germany
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Figure 3: Distribution of 
cases sorted into subject 
matter 1980-2008 in Italy
This is not unexpected. In Interviews conducted with judges some argued that the increased 
levels of unconstitutionality rulings are linked to the rise in the importance of financial and 
environmental cases (G1; A1). The judges are especially conscious of the impact of financial 
cases relating to tax or budgetary concerns. When a law is passed it  remains in power till the 
moment it is reviewed by  the court. Regarding financial issues this signifies that the proceeds 
of the laws, the monetary  gain acquired in the time period between the inception of the law and 
the court ruling, remains in the hands of the state (G1; A1). Both judges argue that they see an 
increase in instances when these kinds of cases are brought to them (G1; A1). This would 
present an explanation for the increase in unconstitutionality rulings. The argument has another 
aspect. The judges describe the circumstances of a financial law as follows: because a law 
remains in effect till the moment the court rules it unconstitutional, the financial proceeds of 
this law up to that moment, the moment of unconstitutionality, remain in the hands of the state. 
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Therefore a win/win situation develops for the law-maker. If the court rules the law 
constitutional then future financial proceeds are safe as well as those acquired since the 
inception of the law. Whereas if the court rules the law unconstitutional, in part or whole, then 
the law-maker still remains with a financial gain from the period between inception and ruling. 
Moreover, as most  financial cases garner little public attention the law-making body does 
suffer a loss of perceived legitimacy  by the general public. The constitutional courts, on the 
other hand, express concern regarding this development (G1; I3,4). In their perspective there is 
no legitimate reason for this development and they are loath to be used as financial law 
makers.  Resulting from this sentiment is the reaction by judges to make clear, through an 
increased number of unconstitutionality rulings, that the courts will not treat these cases lenient 
now or in future. This could explain the increased numbers of unconstitutionality  rulings in 
Germany and Italy, especially in consideration of the decrease of the more conciliatory form of 
rulings, the partial unconstitutionality. 
A similar argument can be made regarding the environment. Many instances present the 
legislator with a further win/win situation in front of the courts. Most environmental laws also 
contain a financial aspect and in relation to purely monetary gain the same situation applies. 
Furthermore, the environment has developed over the last two decades into a topic which 
garners public approval (I1,3). A politician stands in good regard when he or she argues for or 
includes in a legislative proposal aspects of environmental protection. This has led to aspects 
of laws not being integrated well within the wider legislative proposal and to parts of laws 
which are not as well written or researched as they should be. This “shoddiness”, as one judge 
called it (I3), leads to courts feeling, on the one hand that there is a need to clarify laws 
through clear decisions but also, on the other hand, to send a further signal that more care has 
to be taken in the formulation of legislative proposals. This signal is the increase of clear 
unconstitutionality rulings. The environment and financial cases, as seen in Figure 1,2, and 3 
some of the largest groups of cases reaching the court and therefore an increase in percentages 
of laws being ruled unconstitutional in these might explain the changed pattern of decision-
making by the courts. This would mean that if the impression of the judges proves to be 
correct then we should see an increase of cases of both environment and finances over time 
therefore accounting for the increase in unconstitutionality rulings overall.  
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4.2. Distribution of cases across time - Has a fundamental change in any of the categories 
caused the overall change in the decision making pattern?
Comparing the distribution of different categories of cases over time there is an increase in 
absolute numbers apparent. However, when considering these cases as a percentage of the 
whole no clear pattern can be identified. The cases in the categories of Finance, Environment, 
Social Political Rights, Education and others show that only in the category of Environment 
there is an increase in cases and rulings. This is an expected result as cases under the 
Environment category are very recent occurrences. The increase in abstract review cases is 
evenly distributed among the different categories of cases. Moreover, the changed pattern of 
decision-making cannot be linked to certain categories of cases exclusively. 
4.2.1 Is the change in overall pattern based on a fundamental change of the ruling pattern in 
the Finance category? 
The Finance category is dominated by cases relating to new budgets and financing of public 
projects. Publicly, they generally receive little attention, apart from some exceptions such as 
the attempt by the city  Berlin to declare the high level of its contributions to the national 
budget as unconstitutional. The lack of public notice taken of these cases, however, is not an 
indication of the importance of the cases. Challenging a statute on its financial applications or 
implications can be a last  effort of the opposition parties to change policy (Schaal 2004: 95). 
An increase in finance cases therefore might indicate a more confrontational political 
atmosphere between the parties. This is definitely the position judges themselves express in 
interviews. They deplore that they are forced into choosing between alternative politically 
controversial views, especially in the finance category(I1,3,4; G1,5; A2,3,7). As seen above, at 
the same time as criticising the opposition parties for challenging laws on financial grounds as 
a ploy in party politics they criticise the government parties as being intentionally less 
painstaking in testing the constitutionality  of financial laws before passing them 
(G1,3;A1,2,3). Figure 4 and 5 show that there are some problems with this assumption. Whilst 
there is an increase in total numbers of finance cases (Figure 4) the percentage these cases 
present of the total of cases is not on the increase (Figure 5). 
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Distribution of Rulings in Finance Category in Absolute Numbers
Figure 4: Development of rulings in 
absolute numbers in Finance category
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Cases in Finance Category expressed as Percentage of Total Cases
Figure 5: Development of number of cases 
in Financial category in Percentage of 
total number of cases.
It is therefore possible to conclude that  there is no noticeable increase in the willingness to 
challenge finance laws in respect to any other category. Opposition parties are not more likely 
to challenge laws on their constitutionality under finance issues today than they were thirty 
years ago. Moreover, financial laws do not seem to lack quality  any more, or less, than laws in 
other categories. The interesting question however is if the changed decision-making pattern 
can be explained with an increase in unconstitutionality rulings found in the finance category. 
Figures 6,7,8 and 9 display  the development of kinds of decision in Italy, Germany, and 
Austria respectively. 
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Distribution of Rulings in Italy as Percentage of Cases (all categories) in Finance 
Category
Figure 6: Development of rulings in 
Finance category in Italy expressed as 
percentage of the total of all cases (all 
categories)
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Distribution of Rulings in Germany as Percentage of Cases (all categories) in Finance 
Category
Figure 7: Development of rulings in 
Finance category in Germany expressed as 
percentage of the total of all cases (all 
categories)
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Distribution of Rulings in Austria as Percentage of Cases (all categories) in Finance 
Category
Figure 8: Development of rulings in Finance 
category in Austria expressed as percentage 
of the total of all cases (all categories)
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Distribution of Review (Partial and Unconstitutional rulings) in Finance category
Figure 9: Development of levels of review in 
Finance category in Austria, Italy and 
Germany between 1980-2008. The figures are 
displayed as percentages of the total of all 
cases, all categories.
From this it  is possible to conclude that the development of rulings is even converse to the 
overall development of rulings. Overall partial rulings are on the increase and unconstitutional 
rulings on the decrease in Austria, which leads to more laws seeing review. In the Finance 
category the level of unconstitutionality  rulings remains the same, whilst the number of partial 
unconstitutionality decisions decreases. Review overall in the Finance category therefore is on 
the fall in Austria. In Germany and Italy  the same development can be observed. We would 
expect in Germany  the percentage of unconstitutionality  rulings to increase, the percentage of 
partial unconstitutional rulings to decrease and the constitutional rulings to remain even or 
decrease as well. Figure 7 clearly displays an opposite development with an increase in 
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constitutionality rulings and a decrease of unconstitutionality  rulings. Italy’s increase in 
constitutionality rulings in the Finance category is also unexpected. Overall there is a decrease 
of constitutionality  rulings, and consequently an increase in review of cases. Figure 6 show 
that the trend observed in the Finance category  is opposite to this expected result. The 
conclusion therefore has to be that the development in the Finance category, one of the largest 
categories of cases, cannot explain the overall pattern change in abstract judicial review. Even 
more importantly, the observed pattern in the Finance category  is converse to the overall 
pattern. 
The above analysis is based on a distribution based on percentage of the total cases. This is in 
order to examine the explanatory  strength of the Finance category  over the overall pattern 
change. No higher percentage of cases reviewed find their origin in the Finance category, as 
had been suggested in interviews. This is the necessary  analysis to explain if the change in 
overall pattern is due to a change in a single category, for example Finance. However, it does 
not present an image of the development within the Finance category, independent of other 
categories. This is displayed by  Figure 10,11, and 12 below. We see from these figures that 
even when presented as percentage of the total Finance cases the overall pattern does not 
repeat itself in this category. The original argument that the rise in party political strife 
reaching the courts finds their strongest expression in the Finance category cannot be 
supported by the statistical data found here. Purely  on the basis of the quantitative data no such 
development can be observed. However, certain parts of the literature argued that courts are 
more likely  to rule in favour of the ruling elite (see section 2.3.3). An increase in 
constitutionality rulings in the Finance category, a clear ruling against the non-government 
actors challenging a governmental law might give more credence to this view. If seen from this 
perspective, the pattern in the Finance category does not only lack explanatory  powers to 
illuminate the causes of the increased levels of review in Germany and Italy  but furthermore 
undermines the second part of the hypothesis - that politicians are more likely to fight the 
political war in front of the courts now than they were 30 years ago. There is no evidence that 
their chances of success have improved in this category and therefore there is no incentive for 
them to involve the courts. It remains to be seen if the other large areas of cases are able to 
serve as an explanation for the changed decision making pattern. 
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Distribution of Rulings in Austria (Finance category)
Figure 10: Development of rulings 
in Austria within the Finance 
category in percentage of total 
Finance cases. 
Distribution of Rulings in Germany (Finance category)
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Figure 11: Development of rulings in Germany within the Finance category in percentage 
of total Finance cases
Distribution of Rulings in Italy (Finance)
Figure 12: Development of rulings in 
Germany within the Finance category in 
percentage of total Finance cases.
4.2.2 Is the change in overall pattern based on a fundamental change of the ruling pattern in 
the Political and Social Rights category?
The distribution in absolute numbers in the Social and Political Rights category mirrors that of 
the Finance category. The absolute number of cases are on the increase (Figure 13) in all three 
countries but the percentage these cases from of the total number of cases is near to 
unchanging in Germany and Italy. Only Austria sees a perceptible increase in the percentage of 
cases which are classed as cases under the Social and Political Rights category (Figure 14). 
This might prove to be an interesting development as Austria also is the odd one out in the 
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overall pattern change as its increase in review is based on an increase in partial 
unconstitutionality, the less controversial, rulings. 
Distribution of Cases in Social and Political Rights Category in Numbers
Figure 13: Development of number of cases 
in Social and Political Rights Category 
expresses in absolute numbers.
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Distribution of Cases in Social and Political Rights Category (% of Total Cases)
Figure 14: Development of number of 
cases in Social and Political Rights 
Category expressed in percentage.
In Austria the Social and Political Rights category  displays a similar overall decision making 
pattern as was seen in the total of cases (Figure 15). There is a definite increase in partial 
unconstitutionality rulings. However, there is also an increase in constitutional rulings as well 
as unconstitutional rulings, even if the rise is not as strong. This is a result of the general 
increase of Political and Social Rights cases overall. (Figure 16) expresses the development 
within the Social Political Rights category itself, not the development in respect to the total of 
cases (Figure 15). The development within the isolated group is a mirror image in respect to 
partial and constitutionality rulings of the overall development observed in Chapter 1 Figure 7. 
However, the expected decrease in unconstitutionality rulings is missing. 
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Distribution of Rulings in Austria as Percentage of Cases (all categories) in Social and 
Political Rights Category
Figure 15: Development of rulings in 
Social and Political Rights category in 
Austria. They are expressed as percentage 
of all cases (all categories)
Distribution of rulings in the Social and Political Rights Category in Austria
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Figure 16: Development of rulings in 
the Social and Political Rights category 
in Austria in %
Two questions need to be answered: 1. Is the change in the Social and Political Rights category 
enough to explain the change of the overall pattern? and 2. Why does the Social and Political 
Rights category in Austria mirror the overall development in Austria, but not in Germany and 
Italy, as can be seen below. The answer to the first question is displayed in Figure 17 below. 
The change in review levels in Austria overall can be almost entirely with the change in levels 
of review in the Social and Political Rights category. The percentage of laws seeing any form 
of review in the Social and Political Rights category  lies at 37.3% for the period 2000-2010, 
which is only 4.7% below the overall of 42% (Chapter 1 Table 3). For the 1990s, however, the 
explanatory  power of this category  is limited as here the review levels lies at below 10%, in 
comparison to the 50% in the overall distribution. Even combining it with the Finance cases, in 
which the 1990s see a higher level of review, the number still falls short by over 20%. In the 
2000s adding the two categories together leaves us merely 2% short. So the answer to the 
question if the change in the Social and Political Rights category can explain the overall 
pattern has to be no. Adding the two major categories of cases together seems to explain 
partially the 1990s and almost entirely  the 2000s in Austria. Nevertheless the source of the 
pattern change falls short in explaining the development in Germany and Italy. As the levels of 
review in both countries are almost unchanging in the social and political rights category  over 
the last 30 years (Figure 17). 
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
Partial Unconstitutional cases in Social and Political Rights (A)
C
as
es
 in
 %
Years
! 98
Comparison of levels of review expressed inPercentage of Cases (all categories) in Social 
and Political Rights Category
Figure 17: Levels of review in Social 
and Political Rights Category expressed 
in percentage of all categories.
The analysis of the Italian and German cases in the Social and Political Rights category the 
image is further refined. Figure 18 and 19 show that  the development of decision-making 
patterns in these two countries has nothing in common with each other or with that  of Austria. 
The only commonality observable is the fact that the decision-forms formerly considered most 
rare are on the increase (Kommers 1997; Modugno, Agro et  al. 2008). However, the increase 
in unconstitutionality  rulings in Germany and partial unconstitutionality  rulings in Italy as 
percentage of the total of categories is not grave enough to result in an overall increase of 
cases seeing review in this category as it tends to be coupled with a decrease in the more 
common form of decision format resulting in review, partial and full unconstitutionality 
rulings in Germany and Italy respectively (Figure 17). 
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Distribution of Rulings in Italy as Percentage of Cases (all categories) in Social and 
Political Rights Category
Figure 18: Development of rulings in 
Social and Political Rights category in 
Italy. They are expressed as percentage 
of all cases (all categories)
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Distribution of Rulings in Germany as Percentage of Cases (all categories) in Social and 
Political Rights Category
Figure 19: Development of rulings in 
Social and Political Rights category in 
Germany. They are expressed as 
percentage of all cases (all categories)
Within the category itself the overall pattern finds replication (Figure 20 and 21). Therefore, 
the overall change cannot be explained by this category either but the category in itself 
displays the same overall developmental markers. It therefore can be concluded that whilst 
social and political rights cases are not the root of the development overall their development 
is not entirely unlinked. Whilst it  cannot be concluded without doubt that the same explanatory 
factors will come to weigh within the category  as do for all cases combined it  seems likely and 
probable. The fact that increases in unconstitutionality rulings and partial rulings do not 
account for the overall pattern change simply indicates that the category of social and political 
rights cannot be the sole source of change. This is further supported by data from the 
environmental and educational areas below. 
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Distribution of rulings in Social and Political Rights Category in Germany
Figure 20: Development of rulings in the 
Social and Political Rights category
Distribution of rulings in Social and 
Political Rights Category in Italy
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Figure 21: Development of rulings in the 
Social and Political Rights category
4.2.3 Environment, Education and Other cases 1980-2008
No other category of cases has the potential to explain the overall pattern in its own right. The 
environment might form the third largest category in the last decade but was negligible for 
much of the period prior to that. Figure 22-28 all show that whilst we see an increase in 
absolute numbers, no category is becoming more predominant in percentage of the whole. 
Education cases only exist in a sufficient number in Italy and Germany and even there the 
numbers are small (Figure 23). This sounds promising as Italy and Germany show a different 
pattern in which kinds of review are on the increase. In Austria partial rulings were on the 
increase whilst Germany and Italy  see a rise in unconstitutionality rulings. However the 
numbers are simply not sufficient to explain the increase in rulings alone. 
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Distribution of Cases in Environment Category in Numbers
Figure 22: Development of number of cases 
in Social and Political Rights Category 
expresses in absolute numbers.
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Distribution of Cases in Environment Category in Percentage of Total Cases
Figure 23: Development of number of cases 
in Social and Political Rights Category 
expresses in percentage.
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Distribution of numbers of cases in Education category 
Figure 24: Distribution of cases in numbers and percentage in the Education category
This becomes even more apparent when considering the development of rulings within the 
totality of cases. As percentages within the increase in kinds of rulings seems to be evenly 
spread across the review categories and time. With other words whilst there is an increase for 
all kinds of rulings the increase is so evenly  spread among the kinds and years that not one 
single kind of ruling is evenly on the rise. Concerning constitutionality  rulings, they are clearly 
on the decrease in all three countries in the environment category (Figure 28) and education 
category (Figure 33). Levels of partial unconstitutionality rulings remain even over time or are 
on a slight decrease when concentrating on percentage of all cases. Therefore, both areas 
support the argument that, rather than one area being the cause for the change in levels of 
review, and especially unconstitutionality rulings, the cause of the change in abstract judicial 
review decision-making pattern is rooted in changes across the case categories. 
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Distribution of Rulings in Italy as Percentage of Cases (Environment)
Figure 25: Development of rulings in 
Environment category in Italy. They are 
expressed as percentage of all cases (all 
categories)
Distribution of Rulings in Germany as Percentage (Environment)
No partial rulings in % in Germany
Figure 26: Distribution of Rulings in Environment category in Germany in %.
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Distribution of Rulings in Austria as Percentage (Environment)
Figure 27: Distribution of Rulings in 
Environment category in Austria in 
%
Development of levels of review in the Environment category expressed in %
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Figure 28: Levels of review in Environment 
category expressed in % of category
Distribution of rulings in the Environment category in Austria in percentage of category
Figure 29: Development of rulings in 
Environment category in Austria. 
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Distribution of rulings in the Environment category in Germany in percentage of 
category
NO partial rulings in Germany
Figure 30: Development of rulings 
in Environment category in Austria
Distribution of rulings in the Environment category in Italy in percentage of category
Figure 31: Development of Rulings in the 
Environment category
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Number of rulings in total numbers and percentage in Education category in Germany 
and Italy
Figure 32: Development of education cases in % and number 
Development of rulings in Education category in Germany
Figure 33: Development of rulings in 
Education category in % of education 
cases. No partial rulings. 
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4.2.5 Other
Figure 34: Development of number of 
“other” cases in %
Development of rulings in “other” category
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Figure 35: Development of rulings in “other” category expressed in % of total 
The “other” category is in absolute numbers not important enough to influence an overall 
pattern-change significantly but it is interesting to see that cases in this category are not on the 
increase (Figure 34). 
4.3. Can the change in decision-making pattern in any of the categories explain the overall 
change?
The short  answer to this is: No. Table 1 to 4 give a summary of the above graphs and therefore 
illustrate the answer to the question well. There is an overall increase of abstract judicial 
review cases in all three countries evenly spread across categories, more so in Germany and 
Italy than in Austria. Only  the Finance category does not contribute to the increase in review, 
partial and unconstitutional combined, observed in Chapter I (Table 1). It therefore can be 
concluded that the change in pattern has a reason which holds sway over all categories, with 
the possible exception of finance (Table 1-4; red highlight). This directly contradicts the 
predictions judges made about the source of the change in pattern. In their impression, cases 
involving financial matters, are the cases in which politicians are most likely to test the borders 
they are set by the constitution and in which the quality of legislation has decreased most. 
Is there one category that can explain the increase in unconstitutionality rulings in Germany 
and Italy, and the decrease thereof in Austria? In the categories of Environment, Social and 
Political Rights and “other” all fit  the change in pattern regarding the increase in 
unconstitutionality rulings (Table 2-4; yellow highlight). It is therefore equally the case that the 
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changing pattern within the cases seeing review cannot be traced back to one single category. 
The change is observable in all but one category, finance. 
Finance Italy Germany Austria
Cases in 
Numbers
Cases in %
% of review
% of total
% in category
+ + +
= = =
= - -
uc c p uc c p uc c p
= + - - + = = + -
- + = - + - - + =
Table 1: Summary table of development in Finance category
Social and 
Political 
Rights
Italy Germany Austria
Cases in 
Numbers
Cases in %
% of review
% of total
% in category
+ + +
- = +
+ = +
uc c p uc c p uc c p
+ - = + + - + + +
+ - + + + - + - +
Table 2: Summary table of development in Social and Political Rights category
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Environment Italy Germany Austria
Cases in 
Numbers
Cases in %
% of review
% of total
% in category
+ + =
+ + -
+ + +
uc c p uc c p uc c p
+ + + + + 0 + - +
= = = = = 0 = + -
Table 3: Summary table of development in Environment category
Other Italy Germany Austria
Cases in 
Numbers
Cases in %
% of review
% of total
+ + =
= = -
+ + +
uc c p uc c p uc c p
+ = - + = - + + -
Table 4: Summary table of development in Other category
The only overall conclusion able to be drawn from the analysis of the cases in kind seems to be 
a realisation of a lack of overall pattern. Not one single category of cases can be held 
responsible to the change in overall pattern. Not one single category  is able to explain the 
overall pattern but rather the explanation must lie with an external factor influencing all the 
categories, with the possible exception of finance, equally. The hypothesis of this thesis posits 
that there is a “European” influence affecting the jurisprudence of constitutional courts. 
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4.4. Interesting statistics - style, membership and levels of trust
The literature reviewed in Chapter II showed however that standard research in the behaviour 
of courts is more concentrated on other potential influences rather than subject matter of the 
case. A first  exploration of the typical data such as composition, style and trust levels also 
shows interesting developments with potential explanatory power in respect to the search for 
reasons of the changed decision-making pattern. 
4.4.1 Style expressed through length of decisions
Style of decisions has often been linked to the length of the decisions (Holland and Webb 
2010: 284). Two forms of decisions are commonly identified: an interpretative style and a 
literal one, often also called the impure and pure style (Posner 1995). From the data relating to 
the length of cases in the three countries it becomes clear that they have developed very 
differently. Figure 36 shows that the average length of decisions has increased steadily over the 
last three decades in Italy. Between 1978 and 1993, the first  half of these 30 years, the average 
length of decision is 3.5 pages whilst  it is 7 pages after 1993. In Austria the development is 
converse. Figure 37 shows a steady decrease in the length of the text of decisions over the last 
three decades. In Germany, on the other hand, there seems to be no noticeable change in length 
of decisions (Figure 38). However, the German Constitutional Court is particular in so far that 
its decision texts are longer than those of the other courts. In the early 1980s Austria and 
Germany seem to have comparable length in texts of decisions but whilst  the Austrian case 
length has declined since, the German court’s case length remains constant.
Figure 36: The development of length of 
decisions in Italy. Length displayed as average 
per year excluding outliers. An outlier in 
statistics is a point in a sample widely separated 
from the main cluster of points in the sample. In 
this case it means a case which is more than ten 
pages different from any of the other cases that 
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Figure 37: The development of length of decisions in Austria. Length displayed as average per year excluding 
outliers. An outlier in statistics is a point in a sample widely separated from the main cluster of points in the 
sample. In this case it means a case which is more than ten pages different from any of the other cases that year.
Figure 38: The development of length of decisions in Germany
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The German Constitutional has been known for its interpretative and impure style since its 
inception. Its tendency to prefer a style which argues from first  principles, uses a high level of 
metaphors and interpretation of traditional philosophical and legal concepts has been 
commented on often in comparison to the US Supreme Court (Ackerman 1997: 797). The 
Italian Constitutional Court’s development on the other hand is less typical. The court has 
often been compared more with the US Supreme Court and its decisions were seen as very 
legalistic and “pure”. In this it  was perceived as a very legal positivist court (Merryman 1965: 
47; Casamassima 2008: 78). Notwithstanding, that the design of the Italian system is closest to 
those of the Austrian and German Constitutional Court (Groppi 2009: 129). The English 
speaking literature often assumes the closeness between the Austrian and German 
constitutional court without closer examination (Lijphart 2004: 105). 
For the period before 1978 both courts, the German Constitutional Court and the Austrian 
Constitutional Court, seem to develop similarly  at least concerning length of decisions. The 
average length of cases is around 14 for each year in the decade before 1978, even taking into 
account the constitutional reform of 1975 in Austria (Gamper 2007). The Austrian 
Constitutional Court was known for its interpretative style and its use of philosophical and 
legal concepts similar to the German Constitutional Court (Oehlinger 2007). Expectation based 
on forecasts developed from the early  years of both the German and the Austrian 
Constitutional Court therefore would lead to the assumption that both courts are 
representatives of the interpretavist, “impure” style and have, on average, longer decision texts 
than the Italian court. The Austrian constitutional’s average length of decision is however on 
the decrease over the last 20 years, suggesting a change in style. In Italy the development is 
converse with decisions becoming longer on average, also indicating a change in style. 
4.4.2 Membership of the court
Another interesting statistic lies withe the membership of the court. The increase in Academics 
on the bench has been noted in the literature before (Kommers 1997). The German 
constitutional court especially has always had the reputation of being highly  influenced by the 
high number of academics in its membership (Landfried 1984; Kommers 1997). It  has been 
argued that courts with higher numbers of academics use a more interpretative style in their 
decisions and the German court along with the European Court of Justice is generally cited as 
an example (Wald 1993; de Burca and Weiler 2001). The number of Academics on the bench is 
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often linked to the style a court exhibits in its decisions (Posner 2008). The hypothesis that 
higher numbers of academics in the membership  of the courts leads to greater evidence of the 
impure style in the case materials holds when applied to the current membership of the 
German, Austrian and Italian courts in so far as the German and Italian courts tend to have 
more academics on the bench than the Austrian one. Over the last three decades the 
membership of the Austrian constitutional court has changed away from over 50% academics 
to less than a third (Figure 39). The Italian Constitutional Court on the other hand has 
increased its membership of academics from half to two thirds (Figure 39). A higher number of 
academics in the membership of the court therefore coincides with more evidence of the 
impure, longer style, observed above, in the texts of decisions rendered
Figure 39: Academic Membership of the 
Constitutional courts of Italy, Germany and 
Austria
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So whilst  there seems to be no pattern at  all in the categories of cases there is a clear pattern 
relating to style and membership. It is further suggested by some of the literature that style and 
membership are related. Moreover, their development seems to be parallel with the 
development of unconstitutionality  rulings in all three countries. It  might therefore be possible 
to explain at least some of the pattern shifts through these variables. It still falls short to 
explain the overall change, the overall increase of any form of review. 
4.4.3. Levels of Public Trust
Both the change in style and membership therefore needs to be explained as well as the 
changing pattern in abstract  judicial review. A possibility is the amount of public criticism 
(Esterling 1998: 113; Epstein, Knight  et al. 2001). It has been postulated that higher levels of 
criticism will make a court cautious. The argument hypothesises that the court is dependent on 
public approval to insulate it against political reprisals (Ferejohn and Kramer 2006). A court 
can be more proactive if the political institutions are facing loss of public standing if they 
oppose the court (Kramer 2007). Therefore a court which enjoys high public standing is able to 
be more interpretative and active (Kramer 2004). The German Constitutional Court is often 
cited as a good example for this theory (Kommers 1987; Landfried 1994; Kommers 2006). 
The development of the decision-making pattern over the last three decades indicates a higher 
probability  of a law seeing review in its entirety  in Germany and Italy, a lower probability in 
Austria. Consequently, we would expect  no or few instances of public criticism in Germany or 
Italy whilst some or many criticisms in Austria in the 1980s. Additionally, we would expect 
high levels of public trust in Italy and Germany and lower ones in Austria. 
On first impression the last three decades seem to fit the image. The German Constitutional 
Court has always enjoyed high public regard and the political institutions have always 
displayed caution towards the court (Landfried 1984). This does not mean that there have been 
no criticisms, but for the most  part  they have been very  mild. Only in the recent  two years has 
there been increased criticisms by the political institutions starting with the protest  of the 
minister of the interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, when the constitutional court decided that the 
terrorist laws he had proposed were not  lawful (Jungholt and Mueller 20.1.2008). Shortly after 
that, the court’s public standing might have been damaged by the very public and political 
debate about the new appointment of the president of the court (Keil, Kerscher et al. 2008). 
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This was the first time in the history of the court when the appointment of a judge became a 
political issue. We have no actual research data on the impact this had on the trust of the 
population in the constitutional court. The last data are from 2009 (Figure 40) in which the 
court consistently  receives higher levels of trust and approval from the population than any of 
the other institutions. When looking at the same statistic over the last thirty years it becomes 
clear that the constitutional court consistently  has the highest level of approval in the 
population (Vorlaender and Brodocz 2006).12  Therefore the development in style and 
membership of the German Constitutional Court  fits the hypothesis that both are influenced by 
the level of public and political approval within the system the court exists within. 
Figure 40: Trust in the 
German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
in 2009 (Statista 2010)
The expectation is therefore met regarding the German constitutional court. Concerning the 
Austrian Constitutional Court, we would expect a period of criticisms in the 1980s which then 
leads to a change in style and membership. This holds true as well. The late 1970s and early 
1980s saw a very active court locking horns with the political institutions (Oehlinger 2007). 
This led to wide spread criticisms and the court withdrawing to become more legalistic in its 
public voice (Funk 2007). The 1990s and early  2000s were relatively free of criticism for the 
court. The last three years see Presidents of the Constitutional Court being more vocal in their 
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12 The court does loose some public approval in 1994 following the “soldiers are murderers” 
decision but it never falls lower than that of the other institutions. 
criticisms of political institutions in respect to human rights, democracy and equality. The 
same time period sees the court faced with more criticisms by political institutions as well 
(Gamper 2007; Gamper and Palermo 2009). This is interesting considering the indications of a 
change from a “pure” to a more “impure” style of decision-making in the last few years. At the 
same time opinion polls show a decrease in the trust of the public in the courts and the 
constitutional court in particular (Standard 2009; Zeitung 2009). Figure 41 displays levels of 
trust in the Austrian level system over the last three decades. Levels of trust decrease 
throughout the 1980s before increasing again in the 1990s. 
Figure 41: Trust levels into the Austrian legal system over the last three decades according to the World Values 
Service (Service 2009) 
We should expect the Italian Constitutional Court to either have little or no criticism in its 
history. Again, the assumption holds true. The Italian Constitutional Court has led a fairly 
unremarkable existence throughout the 1980s and early  1990s. However, this routine period 
without any  remarkable occurrences is important. There was no criticism for the court. The 
Italian Constitutional Court existed almost invisibly in Italian society without any  instances 
which drew either bad or good attention. The court then profited from the general increase in 
trust in the judiciary in general when the courts started the war against the Mafia and 
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corruption in general. The constitutional reform in 2001 leading to a shake-up in the 
relationship  between the national and regional levels of government has led to the court having 
a more visibly  important role in policy shaping (Groppi 2009: 144). So the higher regard for 
the judiciary  coincides here with a move from a more purist to a more impure style. Figure 42 
shows the development of levels of trust in Italy over the last three decades. Trust in the Italian 
legal system is on the increase over the last decade. 
Figure 42: Trust levels into the Italian legal system over the last three decades according to the 
World Values Service (Service 2009)
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4.4.4. Increased reference to extra-national concepts - namely “European” concepts.
The increased importance of supranational factors on courts and court decisions has been 
observed all over the world (Tate 1995). The statistical analysis of case materials in Germany 
Austria and Italy support this statement (Figure 43-45). 
Figure 43: Percentage of laws containing a reference to a supranational source of law in 
Germany
Figure 44: Percentage of laws containing a reference to a supranational source of law in 
Austria
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Figure 45: Percentage of laws containing a reference to a supranational source of law in 
Italy
In comparison to style, membership and trust, supranational reference are on the increase in all 
three countries. This is not entirely surprising, it has long since been argued that our world is 
becoming ever more aware of the international arena and courts are no exception. Even the 
United States Supreme Court is increasingly known to refer to supranational factors, if only  in 
passing and in obiter dicta (Duxbury 1995). Interesting, is the form this supranational 
reference takes as in over 98% of these cases the reference contains the word “European”. 
A first  assessment can be drawn relating to application of the common factors identified as an 
influence on a judge’s decision in the literature on constitutional courts generally and the first 
explorations of the data from the German, Austrian and Italian constitutional court. The 
literature on the influence the ruling elite has on the constitutional courts suggests that 
politically  difficult  decisions are decided in a way  that is in accordance with the ruling elite’s 
desires. Most of these cases will be found in the category of social and political rights and 
there is no indication that  the courts are shying away from declaring laws unconstitutional. Far 
from it, in this area there is a clear increase in review over the last  three decades. This might 
not necessarily signify  that the hypothesis that  courts are more likely to rule with the ruling 
elite in controversial cases is not applicable. Due to the way  the cases are categorised it is very 
possible that categories such as environment and especially  Finance also contain highly 
controversial cases and that it is therefore impossible to say  if courts are more likely to rule 
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with the interests of the ruling elite in controversial cases. On the other hand it will have to be 
seen if the courts are overall more likely to consider the desires of the ruling elite. However, 
there clearly  has been a change not only  in the decision-making pattern observed on these 
constitutional courts, and a change that cannot  be attributed to simply  a change in one category 
of cases whilst others remain unaffected. The categories give no indication for the reasons for 
this change. However, the change has developed parallel with a change in the membership  of 
courts, trust levels and a change of the overall style. Moreover, an increasing tendency to refer 
to the “European” in some format has been observed in the same time period. 
The literature has demonstrated that the traditional approach of research into the factors which 
influence the judge in his or her decision-making concentrate on one variable exclusively. 
Little research has, as yet, been undertaken which looks at the interconnectedness of various 
variables to explain a particular observed outcome. From a first investigation of the data 
relating to the Italian, German and Austrian constitutional court it is not possible to exclude 
certain influences in their entirety  - but it is possible to conclude that some variables seem 
more likely than others The hypothesis set out  in the first Chapter appears a probable from the 
above analysis. A first look at the data shows that parallel to the increase in review a change in 
the membership pattern and style of these courts can be identified. At the same time there is 
more recognition not only of European Community  laws and regulations within the texts of the 
decisions but also of more instances in which the courts refer to European obligations, values 
and ideals. This is not surprising when taking into account that a more interpretative style, the 
most likely reason for the longer court  cases, is often the result of increased academic 
membership. Furthermore, more interpretative styles are often characterised through more 
teleological arguments and discussions of values, obligations and ideals in the abstract. That 
within the European Union, an area in which each country faces the challenge to include the 
fast and extensive growth of European legislations into its national system, these debate are 
often found in conjunction to the word European is hardly surprising. To close the circle it  has 
been suggested in interviews that the increased number of academics appointed to the courts 
is, at  least in part, based on the necessity to increase the representation of specialist knowledge 
relating to areas in conjunction to the European Union in Germany and Italy. 
Although this argument of linking the variables of style, membership  and the “European” 
seems promising, it  also seems impetuous to discard the attitudes of judges, the influence of 
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the ruling elite and levels of public approval. A preference for a more teleological approach 
can be seen as an attitude of a judge or hide the preference of a judge for one political or moral 
choice over another. Also courts have been observed to be more interpretative in their style, 
and more likely  to produce high numbers of unconstitutionality rulings, if public levels of trust 
are high. It therefore still is necessary to test each possible hypothesis in turn before 
concentrating on finding an explanation for the increased levels of review in the three 
countries, and the rise in unconstitutionality rulings in Italy and Germany, by creating a more 
holistic image of the potential influence of a combination of variables.
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CHAPTER V
INTENT, PRECEDENT AND THE BLACK LETTER OF THE LAW
This chapter denotes the first  of five chapters testing the influence of the previously  identified 
variables on the decisions constitutional court judges take in abstract judicial review. Many 
lawyers and legal theorists over the years have argued that the only influence on a judge 
making a decision should be of a legal nature. With other words that only  the black letter of 
the law, precedent of a court of higher standing or the intent of the law-maker should matter in 
the decision the judge takes. This perspective of the role of a judge is a very commonly held 
position not only by academics but by the general public. The myth of legalism, the 
assumption that the judge only applies the tools given to him or her through the law, precedent 
and law-makers, has wide-ranging consequences for the understanding of constitutional 
courts13. As such, this chapter will first detail the importance of the legal variables for our, and 
more importantly, the judges understanding of constitutional courts and the actions of judges. 
To answer the question if a change in the decision-making patterns in abstract review was 
caused by the factors identified by the legalist school of thought three main questions have to 
be considered:
1. Has a change in the importance or treatment of the Black Letter of the Law14 caused higher 
levels of unconstitutionality rulings in abstract judicial review?
2. Did a change in the pattern of adherence or use of precedent cause more laws to see review 
under abstract judicial review in front of constitutional courts?
3. Is an increase in the importance allotted to the intent of law-makers a cause for more laws 
facing review in front of the courts?
Whilst the answer to all these questions will be shown to be inconclusive as to provide a 
reason for a change in the levels of laws seeing review, indication for a change in the legal 
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13 Legalism is not only a prescriptive but also a descriptive theory. Theorists have argued that not only 
should the judge be only motivated by the Black Letter, Precedent and Intent of the law-maker but that 
many are. It has been argued that especially those judges sitting on high courts have perfected the 
technique. See Posner, Richard. 2008. How Judges Think. London: Harvard Univeristy Press.
14 “Black Letter of the Law” is a term originally only applied to common law denoting legal rules and 
concepts which are free from doubt and dispute. They are understood as being commonly known and 
employed without doubt or interpretation in all courts the same way. As most literature on judicial 
review is based on the US Supreme Court the term is also applied to civil law countries. 
culture surrounding the Italian and Austrian court become apparent. These changes indicate 
that a study  into the philosophical attitudes of judges, the European dimension of law as well 
as a changed attitude towards the political branches might prove a more fruitful source in the 
search for the cause of the increased levels of review in abstract judicial review proceedings in 
these countries. 
5.1 Particularities of the Research design concerning the legal variables
For the most part research on the importance of the legal factors, the black letter of the law, 
intent and precedent, has been prescriptive rather than descriptive. Only recently has there 
been an effort to engage in empirical research into the influence legal factors have on the 
decision-making process in courts. This is partially due to two arguments: firstly, that one 
cannot compare legal concepts across legal areas or national borders. Secondly, that the 
concept of the Black Letter of the Law is not applicable to administrative or public law. Both 
of these concerns have to be addressed before presenting the empirical evidence relating to 
Precedent, the Black Letter of the Law and Intent. 
The problem of comparability  in respect to courts has been encountered and addressed in the 
literature at various points. Throughout the whole of this thesis a combination of statistical and 
qualitative analysis will be employed. The textual analysis of the cases will follow the 
example of Spaeth and Segal’s studies of the Supreme Court (1984, 1998, 2002) and 
concentrate on cases in the area of the environment, social and finance. These cases comprise 
around 70% of the cases of all three courts. This sets apart this chapter from other chapters in 
this thesis. Regarding all other variables a comprehensive analysis of all cases is possible but 
due to the intensity of textual analyses it is difficult to engage in an analysis of all cases. More 
importantly, following Segal and Spaeth’s example, it  is undesirable due to reasons of 
comparability. They argue that it  is not possible to compare judicial cases in a textual analysis 
of Black Letter law across subject lines due to the large difference in nature, procedure and 
expertise required. They therefore engage in a comparison within certain areas of the 
jurisprudence of particular courts. Following a close textual analysis of area such as search 
and seizure, finances, environment and social law they widen their analysis by  comparing 
these areas with each other (Epstein et al. 1998; Jacob et al. 1996; Kritzer 2005; Segal 1984, 
1986; Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 1995, 2004). They analysed search and seizure 
cases by searching the text for mention of “exact word”, “intent” and “precedent”. In their 
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2002 book (Segal and Spaeth 2002) they widen the research in terms of precedent, following 
certain cases and their “progeny”. In both instances they had found to be the influence of the 
“Black Letter of the Law” not to be sufficient to change the judge's desired decision. 
Their research differs from this study of European courts in two major ways: a) they 
concentrate on concrete review and therefore are only able to test their hypothesis on a small 
sample of cases. The relative scarceness of material in relation to abstract review allows a 
more thorough analysis of the cases in Germany Austria and Italy. Likewise, b) they 
concentrate for the main part on a quantitative analysis of the texts due to the vast number of 
cases they face in the US. Again, the advantage of the relatively  limited number of cases in 
abstract review allows for a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis. In general, 
there have been disputes of the applicability of the theory of the “Black Letter of the Law” to 
public or administrative law which have to be addressed before considering the empirical 
evidence.  
Secondly, the appropriateness of the application of the concept of the Black Letter of the Law 
to constitutional or administrative law has been drawn into doubt. The concept of the “Black 
Letter of the Law” is relatively  new and was originally an exclusively American term. It is 
based on the common practice which denoted that all codified rules and cases were referred to 
in texts by printing them in black-letter type. A reference to black letter law quickly signified a 
court referring to a concept it considered as generally known and free from doubt or dispute15. 
In recent years the term has become common in civil law countries as well, mainly through 
international trade law concepts (Perillo 1994-1995:282). However, the possibility of any 
“Black Letter Law” concepts in constitutional court jurisdiction has been doubted due to the 
necessity of interpretation in public law and especially administrative law (Gasaway 2005:27).  
This problem is well illustrated regarding the German “dignity clause” in the constitution. 
Article 1 of the German constitution protects “human dignity” and was meant as a catch-all 
paragraph to ensure the atrocities of the Third Reich could not be repeated. Early  on in court 
history, this Article was used to guide the decision on social security, family law, life 
imprisonment and later even environmental cases. In the last decade barely  any case is brought 
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15Naglee v. Ingersoll, 7 Pa. 185 (1847),Jackson ex dem Bradford v. Huntington, 30 U.S. 402, 
432 (1831)
to the court which does not refer to Article 1 in some form. The wide use of the term has 
caused the future Vice-president of the constitutional court to caution the need to use the 
Article less widely (Vosskuhle 2008). The problem lies defining “human dignity” closely 
enough. Whilst the concept of “human dignity” is considered an accepted and overriding ideal 
in the German courts the German constitutional court has not been able to define a usable 
definition that remains without dispute (Kommers 1997). This inability to define clear and 
indubitable borders to the concept of “dignity” contrasts widely with doctrine of trade law, the 
classic area of Black letter law. In trade law concepts and terms are more clearly defined 
simply  because they are based on concrete objects rather than ideals (Bhala 1999:849). 
Nevertheless, the attempt has been made to see in how far it is possible to analyse public law 
under the same stringent guidelines(Holmes 1998:710). For a legalist all legal concepts are in 
some form reducible to Black Letter concepts. This means that legal concepts are clear and 
indubitable for the judge who applies them and can therefore be applied to law across courts 
within the same jurisdiction (Dworkin 1998). It has been argued that eventually this will mean 
that in an area of European law the same concepts would also find applicability  across nations 
(Ward 2007). Therefore the jurisprudence of all three courts should develop similarly and use 
the same principles when coming to the Black Letter of the Law. The text of abstract judicial 
review cases in Germany, Austria and Italy show similar patterns of interpretation of legal 
concepts in the text of the decisions which might give credence to this claim. 
Having considered both possible objections to the research design regarding comparability  and 
applicability of Black Letter Law it is now possible to turn to the empirical evidence. 
Concerning comparability it is reasonable to assume that an analysis across legal areas and 
nations is possible as long as the comparison concentrates not  on the material meaning of 
concepts in particular, but how concepts are employed generally. The question if Black Letter 
is applicable in administrative or public law is simply  a theoretical corollary to the question if 
Black Letter Law influences the judge’s decision. Therefore, the answer depends very much 
on the empirical evidence discovered. This thesis can provide a step in this process by 
considering the empirical evidence if a change in the adherence to Black Letter Law has 
caused the change in the decision-making patterns in abstract judicial review jurisprudence in 
Austria, Italy and Germany. 
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5.2 Empirical Evidence: Black Letter and Precedent  
Adherence to Black Letter Law is notoriously difficult to analyse and the attempt has often 
been considered as futile and impossible (Cross 1997; Howard and Segal 2002; Reynolds and 
Buttolph Johnson 2008). It is true that there is no way to prove or disprove the amount of 
interpretation occurring within the head of a judge - however, it is possible to analyse case 
materials according to the level of interpretation contained. By no means will this be a 
conclusive answer to the question if judges were able to adhere to the Black Letter of the Law 
or needed to interpret the legal terms within their judgements. It  is still entirely possible that in 
cases where no evidence of interpretation is contained in the case materials the judges 
nevertheless employed interpretation in their minds. However, what the instances of 
interpretation in the case material is evidence for is the existence of a positive attitude towards 
interpretation at the court. When interpretation is used openly in case materials it  shows that 
the judges see nothing wrong with the necessity to consider possible alternative meanings of 
certain legal terms. Therefore, whilst a lack of evidence of interpretation in case materials is 
not evidence for a court’s belief in the strict adherence of Black Letter of the Law, the 
existence of interpretation in case materials cannot be seen as hiding a lack of interpretation. 
What is evidence of interpretation in this case? There are distinct differences in the way  case 
materials are phrased. On the one hand there are those cases which state the meaning of laws 
and terms without discussing possible alternate meanings.                                                            
“In effect the regional law of Valle d ‘Aoste (6 June 1977, n. 40, art. 4) states 
textually: “ The regional laws approved of with the regional Council n. 38, in 
date 10 February 1976, and n. 332, in date 30 September 1976, are repealed”.16
In this one page long decision there is no doubt about the meaning of the legislation but the 
assumption that in effect the textual meaning is clear. Other examples are (133/1986):
“.... the provisions,..., are formulated as authoritative: they convene special 
authority or permission, as defined through the textual meaning of proper use 
of the words, which exclude the operation...”17
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16In effetti la legge regionale della Valle d'Aosta del 6 giugno 1977, n. 40, all'art. 4 dispone 
testualmente: "Le leggi regionali approvate con provvedimenti del Consiglio regionale n. 38, in data 10 
febbraio 1976, e n. 332, in data 30 settembre 1976, sono abrogate
17... che i provvedimenti, ..., sono qualificati dalla legge solo come autorizzativi: sono o "speciali 
autorizzazioni", o "permessi", così testualmente definiti nel senso proprio del termine, per modo che, ai 
fini dell'esecuzione delle opere...
And G128/00 the court states:
“According to §12 No 3 Railway law the federal minister decides on the 
approval of the yearly  budget and the strategic plan as well as the termination of 
the employment of the members of the executive body. Herein the minister has 
to pay particular attention to the 1992 railway act.”18
In these cases the court states the meaning of legal principles, often simply mentioning laws 
by paragraph numbers. 
However, in other case materials the courts engage in interpretation by discussing legal 
concepts and alternate possible meanings. Here not only the discussion of meaning and 
definition of norms and phrases is common but also reference to non-codified legal ideals and 
obligations inherent in the constitutional structure (V90/82 (principles of the rule of law), 
V35/82). The last decade has seen the Italian court move to the same style of decision with 
recurrent reference to “national legal ideals” (411/1993), “European/international 
norms” (412/1993) and “community obligations” (353/2004). This frequent mention of legal 
principles, which arise from the mere structure of the state or the philosophical underpinnings 
of democracy have always been a common feature of the German constitutional court 
decisions. 
“The national legal ideal  of comparable conditions of living is only  then 
threatened when the conditions of living are....”19 (BvF 1/01)
There is no explicit federal “legal ideal” of comparable living standards expressly contained 
within the constitution. Rather it is a construct based on the jurisprudence of the constitutional 
court, which sees it  contained within the ideal of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Unsurprisingly, this different, more interpretative, style also finds expression in the length of 
decisions. Those decisions with little interpretation are noticeably shorter than those with 
interpretation. It  is therefore possible to give a statistical overview of all cases concerning 
level of interpretation and a more detailed qualitative analysis of approximately 70% of cases 
by concentrating on environment, financial and social cases. 
!
! 133
18Gemäß §12 Abs3 BundesbahnG entscheidet überdies die Bundesministerin über die Genehmigung 
des Jahresabschlusses und des Lageberichtes sowie über die Entlastung der Mitglieder des 
Vorstandes und des Aufsichtsrates, wobei insbesondere auf die Bestimmungen des BundesbahnG 
1992 Bedacht zu nehmen ist
19Das bundesstaatliche Rechtsgut gleichwertiger Lebensverhältnisse ist vielmehr erst dann bedroht 
und der Bund erst dann zum Eingreifen ermächtigt, wenn sich die Lebensverhältnisse
5.2.1 The development of interpretation in case materials based on length of decisions
When looking at the three countries the development of cases seems to have little in common. 
The length of German cases has remained steady over time with an average of 14 pages.20 
Italian cases have increased steadily over the last 30 years whilst Austrian cases have 
decreased in length.  
Germany- 
1990
Germany
1990 -
Italy
-1990
Italy
1990-
Austria
-1990
Austria
1990-
Length
(in average 
calculated 
per year)
14 14 
(one outlier 
98)
3.5 7 15 5
Table 1: Levels of interpretation measured in length of decision calculated per year and 
decade
When looking at the decisions in more detail this development becomes even more obvious. 
The shortest text of decisions in Germany  is five pages whilst Austrian cases tend to be only 
two pages long today. The length of the Austrian texts however seems to have steadily 
decreased over the last two decades. Those Austrian texts pertaining to cases in the early and 
mid 1980s are substantially longer, on average 7 pages long. This development can be found 
in reverse in Italy. Here the length of texts has steadily increased over time to reach an average 
of 7 throughout the last five years. This is still only half the length of the average length of 
German cases.  The German constitutional court is known for its academic style in writing 
decisions, which might explain the more discursive and lengthy style of German court 
decisions. However, the length of the decisions is based not only  on the regular use of 
academic works and commentaries within the texts but also on the discussion relating to the 
legal provisions and interpretation. The length of the decision is therefore an indication for the 
style of the text written. It is therefore interesting to consider if this change in length in Italy 
and Austria indicates that the style of their decisions closer or further away from the style of 
German decisions.  
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20 calculated per year
5.2.2 The development of interpretation on case materials based on style 
The style of the German court’s decisions have always been considered more interpretative 
and academic than other courts (Kommers 1997; Landfried 1984). Examples for this can be 
found spanning the last three decades. In a German case brought to the court by members of 
one of the Länder parliaments in 2000 the legitimacy of an environmental protection law was 
doubted. Here the court spends considerable time defining property (page 15 of BvK1/00). 
More important however is its reasoning of the necessity of applying concepts of property in 
the name of the rule of law. The Länder government had argued that Article 14 of the basic 
law, the guarantee of property, is not applicable to a Länder government as that  institution only 
has to follow the rules within the Land constitution. That particular constitution did not 
contain a provision for the sanctity of property, which would allow the Land to buy a certain 
area for the purpose of environmental protection.  The constitutional court replied:
“Article 14 of the basic law does not apply  directly to the cases in front of Land 
constitutional courts. The Land constitution also does not contain any 
provisions, which would make the basic law directly applicable as basic laws of 
the Land constitution. However there exists an institutional guarantee which 
makes property in an individual and subjective to an objective part of the 
whole. This institutional guarantee does also apply to the Land constitution. A 
Land, which as part of the federal republic has to follow the institutional 
guarantee in the interest of the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip)... Parts of the 
constitutional order within the Land are those “institutions” which are 
guaranteed by  the basic law. In accordance with this analysis the judicature as 
well as literature have accepted non-codified components as part of the 
constitutional whole such as institutional guarantee of the existence of parties, 
the civil service and local self-administration.”21 
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21Das Grundrecht des Art. 14 GG sei zwar, wie auch die anderen Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes, 
nicht Maßstab des Landesverfassungsrechtsstreits; auch kenne die Landesverfassung keine 
Transformationsnorm, die Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes zu solchen der Landesverfassung mache. 
Es bestehe aber eine Institutsgarantie, welche die individuell-subjektive (grundrechtliche) 
Eigentumsfreiheit auf objektiv-struktureller Seite zu einem Gesamtkomplex freiheitlicher Verbürgung 
ergänze. Diese Institutsgarantie müsse auch Element der Landesverfassung sein. Dies lasse sich 
schon aus der Einordnung Schleswig-Holsteins in den staatlichen "Gesamtstandard" der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland gemäß Art. 1 LV herleiten... Zur verfassungsmäßigen Ordnung in den 
Ländern im Sinne von Art. 28 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GG zählten die vom Grundgesetz garantierten 
"Einrichtungen". Entsprechend hätten Judikatur und Literatur als ungeschriebene Bestandteile der 
Landesverfassungen etwa die institutionelle Garantie der Mitwirkung politischer Parteien, die 
kommunale Selbstverwaltung oder ein nach hergebrachten Grundsätzen gestaltetes 
Berufsbeamtentum anerkannt.
So here the German constitutional court argues for non-codified philosophical components to 
have constitutional value. Furthermore, certain rights are conferred on the people and 
governmental agencies simply because they are institutions within a state observing the rule of 
law, a Rechtsstaat. This is a form of interpretation of the word of the law as there is no clear 
and explicit  definition of the term contained in any of the legal texts – even if the rule of law 
and its protection is contained in the German constitution.
Other cases from 1998, 1994 and 1983 also lend themselves as examples of forms of 
interpretation can also be seen when looking at 2BvF1/94 where the court spends four of the 
ten pages of the decision detailing what an administrative directive is. For this purpose it 
quotes material from the plenary discussions in parliament as well as academic work.
“A failure to follow the referencing guidelines contravenes an “indispensable 
element of the democratic rule of law” (compare to Bartelsperger, Zur 
Konkretisierung verfassungsrechtlicher Strukturprinzipien, VerwArch 58 
(1967), S. 249ff. (270). Such a failure would lead to the directive being 
declared void (compare Wilke in: v. Mangoldt/Klein, Bonner Grundgesetz, 2. 
Aufl. 1969, Art 80 Anm. Xl. 2 d; Nierhaus, a.a.O., Rn328 "formelle 
Wirksamkeitsvoraussetzung"; Bauer in: Dreier Hrsg., Grundgesetz, 
Kommentar, Bd. 2 1998, Art. 80 Rn. 43; Ossenbühl in: HStR III, § 64 Rn. 
65).”22 (BvF3/90)
The German court’s style in its decisions is therefore very discursive and interpretative, 
making wide use of materials outside the law such as academic writings and plenary protocols. 
The German’s court use of direct quotes from laws is limited. In most instances it quotes the 
law being questioned in full or large parts in the beginning but thereafter only refers to the 
laws used by number (e.g. Paragraph 18 Abs.1 Nr.2 BVerfGG (2BvF1/98)). These numbers are 
often followed by quotes of terms out of the text, which then are elaborated upon, such as in 
case 2BvF1/98, where the court discusses the meaning of the term “in the same matter” which 
is contained in the article mentioned before. Therefore the style of the cases is very discursive 
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22Eine Mißachtung des Zitiergebots verletzt ein "unerläßliches Element des demokratischen 
Rechtsstaates" (vgl. Bartlsperger, Zur Konkretisierung verfassungsrechtlicher Strukturprinzipien, 
VerwArch 58 <1967>, S. 249 ff. <270>). Ein solcher Mangel führt deshalb zur Nichtigkeit der 
Verordnung (vgl. Wilke in: v. Mangoldt/Klein, Bonner Grundgesetz, 2. Aufl. 1969, Art. 80 Anm. XI. 2 d; 
Nierhaus, a.a.O., Rn. 328 <"formelle Wirksamkeitsvoraussetzung">; Bauer in: Dreier <Hrsg.>, 
Grundgesetz, Kommentar, Bd. 2 1998, Art. 80 Rn. 43; Ossenbühl in: HStR III, § 64 Rn. 65).
consistently over the whole thirty years.  Many sources have commented that the increase in 
interpretation in constitutional court decisions to be a common development across the world 
in the 1990s (Jackson and Tate 1992; Koopmans 2003; Rogowski and Gawron 2002; Stone 
1992). In case of the German court this clearly is a practice consistently  applied even before 
the 1990s. 
The Austrian and Italian courts’ style is consistent over the last three decades. Similarities can 
however be found in both countries. Firstly, the length of decision seems to vary over time. 
Italian decisions have increased in length reaching an average of close to the German cases. 
Austrian cases on the other hand have decreased in length. The early 1980s see decisions in 
length similar to those of the German court. This might be due to the court regularly quoting 
whole Articles of law as well as debating phrases and legal concepts contained within 
paragraphs and codicils. In this time period there are also extensive debates on the meaning of 
terms. In like manner, in respect to property, the Austrian court writes in 1982 (G35/81): 
“In this case the doubts of the court relate to the possibility  that an 
undifferentiated inclusion of public property into the agricultural order, to 
which the constitutional law relating to farmland applies, will cause 
disproportionate preferential treatment towards some members of the society 
which is against  the principle of equality under the rule of law. If this applies in 
certain instance then the non-conformity  of these situations with the 
constitutional norm of equality are mirrored back onto the whole law...”
Here the Austrian constitutional court  uses the rule of law, or the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, as a 
reason within its decision. The style is discursive; setting out the reasons not related directly  to 
the strict word of the law in detail and discussing them. This is very  similar to the German 
court and further similarities can be found in the regular and extensive use of its own 
precedent, even more than is the case in Germany, to justify its actions. 
However, the style of the Austrian constitutional court has changed over time. Cases from the 
1990s and 2000s are shorter and less discursive. The number of references to past cases has 
decreased by half and laws are mainly quoted as numbers rather than discussing them within 
the text of the decision.
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“The constitutional court does not doubt that  the environment is a fragile good and 
that its protection is a desirable concern. Its protection is contained in the duties of 
the state (see VfSlg 11294/1987 with reference to BGB1 491/1984).” (G312/97)
It is not discussed why environmental protection is part of the duties of the law, as seen above, 
but rather there is an assumption that through reference to prior cases and laws it undoubtedly 
is. In general, whilst there is extensive reference to the numbers denoting laws, there is little to 
no discussion of meaning. Thus a clear assumption underlies the application of the laws, 
which is that there is only one interpretation. The same can be observed in the Italian cases 
from the 1980s. Also little doubt of a single interpretation of the law becomes visible in the 
text.  
“Article 1 of law 47, opening paragraph, allows that “the regions emanate norms 
controlling matters of urban planning and building and decide administrative 
endorsements in conformity  with heading 1,2 and 3 of this law”; while “it is in 
each case a matter of discharge” - as arranged in the third codicil - “the special 
competencies of the regions of special statute and the autonomous regions of Trent 
and Bolzano” 179/1987
A further example can be found in another case from the same period:
“Decree Number 384 of 1987, and the connected law 470 of 1987, has its cause in 
the exceptional atmospheric adversities under which Northern and Central Italy 
came to suffer in summer 1987 for several weeks. Such events, when determined 
as grave emergencies, force the state institutions to compete with local powers 
through employment of a wide range of technical and financial resources” 
966/1986
Parts of the laws are used within the text, not to have their meaning discussed but rather to 
state facts, which have no interpretation. Therefore the cases taken from Italy in the 1980s and 
Austria since the 1990s are very  different stylistically from the German cases. The text shows 
little interpretation, little doubt  on the single meaning of the word of the law and fewer 
precedents quoted.  
That is not to say that there is no interpretation of laws in Austria and Italy  at that time, simply 
that this interpretation is not contained clearly within the text of the decision. This is also 
characterised by stating the intent of the law as seen below:
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“The law under examination was not intended, in fact, in any way to determine the 
categories of prisoners through their work relationships, thus to affect or condition 
prison life and the conditions of atonement through punishment, but wanted 
simply  to offer prison administration the possibility to engage the prisoners in 
socially useful employment.” (2/1990)     
Here there is no debate what the law could mean or why a certain interpretation has been 
undertaken but simply an assumption that this is the only possible way.
However, when looking at cases taken from the 1980s in Austria or late 1990s in Italy 
interpretation contained within the text is clearly visible. Here not only the discussion of 
meaning and definition of norms and phrases is common but also reference to non-codified 
legal ideals and obligations inherent in the constitutional structure (V90/82 (principles of the 
rule of law), V35/82). The last decade has seen the Italian court move to the same style of 
decision with recurrent reference to “national legal ideals” (411/1993), “European/
international norms” (412/1993) and “community  obligations” (353/2004). These frequent 
mention of legal principles, which arise from the mere structure of the state or the 
philosophical underpinnings of democracy have always been a common feature of the German 
constitutional court decisions. 
Stylistically a definite trend can therefore be identified. The text of decisions shows increasing 
empirical evidence of interpretation in Italy, decreasing in Austria and is stable across the 
decades in Germany. The overall development across the last three decades therefore indicates 
that Austria develops conversely to Italy  and Germany when comparing the style. The 
statistical evidence concerning length of court materials supports this development. 
5.3 Is there a correlation between the level of interpretation in the case materials and the 
increased levels of review in abstract judicial review?
On first impression the development of levels of interpretation in the case materials seems to 
have little in common with the increasing trend of review in all three countries. This stylistic 
development however is more promising as an explanation when looking at the levels 
unconstitutionality rulings. These, as opposed to partial unconstitutionality rulings, are 
increasing in Italy and Germany whilst they are on the decrease in Austria. So the stylistic 
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development in Austria is mirrored by the development of unconstitutionality rulings. 
However, just because the development displays a similar trend in the case of Italy and 
Austria, the same development cannot be found in Germany. And it  does not explain why 
more interpretation, and consequently longer decision texts, would be a result  of increased 
levels of unconstitutionality  rulings in Italy whilst the reverse causes lower levels of 
unconstitutionality in Austria. There is no significant link between the decision rendered and 
the style of the judgment. When running a Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficient analysis 
between the level of interpretation (x) and the decision rendered (y) in the case no statistical 
correlation is apparent (Spearman’s Rho measure of association 0.01).  
The Spearman Correlation Coefficient is:
    0.01 = rs=1- ((6(ΣD2)/(N(N2- 1)) 
Formula 1: Where 6 is a constant within the formula (it is always used in the formula), D 
refers to the difference between a subject’s ranking of the two variables (e.g. x = level of 
interpretation = 5 and y  = decision rendered = 2; D = 3), and N is the number of subjects. This 
correlation is significant at a 99% confidence level (Field 2005).
The developmental trends identified hold over the whole range of cases analysed and all the 
decisions rendered. They are neither stronger nor weaker in any  of the legal areas or decisions 
rendered. It is therefore possible to conclude that there is no statistical relation between a case 
seeing review and a style that is more interpretative. 
5.4 The development of the use of precedent
The same developmental trends hold for the number of precedents used in the decisions. Just 
as with the level of interpretation the average number of precedent used remains stable in 
Germany, increases in Italy and decreases in Austria. A steady average of 1.3 per page in 
Germany, increase in Italy from 0.6 to 1 and decrease from 2.3 to 1 in Austria. So here as well 
Austria and Italy  have an opposing development trend which brings them closer to the steady 
levels in Germany. 
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Germany
- 1990
Germany
1990 -
Italy
-1990s
Italy
1990s-
Austria 
- 1990s
Austria
1990s-
Precedent 
average per 
page
1.3 1.3 0.6 1 2.3 1
Table 2: Number of precedent on average calculated per year and per decade
It has been argued that  a judge uses precedent as an aid to fill in those areas in which the black 
letter of the law is lacking in direction. Therefore, higher levels of interpretation, as were 
found to exist in Germany and Italy  in the previous section, should lead to higher numbers of 
precedent being referred to. Statistically this proves to be true.  There is a strong correlation 
between the levels of interpretation (x) and the number of times precedent is used (y) in the 
decision texts (Spearman’s 0.65). 
The Spearman Correlation Coefficient is:
    0.655 = rs=1- ((6(ΣD2)/(N(N2- 1)) 
Formula 2: Where 6 is a constant within the formula (it is always used in the formula), D refers to the difference 
between a subject’s ranking of the two variables (e.g. x = level of interpretation = 5 and y = number of precedent 
= 7; D = - 2), and N is the number of subjects. This correlation is significant at a 99% confidence level (Field 
2005).
However, just as there is no correlation between the level of interpretation and the decision 
rendered, so there is no correlation between the decision rendered and the number of precedent 
used. So whilst the development of unconstitutionality  rulings in Austria, Germany  and Italy 
co-vary  with the levels of interpretation and precedent their development measured on a case 
to case basis is not enough to be linked. To be exact the R2 value (0.13) indicates that only 
13% of the variation in the dependent variable (a law seeing review) is explained by the 
number of precedent and the level of interpretation in the decision. This indicates that there is 
another factor, an antecedent variable, which influences all three, the level of interpretation, 
precedent and the level of review. 
A hint to the identity of the antecedent variable in question has to be found outside the 
statistics. A possible source are the differing and changing socio-political circumstances 
surrounding the courts, such as the image of the judge. Moreover, it  has been argued that 
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courts are dependent on the political branches as they have no enforcement methods when it 
comes to abstract judicial review (Comella 2009:14). A court  cannot force the political 
institutions to follow its judgement and consequently  is dependent on external factors forcing 
compliance. The perceived loss of legitimacy by political institutions if they act against the 
court is one of these external forces (Epstein et al. 2001). Another is the educational 
socialisation of the judges into certain patterns of behaviour (Gibson 1983). If either of these, 
the public image of the judge, pressures by political institutions or philosophical attitudes of 
judges, is able to explain the change in style and the change in the decision-making patterns 
the missing link is established. It therefore needs to be considered now in what way, or if, any 
of the three variables are linked to either style or/and decision-making patterns. The following 
chapters will then consider if this link is evidence of covariance. With other words, two 
questions need to be ascertained:
1. Can a change in the public image of the judge, pressures by the political institutions or 
changes in the philosophical attitudes of judges cause a change in the decision-making 
patterns of the courts in abstract norm review? A question considered below
2. Does a change in the public image of the judge, pressures by the political institutions or 
changes in the philosophical attitudes of judges cause a change in the decision-making 
patterns of the courts in abstract norm review? Which will be discussed in the next three 
chapters.
5.5 The public image of the judge as antecedent variable
However, the public image of the judge is not only important in its consideration as an 
antecedent variable. To evaluate, analyse and understand not only the style in which decisions 
are written but also the underlying messages within interviews, the expectation the interviewee 
has of his role has to be understood. Moreover, an interviewee’s perception of his own role is 
not only informed by society’s perception of said role but he or she also reinforces this social 
perception by attempting to conform to it. “To understand what people are saying, 
interviewers learn to hear the taken-for-granted assumptions of the interviewees and try  hard 
to understand the experiences that have shaped these assumptions”. (Rubin and Rubin 1995:9). 
Knowledge of the societal image of the judge is therefore essential to understand the way 
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cases are presented and the way judges act when making a decision. This societal image is 
bound closely  to the legal variables, as only they  allow for the assumption of the judge as an 
impartial arbiter, as we have seen it to be presented in the United States. What is the situation 
in Europe? 
Like their US colleagues the German, Austrian and Italian judges face regular accusations of 
taking the constitution into their own hands, but the areas in which they are accused of this 
differ extensively from country to country. German judges are rarely accused of ignoring the 
law in their decisions but rather of giving extra-judicial advice even when not asked for an it. 
They  are criticised for having a high media presence. On the other hand, the Austrian and the 
Italian court rarely give interviews but regularly is accused by the political branches of “taking 
the law into their own hands”. However there are notable differences between Europe and the 
United States. The perception of the judge is in Europe, as in the US, the perception of an 
impartial arbiter simply applying the tools (the legal variables, identified above as Black Letter 
Law, Precedent and Intent) given to him. However, in some of the European countries this 
image includes the assumption that judges through their training are allowed to apply their 
expertise more widely. 
It has been argued that a constitutional court is only  able to openly interpret law when its 
legitimacy  is not in question (Epstein et al. 2001:119). The argument of the public image of a 
judge as antecedent variable goes as follows:
Premise:   A court can only be chastised by political institutions
Premise: Political institutions want to preserve legitimacy in the eyes of the 
     public
Premise: Legitimacy  in the eye of the public is higher with courts than it is with 
     political institutions
Premise:   If political institutions chastise courts they loose legitimacy
Conclusion: The court cannot be chastised (as long as its perceived legitimacy 
          is higher than that of the political institutions)
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The perception of what a judge can and cannot legitimately do is therefore a framework for the 
answers a judge can give in media interviews, as well as for the style the decisions are written 
in. For the judge to preserve legitimacy and therefore the efficiency of the court he or she has 
to be seen as acting within the social perception of what a judge is. Within that perception he 
or she is safe from political criticism that will cost him or the court public legitimacy. A 
change in the public image of what is legitimate for the court to do or decide on can therefore 
create reasonable leeway for interpretation for courts.   
In all three countries the perception of the judge is primarily of a legal entity. However, when 
considering the political identity of constitutional court judges two distinct perceptions 
become apparent.  The German judge is seen as applying the law faithfully in his or her 
deliberations of cases but also as a necessary and qualified source for legal interpretation. In 
the German mind it is obvious that there is a certain leeway in the interpretation of laws but 
that the education and experience of the judge make him or her well qualified to engage in this 
interpretation. It is only when the judge seems to offer advice in policy  areas not related to 
current cases that criticism is offered.  
 
In spring 2008 this was demonstrated vividly with public discussions and accusations between 
the Minister for the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble and the constitutional court judges, especially 
Chief Justice Papier. Wolfgang Schäuble did not criticise the court for diverging from the law 
in the decisions it  rendered but rather from giving advice and hints to politicians in interviews. 
He said:
“There is a limit  to all the areas which are protected by basic rights. Where 
these limits lie and how one separates the areas is for the legislature to decide. I 
understand that many constitutional court judges would love to give advice but 
they have no legitimisation for it.”23
This criticism is typical for the current debate in Germany but not for the Austrian and Italian 
debates. 
!
! 144
23Alle grundrechtlich geschützten Bereiche enden irgendwo. Wo diese Grenzen sind, wie man die 
gegensätzlichen Interessen abgrenzt, ist Sache 
 Gesetzgebers. Ich verstehe, dass manche Verfassungsrichter gern Ratschläge geben würden. Dazu 
sind sie aber nicht demokratisch legitimiert. Welt Online http://www.welt.de/politik/article1571640/
Schaeuble_greift_Verfassungsrichter_scharf_an.html
Whilst the German judges are more likely  to be criticised for their extra judicial remarks the 
Austrian and the Italian court are criticised for behaving like a political institution in their 
decision-making. Notable here are the criticisms by the Austrian politician Jörg Haider (Wolf 
2006) and the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Haider repeatedly accused the 
constitutional court of adjusting law to its political ideals when making a decision. In 2006 
when debating a new law concerning linguistic standardisation Haider accused the court of 
being a politicised power in relation to a concrete pending case:
“I am sure that the politicised powers in the court will find a way to turn the 
decision against Kärnten (standardisation) “ (Wolf 2006)
Berlusconi attacked the Italian court with the same accusation, even if it was after a decision 
was made rather than before, when the court declared a law on criminal immunity  for 
politicians as unconstitutional. 
Therefore the perception of the judge in Germany is one of a legitimate law-maker as long as 
he or she is concentrated on a case in front of the court. The Anglo-American image of the 
judge as purely applying the tools given to him or her by the law without room for much 
interpretation is therefore not prevalent  in Germany. In Italy and Austria the situation seems to 
be different. Here the image of the judge is very  Anglo-American based on the assumption that 
in their work the Black Letter of the Law gives them clear and indubitably right instructions as 
to how to decide a case. The accusation of law-making is therefore of serious importance in 
these two countries, more so than in Germany, and all the data taken needs to be evaluated 
under this point of view. 
Partially  the difference in the perceptions of the courts can be attributed to the access the court 
has to the public and therefore the opportunity  it has to influence the public image of the court. 
The German court, through its media office, has always had the opportunity to engage with the 
public and has always made good use of this opportunity. This is not the case in either Austria 
and Italy. Interviews with Austrian and Italian judges are rarer than interviews with German 
judges. Whilst it is possible in any year to find various interviews with German judges 
published in German newspapers the number of interviews from Austrian and Italian judges 
are less frequent. In a decade an Austrian or Italian judge might  only agree once to give an 
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"Ich bin mir sicher, dass die politisierenden Kräfte im VfGH wieder mit irgendeinem Trick eine Entscheidung 
gegen Kärnten herbeiführen" (Wolff 2006) 
interview to the media (or more likely be asked only once). In these few interviews the 
Austrian representation of their judges is more legalist  than the German representation. In Italy 
accusations of the wrong interpretation of the law are common: judges are accused of 
interpreting the law to fit  their political ideals or those of the government. However, there is 
no indication for extreme legalism such as displayed by Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin 1977, 
1998; Whittington 2000) in either country, not even Austria. A certain leeway  in the 
application of law is presupposed, just as limits to the freedom of interpretation are considered 
as commonly understood, and any discussion of the adherence to single possible meanings of 
legal concepts is absent. The Austrian court has only had a media representative since 2001 
whilst the Italian court still has none. The Austrian and the Italian court are therefore regularly 
criticised for acting politically, i.e. interpreting the law to fit their political desires, rather than 
legally, without ever having the possibility to react to the accusations. They  are criticised for 
interpreting the law to fit their political desires. This emphasises the legalist understanding of 
the position the court in both countries. Interestingly, these criticisms in Austria are often 
followed by demands that the “law should return” (Wolf 2006) to its original state. Therefore 
implying that the general understanding is that there is a way to apply  the law without 
interpreting it  but that the court had moved away from this position wilfully ignoring the 
Black Letter of the Law for their own interpretation. Clearly  in the development of the 
Austrian court something has happened which has changed the court from applying the law to 
making the law in the eyes of the country. Only since the late 1980s the Austrian court appears 
to face accusations of judicial activism. Moreover, these accusations seem to lessen in 
frequency since their high point  in the early  1990s (Gamper 2000). The Italian court on the 
other hand has only been facing accusations of judicial activism within the last few years, a 
circumstance virtually unknown prior to 2001. Again this hints at a change in the view of 
judges, or in the behaviour of judges. The question remains to be seen if this change in Austria 
and Italy  is the cause for the increased levels of review in abstract judicial review or if another 
factor, as yet undiscovered, has caused the change in attitudes alongside a change in review 
levels. 
However, if this change in attitudes towards the court is the reason for the changed 
unconstitutionality levels in abstract review then the unchanged attitude in Germany presents a 
problem. The view of the constitutional court in Germany seems to always have been less 
legalistic. In 1964 Georg August Zinn, then Prime Minister but before that a serving member 
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of the constitutional council designing the constitutional court, declared the constitutional 
court a success because it decides whether laws are according to the word and spirit of the 
constitution (Ziegler 1964). Through decisions on referenda for nuclear electricity and public 
television stations the court “has shown the federal and state governments and parliaments the 
constitutional limits of their powers and has given the numerous regulations of the basic law 
real substance”24  (Ziegler 1964). So already in the 1950s, shortly  after its foundation, the 
constitutional court was seen as adhering to the spirit  of the law and giving the law substance 
rather than simply applying law and taking substance from it. Additionally, the court was 
praised for these actions. The discussion itself has therefore a different flavour. In 
interpretation of the constitution the judges are, in the opinion of the public and politicians, 
obliged to also protect the spirit  of the constitution. The criticism is levelled at the extra-
judicial activities. Schäuble and others suggest restraint regarding to suggestions made in the 
media by constitutional court judges on how politicians should and can phrase future 
legislation. Even among judges there seems to be division on this topic. Justice Hassemer, in 
an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine, supported the calls for restraint  when giving 
suggestions to politicians. Legalism therefore seems to take a different form in Germany. The 
necessity of interpretation of the law when applying it to a case is not in doubt. What is in 
doubt, and always has been, is the right of a judge to be vocal about possible future topics in 
front of the court? Therefore, whilst the Italian and Austrian attitudes towards their judges has 
changed towards a clear display of legalism in the Anglo-American sense no such view can be 
identified in Germany either today or in the past.  
There is a second component to the public image of the judges - the way they themselves 
present their position in the media. They regularly face questions of judicial activism and their 
answers in format as well as content are enlightening in the face of reconstructing the image 
being formed. After a controversial ruling Professor Adamovich, then president of the Austrian 
Constitutional Court, was asked to comment on accusations of the court putting itself “above 
the law”. This is one of the very few interviews given by an Austrian judge and 
characteristically to interviews in all three countries. The answer of Professor Adamovich 
concentrated on specific topics, in this case the appointment procedures of judges. However, it 
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24“ …den Regierungen und Parlamenten von Bund und Ländern die verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen 
ihrer Befugnisse verdeutlicht und zahlreichen Bestimmungen des Grundgesetzes faßbare Konturen 
verliehen."
is clearly  visible that  he is aware of the accusations of political influence on decisions when he 
says:
“Where there is a constitutional court there is also a certain political influence. 
This is not necessarily bad – as long as the judges are highly qualified and follow 
their conscience enough so that they  do not decide in the interest of the political 
parties but rather how the law dictates and they what they see as right” 25 (Klenk 
2002)
This is a typical example. The Austrian judge is emphasising the fact that even if there is the 
potential political influence the fact that judges are bound by their conscience to follow the 
law negates any outside influence. The format of interviews with constitutional court judges is 
very similar across all three countries. Rarely do questions relate to the overarching 
jurisprudence of the courts. Interviews are given related to concrete cases and specific 
instances of law. 
From the evidence above it is possible to extrapolate three main assumptions relevant when 
considering the empirical data relating to the legal variables: The adherence to the Black 
Letter of the Law, precedent and intent of the law-maker.
1. The judges in Austria and Italy face a more “legalistic” public opinion than those in 
Germany. As a result their answers to interview questions but  also their style in writing 
decisions will have to display less open interpretation than those in Germany.
2. The Austrian and Italian constitutional court seem both to only have been criticised for 
judicial activism recently. This leads to the conclusion that either a change in public 
perception or a change in the behaviour of courts has occurred.
3. The public perception of the judge and the role of the court has remained stable in Germany 
over time. As a result it is not  possible to see the change in perception as a cause for 
changed review levels in abstract judicial review in itself in all three countries. Rather, the 
review levels and the perception of the judges have to be influenced by a third factor.
The importance for the testing of the empirical evidence relating to the legalistic variables, the 
Black Letter of the Law, precedent and intent of the law-maker are therefore twofold: they are 
predicted to be more prominent in Austria and Italy, as the image of the judge is more strongly 
linked to these variables and German judges are predicted to be more open when speaking 
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25 Überall, wo es ein Verfassungsgericht gibt, gibt es einen gewissen politischen Einfluss. Das ist nicht 
weiter schlimm, wenn die Richter qualifiziert sind und genug Gewissen haben, nicht so zu entscheiden, 
wie es die Partei verlangt, sondern so, wie sie es für Recht und richtig halten
about interpretation of legal rules. However, the empirical evidence presented above does not 
fit this image wholeheartedly. A model which postulates the change of review levels to be 
caused by  a changing image of the judge in Germany, cannot explain sufficiently the change in 
review levels, as there is no change corresponding change in the public image of the court 
over the last  three decades. The Black Letter and precedent seem to be stronger in Austria than 
in Germany, which would fit the model, however Italy  should here develop like Austria. 
Contrary  to this expectation Italy  develops converse to Austria. Therefore it can be concluded 
that the changing image of the judge is not sufficient to explain the increased levels of review 
nor the style of the decisions. 
5.6 Political institutions as antecedent variable
A change in the attitudes of the political institutions towards the constitutional courts seems to 
be more promising as antecedent variable. The political surrounding of the court has changed 
extensively  in Austria and to a lesser extent in Italy. The jurisprudence of the Austrian 
constitutional court  underwent two changes in the last thirty years, one in the late 1970s and 
one mid 1990s (Gamper 2007; Gamper and Palermo 2009:48). Prior to the 1970s the decisions 
rendered by the Austrian constitutional court displayed little to no interpretation and avoided 
political controversy. An article was simply stated as having one meaning without explanation 
or recognition of a different possible meaning. Very like the Austrian constitutional court is 
phrasing its decisions now. A change of this attitude towards cases was notable at the Austrian 
constitutional court in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Austria’s political system was and is 
based on the constitutional rule that the constitutional court can only interpret and annul laws 
that are not of constitutional ranking. Therefore all controversial or difficult laws, such as 
many tax or budgetary laws, were passed as being of constitutional rank. The prohibition to 
concern themselves with laws of constitutional rank was accepted by the constitutional court 
until the late 1970s/early  1980s when the judges began to argue for a distinction between laws 
simply  passed as constitutional and those with truly constitutional character (Gamper 2007). 
The early eighties then resulted in various laws with constitutional rank being annulled by the 
court nonetheless. This caused the first change in attitudes towards the court. It had now 
moved from a very inactive and uncontroversial court to one engaged in the political process 
through judicial review. The court defended its right to annul even laws with constitutional 
rank until the mid 1990s when a case on linguistic harmonisation resulted in a public outcry 
and protest against the court  and especially its president (Gamper and Palermo 2009:49). As a 
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result the more restrained elements at  the court  gained in influence, supported by the 
appointment of various advocates of restraint to the bench to replace retiring judges (A1,2,4). 
As a result the court has reverted to the pre 1980s style and attitude, at least in part. Its style of 
judgement changed back to the simple statement of the meaning of laws rather than a 
discussion thereof. 
In the Austrian case it seems therefore to be an external factor, the insistence of the political 
institutions to deny the court its jurisdiction, which led to the court annulling more laws. This 
seems to support the assumption that no matter the importance of the legal variables of 
precedent, Black Letter of the Law or intent, the courts cannot act against the will of the 
political institutions consistently. This is supported by interview data when one of the judges 
tries to explain the decision making process:
 “The most important influence is precedent...Even academic writings are 
without importance for the decision ... but one cannot decide something that is 
politically and economically impracticable” (A 3)26
“It is the fear of the constitutional court  judge that he oversteps his boundaries 
and creates an “accident”. That, with his decision, he creates with his judgment 
an unwanted, not practicable situation and these are the moments when 
considerations of practicability come to the fore. A situation in which one has to 
say: the constitution points in this direction, but  if we rule in this way then 
something will break down.” (G1) 
According to this explanation the change in review levels would be due to the change in 
political attitude towards the courts and the courts reactions to these changes. However the 
socio-political surroundings of the courts has only  changed significantly in the case of Austria. 
In Germany and Italy no such development can be identified clearly. 
The use of political intent within the case materials however does increase in all three 
countries, just as the levels of review do. The German constitutional court has always referred 
to the intent of parliament in its case materials and made open use of evidence collected 
through parliamentary committees. However, especially in the last  decade the court has 
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26 Das wichtigste ist die vergangene Rechtssprechung... Es nimmt noch nicht einmal die Akademische 
Literatur einfluss...aber man kann ja nichts entscheiden das nicht politisch und wirschaftlich praktikabel 
ist.
become more critical in its stance towards parliament. In various instances it reminded 
parliament that the constitutional court was not founded to resolve parliamentary debates 
(Koopmans 2003). This is evidenced by  the increasing numbers of cases which contain 
detailed analysis of the parliamentary proceedings and statements relating to a case. In Italy 
and Austria these debates on the intent of the law-makers were virtually unheard of in the 
1980s but have since become common place. However, just as with precedent and Black 
Letter there seems to be no statistical evidence for a link between a case containing reference 
to the intent of law-makers and possibility of this case seeing review. 
So, contained within the case materials the evidence of political institutions as antecedent 
variables is mixed. Relating a change in political circumstances, seen as the attitudes political 
institutions display towards the court, is not successful in explaining the change in levels of 
review. However, the increasing reference to intent of law-makers suggests that political 
institutions might be somehow linked to the change in levels of review. This is a hypothesis 
that will be considered in Chapter VII. 
5.7 Philosophical Attitudes of Judges as antecedent variable
When assuming it is not the change in political attitudes that triggers the change in review 
levels another possible explanation needs to be found. This alternate explanation is that a 
change in attitudes of judges might be influencing the levels in interpretation in case materials, 
the image of judges, and the levels of review. As one of the Austrian judges mentioned:
“There is no influence aside from the constitutional and legal foundation of the 
decision....but there are instances in which a law is annulled when one has to 
admit that whilst parliament decided differently  the constitutional court judges 
annul it as it contravenes the philosophical foundations of the state”27
However, what the philosophical foundations of the state are depends very much on the 
personal understandings of these judges (A1)28. 
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27  Es gibt bei  uns keinen Einfluss, eis gibt nur eine verfassungsrechtliche und rechtliche 
Grundlage...aber dann gibt es schon Faelle in denen was aufgehoben wird wo man schon sagen 
muss: das Parlament hat das Gesetz so entschieden aber da sagt der verfassungsrichter dies 
wiederspricht den tragenden Grundsätzen unseres Staates.
28Ich habe lange geglaubt es seien nur die unterschiedlichen Rechtsauffassungen der Richter die sich 
zentral auswirken würden. 
Ulrich K. Preuss (1994) argues that due to the philosophical underpinnings of European legal 
thought it is the cultural background of the judges not their political beliefs which influences 
their decision. However, one question remains: what is the cultural background? One German 
judge (G4) argued that it  is the influence of the “academic fathers” of individual judges, which 
can be clearly identified within the arguments. In his view it is therefore held that the 
arguments of judges are based on the philosophical underpinnings of their schools of thought. 
Judges from the Italian and Austrian court deny  the direct influence of this. In both countries 
the opinion is voiced that people might come to the court with an identifiable school of 
thought but are socialised into the “school of the constitutional court”, as an Italian judge calls 
it (I3) within a year. Austrian and Italian judges also have connected the initial schools of 
thoughts influencing judging with the professional backgrounds of the judges. As 
appointments are made from academia, lawyers, high court judges, magistrates and solicitors, 
different schools of thought can be identified depending on where the judge originated. 
It has been argued that the make-up  of courts influences the style a court displays in its 
decisions. Also a high number of academics on the court correlates with more interpretative 
styles in case materials (de Burca and Weiler 2001; Kommers 2006; Kommers 1997). 
Therefore philosophical attitudes of judges are the most promising avenue of research as 
antecedent variable. The influence of the philosophical attitudes on the style of decisions 
seems to be unchallenged, however, there is a distinct lack of empirical data relating to it 
possible influence on the outcome of decisions. It therefore needs to be ascertained if the 
increased levels of review in Austria, Italy and Germany are defacto caused by a change in 
judicial philosophical or political attitudes. This will be discussed in the next Chapter.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has considered if a change in the levels of interpretation, the style or the use of 
precedent has caused more laws to be reviewed under abstract  review proceedings. Two 
distinct styles of decisions can be identified over the last three decades in Austria, Italy and 
Germany. Decisions in Italy  are getting longer, emphasising the different  meanings of 
concepts and provisions possible and explaining the rationale the court had to choose one 
interpretation over another. There are regular references to academic sources clarifying 
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debates and arguments. This is a style of decision the German constitutional court always has 
displayed in the format of its decisions. “Democratic ideals” and “international obligations” 
are discussed and referenced alongside paragraphs and codicils. The Austrian constitutional 
court followed this style of decision in the early 1980s as well but underwent a change in the 
1990s towards a different style. From this time onwards the style of decision is shorter, stating 
the meaning of terms and concepts rather than discussing alternative interpretations. The use 
of academic sources decreases and references to legal concepts such as “European ideals”, 
“rule of law” or “democratic obligations” are virtually unknown since the early 1990s. 
Clearly, there is a change in the style of the decisions. Additionally, this change seems to 
display  covariance with the development of unconstitutionality rulings in Austria and Italy, if 
not in Germany. Statistical tests however suggest that there is no direct link. The change in 
style and the change in decision-making patterns in abstract judicial review are statistically 
independent. It  therefore seems most likely that  there is a third, as yet unidentified, factor 
causing the change in style of decisions and the change in decision-making patterns in all three 
countries. Two possibilities present themselves as to the identity  of this third factor. The more 
interpretative and explanatory  style of the European Court of Justice has been attributed to the 
Judges being mainly recruited from academia and bringing with them a different philosophical 
attitude to the bench. So a change in philosophical attitudes at the courts might one of the 
reason for a change in the style and decision pattern. A further cause might  be found in 
literature on the Eastern European constitutional courts. An increase in partial 
unconstitutionality rulings, and a converse decrease in norms being declared unconstitutional 
in their entirety, has been attributed to the court reacting to criticism from the political 
institutions in Russia and Hungary (Epstein et al. 2001; Zagrebelsky 2005). It therefore 
remains to be seen if it can be ascertained that the change in decision-making patterns in 
abstract review can be linked to changes in philosophical attitudes at the court or the influence 
political considerations play in decisions. 
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CHAPTER VI
POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ATTITUDES OF THE JUDGES AS 
CAUSES FOR THE CHANGES IN THE DECISION-MAKING PATTERN
Precedent, Intent  and Black Letter of the Law, the so called legal variables, failed statistically 
to explain the increased levels of review in Austria, Italy or Germany. Moreover, the analyses 
have shown that  the legal variables are also affected by  change. The change in the legal 
variables, whilst seeming to be independent from the change in decision-making patterns in 
abstract norm review, might nevertheless be connected through a third variable. One possible 
factor which has pertinence on both the style of the decisions and the decision-making pattern 
in abstract review are the philosophical and political attitudes of the judges. Literature on the 
United States Supreme Court suggest the political attitudes of judges to be the main influence 
on the decision taken by  courts (Epstein et al. 1998; Murphy and Pritchett 1961; Pritchett 
1948; Schubert 1965, 1970; Segal and Cover 1989; Segal et al. 1995; Segal and Spaeth 1995, 
2004; Segal and Spaeth 2002). This variable has often been dismissed out of hand in Europe 
as the appointment procedures of most European courts are seen to isolate the courts from the 
political allegiances of the single judge.(Kommers 2006; Kommers 1997; Volcansek 1990, 
1994; Volcansek 2000). In Europe, it has been argued it is more likely to be the philosophical 
background of the judges which influences their decision-making rather than their political 
affiliation (Preuss 1991, 2003). As seen in the previous chapter, with the German 
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, it has often been hypothesised that the 
high percentage of academics are the reason for the more interpretative style (Alter 2001; de 
Burca and Weiler 2001; Preuss 1999). The argument here is that a high number of academics 
at the court influences the philosophical attitudes of the court. However, neither the potential 
influence of political nor of philosophical attitudes on the outcomes of court cases has been 
tested empirically. A conclusive answer whether the political allegiances or philosophical 
attitudes of a judge influence the outcome of a case remains elusive. The purpose of this 
chapter is therefore to test  if the political or philosophical allegiances of judges have changed 
over the last 30 years and if this change has led to the increased levels of review observed in 
abstract judicial review. In order to do this the make-up of the court will be discussed through 
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their appointment procedures before testing the influence of philosophical and political 
attitudes on the decision-making patterns in the three countries.   
6.1 Appointment Procedures
An empirical analysis of a change in political or philosophical attitudes can only  be measured 
through a change of court membership. This assumes that the attitudes of judges remain stable 
throughout their tenure. It is impossible to account for changes in philosophical attitudes 
within the minds of judges. It is only possible to observe a correlation between the change in 
membership of the court and the increased levels of review. Clearly  the appointment 
procedures of the courts are an important consideration in this and have to be compared first. 
Constitutional theory  argues that in Europe the appointment procedures of judges to the 
different courts ensure that their personal political opinions and leanings have no influence on 
the outcome of the cases. This is why  scholars on constitutional courts have argued that it  is 
not necessary to worry about the influence of political opinions of judges on the outcome of 
cases here in Europe (Garlicki 2007; Gillman 2002). This would make this chapter superfluous 
and no result  would be expected from the data collected. However, the historical assumption 
that European courts are insulated from politics through its appointment procedures is a 
chimera that does not even stand up to scrutiny of the appointment procedures - at least not in 
Austria and Germany. Consideration of the provisions of appointment highlights how many 
avenues are left open in which the courts can be dominated by one or the other party. The 
necessity to consider the physical evidence provided by the statistical data to answer the 
question if one or more groups of plaintiffs with the same party affiliation are preferred in the 
judgements the court passes therefore remains. If one party can be identified then it is possible 
to attempt to link this preference to the political attitudes of the judges sitting on the court at 
the time.
When the European courts were founded, both after 1945 and 1989, the necessity to isolate the 
courts from the political opinions of single judges was a concern in the design of the court 
systems. In Germany, Austria and Italy this was the case even more so than in many other 
countries. All previously licensed judges had been, per force, members of the fascist parties 
and it would have been impossible to remove all from office (Sachs 2004). It was therefore 
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decided to prosecute those against whom there was evidence of misconduct and crimes against 
humanity and to replace those on the highest levels, where possible, with known opponents of 
the previous regimes. Whereas when a decision had to be made of how to regulate 
appointment to the constitutional court it was desired to ensure the future neutrality of this 
court. The incorporation of a constitutional court into the political system was a condition the 
allies insisted on, and its purpose was to ensure that no single party  would be able to dominate 
the political system and change its basic constitutional form (Haase and Keller 1989:218). The 
constitutional court  was therefore a safeguard and as such it needed to be independent of the 
parties in government.
However, a constitutional court decides on the constitutionality, and therefore applicability, of 
democratic laws without itself being a democratically  elected body. This creates a vacuum of 
democratic accountability  (Gamper 2007:175). Two solutions can be, and were, imagined and 
discussed. On the one hand it would be possible to make the position of a constitutional court 
judge an elected one. On the other hand appointment could be given to those who were 
elected. The first case was dismissed out of hand. A democratic elected constitutional court 
would be too populist (Schaal 2004). The German and Italian people had proven that they 
would vote for exactly those ideas the court was supposed to ensure would never become 
expressed again by a political body. Giving parliament the right to appoint the members of the 
court on the other hand seemed counter-intuitive if the court’s mandate was to protect the 
constitution against other political bodies, among which parliament has to be counted. The 
three countries chose different paths to ensure that any  one party would not dominate the 
appointees to the constitutional court. 
Austria returned to the constitutional system that was in place before it became part of the 
German Reich. Hans Kelsen, one of the most eminent scholars of modern day  constitutional 
theory  was one of the authors of the Austrian constitution of 1920 and a member of the first 
constitutional court. He had seen the dangers of political influence on the court through 
appointment procedures and had argued for a system of mixed appointments long before it 
became a recognised necessity for courts all over the world (Kelsen 1920). There are 12 
regular members, along with the president and vice-president, on the Austrian constitutional 
court. Half of the judges are appointed by both houses of parliament to equal parts. The other 
half, as well as the President and Vice-president, are appointed by  the national government 
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(Ohlinger 2007:442). In comparison to most  other European states this still allows the 
government a comparatively large influence on the appointment procedure. However, this 
impression is tempered by  the constitutional conditions the government has to fulfil when 
choosing its candidates. The government has to choose among current judges, academics 
employed at a university  or civil servants. This was supposed to ensure that the government 
could not choose politicians. Nevertheless it  has been argued that, in comparison to Italy and 
Germany, the Austrian court has an appointment procedure more open to potential political 
influence (Funk 2007:325).
Italy has often been considered the country with the most apolitical court appointment 
procedure (Funk 2007:325). Of its 15 judges one third is chosen by the High Courts 
unanimously. The houses of parliament choose one-third in joint session with a two-thirds 
majority. The President of the Republic chooses one-third. Traditionally the President of the 
Republic bases his choice of whom to appoint on the ideal of a balanced court (Pederzoli 
2008:106). As in Austria and Germany the appointed judges have to be qualified to practice on 
the highest judicial level and as in Germany many are academics as well as constitutional 
court judges. It  is clear that in Italy  it is not the national government but the President of the 
Republic that  has the most influence on the appointment procedure as a single unit. However, 
just like the German president the office of the Italian President is considered as ceremonial 
more than political. In both countries the role of the president is understood as neutral and 
divorced from party politics, at  least after he is elected into office. Often they are not even 
party  members. It is therefore less in their interest to give any one party more or less influence 
when appointing the judges in Italy.
The German court’s appointment procedures are formally the least diversified. The two houses 
of parliament appoint all judges. The sixteen judges on the constitutional court are separated 
into two senates with distinct duties. Each house of parliament appoints half of each senate 
with a two-thirds majority. A committee consistent of representatives of all parties in 
parliament suggests a candidate and the Houses vote on this choice. Since the foundation of 
the court this process has been governed by the convention that the main parties in 
government, the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals, and the Greens, take turns 
in appointing judges. Therefore the electoral committee would propose a choice supported by 
the party  whose turn it  was to appoint and parliament would rubber stamp this choice. In 2008 
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this process failed on the refusal of parliament to accept the proposed choice due to the 
personal opinions of the proposed judge regarding torture. So for the first time a choice of 
constitutional court judge in Germany has become politicised. It is notable that the agreement 
between the parties has not broken down as the final choice was supported by the same party 
proposing the rejected judge. The debate has emphasised the need to formalise the 
arrangement and possibly introduce safeguards to ensure that appointment does not become 
politicised as it has in the United States. Until then the German constitutional court  represents 
in its appointments the main parties in parliament, those in government and in opposition.
These appointment procedures have led to many scholars claiming that in European courts, in 
comparison to the United States Supreme Court, the political attitudes of single judges do not 
influence the decision. This is due to the wide range of parties and backgrounds which are 
represented at the courts, leading to the influence of the single judge, and therefore the party, 
is diluted. However, an analysis of the appointment procedures in all three countries leave 
room for doubt. In Austria, the government appoints half the court, as well as the President 
and the Vice-president. In all but four years over the last thirty  years this meant that  in reality 
the two main parties governing in a grand coalition appointed half the court. The parties in 
government are the same parties, which dominate the Houses of Parliament and therefore the 
other half of the appointments to the constitutional court. Clearly  the scope of one party or two 
to appoint a court that will have a majority of its choices on it is not only a danger but a given. 
In Germany, it  is only an informal convention that ensures that all major parties are present on 
the court. Much of the discussion concerned with the appointment of new judges to the 
constitutional court occurs in committee and is therefore not  transparent and open to scrutiny. 
The Italian court is the most diverse in its appointment procedures. Whereas theoretically  the 
President is free to appoint in a way that will give predominance towards one group or another 
on the court. 
It therefore is evident that constitutional courts in Europe are not above the potential political 
influence of political parties through the judges appointed to the court. It also is evident that 
this connection needs to be researched to question if the political attitudes of judges cause the 
increased levels of review. Very little empirical evidence exists in the literature that indicates a 
systematic test of data relating to the results of cases in relation to the identity of the plaintiffs 
or the origin of laws. This is especially pertinent concerning abstract judicial review as only 
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political bodies can ask the court for a ruling. Abstract review can therefore easily be used for 
the purpose of party politics. However, the potential gain/loss scenario for a plaintiff needs to 
be considered here. As the court rules on a law, a decision to declare a law unconstitutional 
will be a perceived “loss” for the party who passed the law. However, if a party approaches the 
court asking for the review of a case and is not successful it as well incurs a perceived “loss”. 
Turning to the court  is therefore not a cost free endeavour.  It needs to be ascertained if any 
party, group, or institution receives preferential treatment in front of the court. If one of the 
bodies or any of the parties involved in the selection process receive preferential treatment 
then it is possible to assume that the appointment process has resulted in a court which allows 
the political opinions of the judges to influence the end decision. 
It is therefore clear that the appointment procedures in all three countries allow for drastic 
changes in membership of the courts in relation to profession, political attitudes and education 
background. The question remains however, if such a change has occurred over the last three 
decades and if this change has caused increased levels of review. 
6.2 Philosophical Attitudes
How would philosophical attitudes find expression in a measurable way through the 
membership of the court. Two ways have been suggested: professional background and 
academic background. Ulrich K. Preuss (1994) argues that due to the philosophical 
underpinnings of European legal thought it  is the cultural and academic background of the 
judges − not  their political beliefs − which influences their decision. This view is also 
represented in the interviews with the judges. One German judge (G4) argues that it  is the 
influence of the “academic fathers” of individual judges, which can be clearly identified 
within the arguments. In his view the arguments of judges are based on the philosophical 
underpinnings of their schools of thought. Judges from the Italian and Austrian court are more 
critical of this view. In both countries the opinion is voiced that judges might come to the court 
with an identifiable school of thought but are socialised into the “school of the constitutional 
court”, as an Italian judge calls it (I3) within a year. Austrian and Italian judges have 
connected the philosophical attitudes influencing judging with the professional backgrounds of 
the judges instead. As appointments are made from academia, lawyers, high court judges, 
magistrates and solicitors, different schools of thought can be identified depending on where 
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the judge came from. In Austria and Italy the high court judges dominate and their way of 
approaching rulings is said to predominantly  influence any judge after a year (A3). In 
Germany, it is the academics who dominate (G2). The professional background of the judges 
has been linked to different styles of the way decisions are being phrased. Therefore the 
professional background appears most promising as a possible cause for the increased levels 
of review. It also has resulted in a different style of how the judgments are expressed (de 
Burca 2001, Hassemer 2004)  
6.2.1 Professional Background
The German constitutional court especially has always had the reputation of being highly 
influenced by the high number of academics in its membership (Kommers 1997; Landfried 
1984). It has been argued that courts with higher numbers of academics use a more 
interpretative style in their decisions and the German court along with the European Court of 
Justice is generally  cited as an example. The image this presents is deceptive, the current and 
past membership  of the German Constitutional Court has never had more than half of the 
membership recruited from academia (Table 1).
Judge Background Univeristy International 
connection
Papier Academic Muenchen X
Hohmann 
Dennhardt
Judge
Bryde Academic Muenchen X
Gaier Judge
Eichberger Judge
Schluckeberger Judge
Kirchhof Academic Tuebingen X
Masing Academic Freiburg, Bielefeld, 
Heidelberg
X
Vosskuhle Academic Berlin, Freiburg
Bross Judge/Academic Muenchen, 
Freiburg
X
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Judge Background Univeristy International 
connection
Osterloh Academic Frankfurt
Fabio Academic Muenster, Trier, 
Muenchen, Bonn
Mellinghof Judge
Luebbe-Wolff Academic Bielefeldt X
Gerhardt Judge
Landau Judge
Table 1: Membership of the German Constitutional Court based on profession and 
academic links
The current Italian court has a higher number of academics within its members at just over 
two-thirds (Table 3). This is promising as an explanation as it might explain the increasingly 
interpretative style displayed by  the Italian Court. The Austrian Constitutional Court, whose 
style is displaying the least evidence of interpretation has the smallest number of academics in 
its membership (Table 2). 
Judge Background University International 
connection
Holzinger Judge Graz
Bierlein Judge Wien
Haller Academic Wien
Lass Judge Innsbruck
Liehr Judge Wien
Ruppe Academic Graz
Oberndorfer Academic Linz
Mueller Judge Wien
Brechthold-
Ostermann
Judge Wien
Kahr Judge Graz X
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Judge Background University International 
connection
Schnizer Academic Salzburg X
Hoertenhuber Judge Linz
Gahleitner Judge Salzburg X
Grabenwartner Academic Wien
Table 2: Judges on the Austrian Constitutional Court based on profession and academic 
links
Judge Background University International 
connection
De Siervo Academic Firenze
Maddalena Judge/Academic Napoli,Pavia, 
Tuscia
X
Finocchiaro Judge
Quaranta Judge
Gallo Academic Rome
Mazzella Avvocato Generale
Silvestri Academic Messina
Cassese Academic Pisa, Rome, 
Naples
X
Saulle Academic Rome, Napoli X
Tesauro Academic Rome, Napoli X
Napolitano Consiglio di Stato
Frigo Avocato/Academic Brescia
Criscuolo Judge
Grossi Academic Firenze X
Amirante Judge
Table 3: Membership of the Italian Constitutional Court according to profession and 
academic association
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The hypothesis that higher numbers of academics in the membership of the courts leads to 
greater evidence of interpretation in the case materials holds when applied to the current 
membership of the German, Austrian and Italian courts. Even when comparing the 
development of evidence of interpretation and development of membership of academics on 
the courts the hypothesis holds. Over the last three decades the membership  of the Austrian 
constitutional court has changed away from over 50% academics to less than a third (Figure 2 
and Appendix 6 for a tabular representation of membership by profession/appointment). The 
Italian Constitutional Court on the other hand has increased its membership of academics from 
half to two thirds (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Membership of Academics (Italian Constitutional Court)
Academic Membership on the Austrian Court
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Figure 2: Membership of Academics Austrian Constitutional Court
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A higher number of academics in the membership of the court therefore coincides with more 
evidence of interpretation in the texts of decisions rendered. However, there is no statistical 
correlation between the ratio of academics in the membership  of the court and the decision 
rendered in the case (Spearman Rho = 0.023 where 0 = no correlation and 1 = perfect 
correlation) (McLean et al. 1993:98).
The Spearman Rho Correlation Coefficient is:
    0.023 = rs=1- ((6(ΣD2)/(N(N2- 1)) 
Equation 1: Where 6 is a constant within the formula (it is always used in the formula), D refers to the difference 
between a subject’s ranking of the two variables (e.g. x = academics in the membership of the court = 5 and y = 
decision rendered = 2; D = 3), and N is the number of subjects. This correlation is significant at a 95% confidence 
level (Field 2005).
The high number of academics and the evidence of interpretation in the case materials 
therefore co-vary  but  are not related. In both the Austrian and Italian court there are some 
untypical years in which neither less evidence of interpretation nor lower levels of review 
coincides with lower levels of academics (Austria 1983-1985; Italy 1995-1997). Table 1, 2, 3, 
which shows the academic and professional background of judges, also shows that up to a 
third of the judges in the current courts have a connection to international institutions, be that a 
university or an international court. In the 1980s a judge with an international affiliation was 
rare. This might also be a factor contributing to the change in style. Chapter VII will discuss 
the possible influence an international connection might have on the decision-making pattern. 
The possible influence it has on style seems puzzling. The European Court of Justice, known 
as a court with a highly interpretative and lengthy style, is attributed to have developed this 
following the example of the German Constitutional Court (Alter 2001; Kommers 1997). 
Therefore it seems that the international connection comes secondary to the style. 
6.2.2 Academic Background
It is harder even to empirically test the influence the “academic fathers” have on their 
“academic children”. In interviews, it has been suggested that universities have different 
philosophical epistemologies which they impart on their students (G4, A5, A3, I3). As a result 
domination of one epistemology over others on the court  would influence the view of law at 
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the court and therefore the style of the case materials. Table 1,2,3 all show the domination of 
one or two universities over others in the current membership of the court. The University of 
Rome and the University  of Vienna in Italy  and Austria and the University  of Munich and the 
University  of Freiburg in Germany are all recruiting grounds for the national constitutional 
courts. However, this pattern is constant over time. These universities dominate the 
membership of the court over the last three decades (Appendix 6). This is not  surprising as all 
universities are among those with the highest reputation in their respective national 
educational system. Also statistically  no correlation can be found between any of the 
universities and a case seeing review. 
Munich 0.03= ϕ = (X2/n)1/2
Freiburg 0.1= ϕ = (X2/n)1/2
Rome 0.07= ϕ = (X2/n)1/2
Vienna 0.12= ϕ = (X2/n)1/2
Equation 2: Phi cofficient where X2 = to Chi Square and n = population. Chi Square denotes the statistical 
significance of the correlation by calculating the degree in which the observations could occur at random. For the 
derivation of the equation see Appendix 4. 
It therefore can be concluded that philosophical attitudes, either measured through 
professional or academic background, are not the cause, or at least the single cause for the 
increased levels of review. 
6.3 Political Attitudes
If it is not the philosophical attitudes of judges which causes the increased levels of review it 
is still possible for their political attitudes to be the cause.  This is a common argument in 
respect to the US Supreme Court but has never empirically been tested in Europe (Epstein et 
al. 1998; Epstein and Segal 2007; Howard and Segal 2004; Segal 1984, 1986; Segal 1997, 
1998; Segal and Cover 1989; Segal et  al. 1995; Segal and Spaeth 1995, 1996, 2004; Segal et 
al. 1996; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Spaeth and Segal 2001a; Spaeth and Segal 2001b). 
The argument goes as follows: 
1. Political institutions appoint the judges and will only appoint those that agree with their 
political stances. 
!
! 165
2. Therefore the judge has a political and party  identity  and this is visible in the way  he or she 
votes in court. 
3. If it is therefore held that one party  dominates appointments to the court then this party is 
able to have the court vote its way. 
The appointment procedures in Europe have been cited as making it impossible for courts to 
be dominated by  one political party  (Koopmans 2003). However, the consideration of the 
appointment procedures above have shown whilst it  is hard for one political party to dominate 
political attitudes can find their expression not only in the treatment of cases brought by a 
single party, but also:
1. plaintiffs dominated by a party or 
2. by the treatment of regions dominated by one party, 
3. the origin of a law under consideration.
6.3.1 The “origin of cases based on plaintiffs” as cause for increased “levels of review” 
Different institutions and actors have different political associations. If judges are more likely 
to favour one party  over another then this should find expression in their treatment of these 
institutions and actors. To answer the question if the identity  of the plaintiff causes the 
increased levels of review, it  is therefore possible to analyse if any institution or actor is more 
likely to be successful in front of the court. Furthermore if the plaintiff’s party affiliation 
matters to the decision-making pattern. To this purpose, the identity of plaintiffs, political and 
institutional, and the frequency  with which they approach the court needs to be ascertained. 
They  are indicators for the perceived chances the actors and institutions see in winning their 
case. No plaintiff would approach the court and invest in considerable funds without, at least 
in his/her estimation, an expectation of success. If therefore one group of those approaching 
the court perceives their chances of success, of gain29, to be systematically unfavourable then 
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29It has been argued that the “gain” a challenger receives from a court case might simply be the possibility to have shown the 
electorate that the plaintiff did take action against a certain law (Meny 1998:320). If that is the motivation for a court case, 
and if using the court for this form of party politics is on the rise, then the increased ratios of unconstitutionality rulings might 
simply be due to more plaintiffs using the court in this fashion. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter where the 
question if the court favours the ruling elite in its decisions is considered. However, it has to be said here, that there is a 
financial loss incurred through a court case and, possibly more importantly, the loss of legitimacy if a case is decided against 
the plaintiff. Surveys have shown that the constitutional courts in all three countries are exceptionally high in public regard, 
approximately 80% of people trust the court more than any other political institution, and that loosing in front of the court 
results in a loss of public regard for the plaintiffs (Gibson, Caldeira 1998). It therefore seems unlikely that political institutions 
would regularly approach the court simply to show their protest in respect to a certain law. However, it is not unheard off. The 
German abortion cases are a point in case. The government of the time, Christian Democrat, proposed a very liberal 
abortion law to parliament, which passed the law. The Christian Democratic party led by the government ministers then 
approached the court under abstract review and saw the law overturned into a more restrictive one. This is an instance in 
which a party used the court to ensure that all its electorate, liberals and conservatives alike, are satisfied with its actions 
(Landfried 1994). Nevertheless this is an exception and, in general, it can be assumed that a plaintiff only approaches the 
court in an expectation of real gain, the review of a law.
this group  will approach the court less often. This might in turn account  for a change in the 
ratios of laws seeing review in Austria, Italy and Germany. It could be the case that an 
institution or actor, which has been systematically  disadvantaged in front of the court, simply 
no longer turns to the court under abstract review.
When looking at  the distribution of plaintiffs in the last thirty years (Table 4) Austria and 
Germany seem remarkably similar. The number of cases reaching the Italian court are far 
higher than those in the other two courts. This is mainly due to the high levels of cases brought 
through regional/national government conflict. 
Austria Italy Germany
Government 2 518 2
Region 38 622 76
Regional Senate 178 N/A N/A
MPs 37 N/A 41
Table 4: Distribution of plaintiffs (numbers)
In both Germany and Austria the percentage of laws challenged by the government are 
negligible (2/3%) whilst there is a substantial percentage (45%) of cases originate with the 
government in Italy. In all three countries approximately half to two thirds of cases originate 
on the regional level (Figure 1). 
Austria 
3%
49%
48%
Government
Region
MPs
Germany 
2%
64%
34%
Italy
45%
55%
Government Region Figure 5:Distribution of Plaintiffs 
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Only in Italy has there been a change in the ratio of cases brought by any of the institutions or 
actors. In the late 1990s the number of cases brought by and against the regions has increased, 
most likely due to the constitutional reform. A change in the constitutional bases increases the 
number of cases in abstract review for a time. All actors involved in the legislative process 
need to reassert the status quo through litigation clearing up all grey areas in the process (I1, 
(Jackson and Tate 1992)). In both Germany and Austria the ratio of plaintiffs is stable over the 
last thirty years. It therefore appears from this data that no group of plaintiffs in Italy is more, 
or less, likely to approach the court. In Germany and Austria the government is least likely to 
approach the court. However, in both of these countries Members of Parliament compose 
between 34% (Germany) and 48% (Austria) of the abstract review cases. Many of these, as 
will be seen below, are not initiated by the opposition parties but often by  the party  in 
government. Therefore it is possible to argue that the lack of governmental plaintiffs is based 
on finding an alternative means of challenging laws in front of the court through members of 
parliament.
Tests of statistical significance between the “identity  of the plaintiff” and the “likelihood of 
success” present a slightly different image and differ across the three countries widely (for 
exact formula see Appendix 7). In Austria and Italy there is a positive correlation (Table 5) 
between a law seeing review and the identity of the plaintiff.  The Chi Square test indicates the 
significance of a relationship  between two variables at a level below 0.05 and is an expression 
of certainty  that the result  of the data distribution could not have been achieved by chance. A 
Chi Square value of 0.05 or below signifies that there is a 95% or above certainty that a 
variation in one variable is connected, in some way, to a variation in another variable. Table 2 
therefore indicates that there is an above 95% certainty that a variation in the variable 
“plaintiff” is related to a variation in the variable “a law seeing review” in Austria and Italy. 
This connection is absent in Germany.
Austria Italy Germany
Chi Square0.01/ 
SIGNIFICANT
0.001/ 
SIGNIFICANT
0.9/ 
NOT SIGNIFICANT
Cramers V 0.3/
MODERATE
0.5/ 
MODERATE 
N/A
Table 5: Correlations between who challenges the law and the law seeing review
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When correlating the identity  of the plaintiff with the outcome of a case the numbers indicate 
that in Italy there is a moderately strong relationship  (Cramers V value of 0.5; 0 standing for 
no correlation and 1 for perfect correlation) between the plaintiff and the outcome and in 
Austria a moderate relationship (Cramers V value of 0.3). In other words, a variation in the 
variable “plaintiff”, a change in the identity of the plaintiff from case to case for example, 
correlates with a change in the outcome of a case in Austria and Italy.This is not the case in 
Germany. Breaking the analysis into decades the Italian and Austrian development seem to 
follow the same pattern as identified in the previous chapter relating to levels of interpretation 
in case materials. The link between the identity  of the plaintiff and the outcome of the case 
increases in Austria over time whilst it decreases slightly in Italy (Table 6).  
Austria Italy
1980s 0.211 0.33
1990s 0.3 0.35
2000s 0.43 0.28
Table 6: Cramers V Correlation indication over time for Austria and Italy
Austria Italy Germany
Parliamentarians SIGNIFICANT N/A NOT SIGNIFICANT
Regional 
Governments
SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT NOT SIGNIFICANT
National 
Government
 SIGNIFICANT NOT SIGNIFICANTNOT SIGNIFICANT
Table 7: Significance between review and challenging units 
The actual source of this link in both countries can be traced to two different sources of 
correlations (Table 7). In Austria, the relationship  between parliamentarians as the source of 
the case and the law being upheld as constitutional holds. Furthermore, cases brought by the 
government are more likely to see review. In Italy the regional governments are less likely to 
be successful in having national laws overturned. This is not surprising, as literature on the 
Italian constitutional court has argued that the court is a firm defender of Italian unity (Meny 
and Knapp 1998; Modugno et al. 2008; Pederzoli 2008; Volcansek 1990, 1994; Volcansek 
2000). As one judge tried to explain: 
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“Normally the Italian court has been involved in the issue of unity. It  (the court) 
was against the attempt of certain regions to differentiate themselves from the 
other parts of the country. We therefore sometimes say that  the Italian court is more 
centralist. Inclined to rule with the centre, the national government. It is basically 
true.” (I1)
This assumes that the reason for the increased levels of review is in some way related to 
conflict between the government and other actors both in Austria and Italy. Two possible 
reasons for this are possible
A) The political party identity of these actors is contrary  to that of the judges and cause the 
judges to decide against them. 
B) The institutional identity, the fact that the decision would be against the government, is the 
cause why the judges are loath to review the case. 
The answer to the second possibility  has to wait till the next chapter but considerations if the 
party identity of the plaintiff influences the decision will be discussed here. 
When comparing the influence the party identity  of the plaintiff has on the decision in the 
three countries is statistically weak (Cramers V 0.115-0.19). This supports the argument that 
the party affiliation of judges does not influence their decision in a case. 
Italy 0.115 = v= (x2/(n)(min r-1))1/2
Germany 0.185 = v= (x2/(n)(min r-1))1/2
Austria 0.19 = v= (x2/(n)(min r-1))1/2
Equation 3: x2 denotes the significance of the relationship, n the sum of the observations and (min r) the 
minimum value of the number of rows = 1)
No political party  is more, or less, likely  to have success in front of the court. Evidence based 
on the voting behaviour of the judges supports this:
“There are hardly any 4/4 decisions which follow the separation of party 
appointment. It is more the fundamental beliefs of the individual which influence 
the court” (G5)
Therefore the appointment procedures of the court in Europe really  do insulate the courts from 
the influence of the political identities of single judges. Italian judges argue that “the 
membership of a political party does play a greater role on the level of high courts”, possibly 
“due to the influence of presidential appointments which are designed to equal out the 
influence of a single party” (I2).
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When talking with judges about appointment procedures and their influence on the decisions 
the conversation frequently turned to court dynamics. One Italian judge (I4) argues that 
concerning the judicial hierarchy within the courts it is often the presidential appointments that 
feel slightly superior to start with but then outgrow it within the year. In the interviews, and 
watching the interactions between judges at  the Italian court in a focus group, the source of 
appointment was used as a form of teasing among the judges. It did not seem to define the 
judicial groupings − but each judge was aware of who appointed the other judges as were they 
aware of their respective seniority at the court. It is not the source of appointment which seems 
to regulate hierarchy in Austria − it is seniority. The Austrian constitutional court judge 
remains in office until they have reached their 70th year − which leads to very long and 
consistent terms of office (A6). The longest standing member at  the court has been there for 32 
years now and has named seniority  as a defining factor in court hierarchy (A3). Both seniority 
and source of appointment was tentatively linked to philosophical attitudes. The judges argued 
that in discussions the political identity  of the judge is not apparent whilst  his or her 
philosophical attitude was. This philosophical attitude was often based on profession. 
However, it has already been shown above that philosophical attitudes based on profession or 
academic background cannot be linked with the increased levels if review. It can therefore 
now be concluded that political attitudes of judges also have no bearing on the decision of the 
case if these attitudes are measured through political party identity of the plaintiff. 
6.3.2 The political identity of the region where the law under review originated and its 
influence on the levels of review
However, political allegiance can also find its expression in regional identity. It therefore 
needs to be considered if there is a correlation between the regional identities of the judges and 
the higher level of review. If some regional laws are more likely to see review then an increase 
in laws challenged from this region would increased the levels of review overall. More general 
if regional laws are more likely to see review than national laws then an increase in the 
number of regional laws being challenged will lead to higher ratios of review in abstract 
judicial review overall.
The distribution of national and regional laws challenged is fairly stable over time as seen 
below on the example of Italy, Germany and Austria (Figure 3). What is clear from the graphs 
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below is that there is no significant change in the ratio of national or regional laws being 
challenged from decade to decade. There has not been a surge of regional or national laws 
being reviewed and therefore they cannot account for an increase in review. 
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Figure 3: Development of national and regional laws Italy, Austria and Germany
Moreover, it has not empirically  been proven that regional laws de facto saw more review than 
national laws in the last decade. In both Austria and Italy, regional laws are more likely to see 
review than national laws over the last three decades (Table 4). As noted above, this is not 
unexpected as constitutional courts have the reputation of considering giving preference to the 
unity  of the national legal system (Currie 1994; Kempton 1996; Kommers 1997; Koopmans 
2003; Merryman 1965; Modugno et al. 2008; Moreno 1995; Stone Sweet 2000; Volcansek 
1994). This is evidenced in case materials such as in 963/1988:
“Those interests, relating to the entire national community, appear therefore, to 
form a normative basis on which to supply a unitary solution….”30 
Similar utterances can be found in many other cases such as 412/1993, 
472/1995,118/1981,3/1981, 70/1981, 482/1991 and 484/1991. Notable is that  these references 
occur more frequently  in the 1980s and early 1990s whilst in the late 1990s and 2000 there is 
an emphasis on international and European obligations. This supports the surprising result 
from the statistical analysis which fails to find empirical evidence for the preferential 
treatment of national laws in Germany  and in Italy when separating data into decades (Table 
8).  The statistical evidence suggests that there is an increasing likelihood that regional laws 
see review in Austria and a decreasing one in Italy. So, only in the Austrian case would there 
be a possibility that an increase in regional laws causes higher levels of review. However, as 
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30Tale interesse, attinente all'intera comunità nazionale, appare, pertanto, idoneo a 
fondare una normativa intesa a fornire un indirizzo unitario
seen in Figure 3 no increase in regional laws reaching the courts can be noted in the last 
decade. 
Country Austria Italy Germany
Correlation 
coefficient
Chi 
Square
Phi Chi Square Chi square
National 0.002 -0.5 0.6 0.1
Regional 0.002 0.5 0.7 0.2
Table 8: Chi Square and Phi/Cramers V values for the cross-tabulation of regional/
national law and review of a law 1990-.
If it is not an increase in regional laws being challenged which causes the increased levels of 
review it is possibly a change in regional identity  on the court. Political attitudes cannot only 
find their expression in party affiliation, considerations of national unity but also in regional 
affiliation. 
6.4 Political Attitude as Regional Affiliation and its influence on the outcome of a case
Regional identity has never been considered as a possible influence on the decision-making 
process in constitutional courts. When considering current membership  of the courts 
apparently  certain regions and cities dominate (Table 9). Looking further back this image is 
common. For the last three decades the same regions and cities have dominated the 
membership of the court (Appendix 6). This is not entirely unusual as they  are either the seats 
of other high courts, the highest rated universities or the seat of the constitutional court.  
Italy Germany Austria
Savona/Rome Munich Graz
Napoli/Rome Frankfurt Wien
Caserta/Rome Munich Wien/Munich
Napoli/Rome Frankfurt Innsbruck
Rome Tuebingen Wien
Naples/Rome Frankfurt Graz
Patti/Rome Tuebingen Linz
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Italy Germany Austria
Altriparda/Rome Freiburg Wien
Caserta/Rome Freiburg Wien
Napoli/Rome Munich Graz
Rome Frankfurt Salzburg
Brescia Munich Linz
Napoli/Rome Greifswald Salzburg
Firenze Bielfeld Wien
Napoli/Rome Freising
Hessen
 Table 9: Distribution of Judges according to regional affiliation
In Germany this does not seem to relate to any preferential treatment of any laws. No region is 
more, or less, likely  to see its laws revised. The same cannot be said for Austria or Italy. There 
is a strong correlation between a law having originated in Tyrol and it being declared 
unconstitutional as a whole (Cramers V 0.6), and a moderately strong relationship between a 
laws origin in Tyrol and it  seeing review in any form (Cramers V 0.4). This connection has 
become stronger over the last three decades. In Italy  no such connection between any region 
exists in the 1980s. In the 1990s, however a low connection between a law being declared 
constitutional when challenged and its origin in the Trentino Alto Adidge can be observed 
(Cramers V 0.2). This connection disappears in the 2000s again. Tyrol and Trentino Alto 
Adidge are only  separated as regions since the treaty of St Germain after the First World War 
and both have substantial Italian or German minorities among its population. As such both 
regions present some administrative difficulties to the national governments relating to 
linguistic identity, cultural makeup and nationalistic tendencies. No other region is 
disadvantaged or advantaged regarding having its laws overturned or upheld in Italy  and none 
at all in Germany. Neither Tyrol and Trentino Alto Adidge are recruitment centres for 
constitutional court judges. Therefore it can be concluded that a change in the regional 
affiliation of judges did not cause an increase in the ratio of review in either Austria, Italy or 
Germany. 
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6.5 Conclusion
The political and philosophical background of judges appeared initially  promising as an 
explanation for the change in decision-making patterns in abstract review. The membership  of 
the German, Austrian and Italian court  over the last decades shows that higher levels of 
academics correlates with longer more discursive styles of decisions. However, there is no 
statistically  significant link between the number of academics in the membership of the courts 
and the decision-making patterns. The decision-making patterns also do not correlate with 
members of the court originating from different academic institutions. As a result it can be 
concluded that the philosophical attitudes of judges can be linked to the style of decisions but 
not the outcome. Political attitudes of judges measured by party affiliation also fall short in 
explaining the change in decision-making patterns. The only correlation between a law being 
reviewed and the identity of the plaintiff is a regional one. Certain regions, to be exact the 
minority regions of Austria and Italy, are more likely  to have their laws reviewed by the court. 
The number of cases originating with these regions however is too low to account for the 
overall change in decisions-making pattern. Therefore the political attitudes of judges also fall 
short as a possible answer for the question. Nevertheless, the analysis above shows that there 
might be an answer in the influence political institutions have on the decision making patterns. 
There seems to be a relationship  between the plaintiff being the government and the decision 
rendered in a case. This relationship will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII
DEFERENCE TO POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AS 
CAUSE FOR THE CHANGE IN DECISION-MAKING 
PATTERNS?
Neither political nor philosophical attitudes can therefore explain the increase in laws seeing 
review under abstract norm control. Neither are they able to explain the change in style of 
decisions identified in Chapter V. Both in the analysis of the change in levels of interpretation 
in case materials and in the analysis of the influence of political attitudes suggestions can be 
found to the importance of political institutions as a possible antecedent variable. Especially  in 
Austria the evidence of preferential treatment of national laws over regional laws and the link 
judges make between the development of the Austrian constitutional court  and the reactions of 
the political institutions supports political institutions as the antecedent variable. The 
theoretical basis to this argument can be presented as follows:
A) Judges are policy oriented 
B) Judges further their goals through strategically motivated actions
C) These actions are determined by the institutional rules surrounding the court 
D) The current ruling elite is able to “chastise” the court 
Therefore, the court is more likely to rule with the ideals of the ruling alliance than 
against it. 
In this argument, the increased levels of review are caused by a change in the stance the court 
holds against the political institutions with power over the court, namely  the government (Dahl 
1957). To test for a change in the attitude of the court to the government it is necessary to 
consider four questions:
1. Are courts more likely to review laws from past administrations?
2. Are courts more likely to review regional laws by parties not in government?
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3. Are courts more likely to review laws challenged by parties not in government?
4. Has an increased level of judges seeking further political office led to a more government 
friendly court?
The combination of the answers to these questions should create an image of the courts stance 
towards the current administration and ruling elite. 
7.1 Is the increase in review due to the court’s increasing their review of laws of past 
administrations?
An increase in laws seeing review is often used as a measure of endurance of laws of the 
current administration. This is seen as a measure of success of a government. It is therefore 
also used as a measure of the willingness of the court to oppose the ruling majority  and the 
court’s independence from the political elite (Howard and Segal 2004). This would mean that 
a large number of unconstitutionality rulings can be used to argue that the court is immune to 
strategic considerations. In all three countries there has been a constant rise in the number of 
decisions resulting in unconstitutional rulings between 1980 and 2000. In Germany and Italy 
this increase has carried over to this millennium. Austria however has seen a decrease over the 
last 5 years (See Chapter I). However, it is very possible that this increased willingness to 
review laws is based on the courts annulling laws from previous administrations. This would 
mean that the court not only avoids counteracting the decisions of the current ruling elite but 
furthermore aids it by reviewing laws passed under previous governments (de Franciscis and 
Zannini 1992; Furlong 1988:9; Vanberg 2000). 
An unconstitutionality ruling by  a constitutional court against a law the current administration 
has passed is always an “embarrassment” − even in relatively  inconsequential cases especially 
in countries in which approval for the court is high among the general public (Eskridge 1991). 
In all three countries, the public regard for constitutional courts is highest amongst all the 
political institutions (Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova 2001). This might very much be because 
people know generally very little about the courts. The result  is an almost mythical regard for 
their position in government. Therefore an unconstitutionality  ruling should be avoided, so as 
not to open the administration to criticism. However, in reality, loss of public approval is all 
that can happen to the ruling administration. The court on the other hand is more vulnerable to 
the possible repercussions of the political institutions. Theoretically, the government has 
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various means to “discipline” the court. It has power over appointment, being able to appoint 
members which are less open to interpretation (Koopmans 2003). The government can rewrite 
the law and therefore make the decision the court produced mute (Meny and Knapp 1998). 
Most importantly, the government can simply refuse to take full account of the decision. A 
constitutional court has no enforcement ability; it is dependent on the government to take heed 
of the decision. Only the loss of legitimacy incurred by the political institutions when they 
publicly counteract a decision by the highly regarded constitutional courts protects the court. 
Therefore, the constitutional court has to preserve the high regard in which it is held and 
public criticism by the political branches will undermine this. So there are many reasons why 
the court would be unwilling to anger the current administration. Has the court’s behaviour 
changed regarding the current administration’s laws causing higher levels of review? 
In the past it has been argued that the time a case needs to travel through the court results in a 
decision being taken at a time when a new administration has taken office (de Franciscis 
1992). Historically, all three courts’ original duty  was to test laws passed by the fascist 
administrations in the time prior to the courts’ birth. They  therefore spent much of their time in 
the first decades of their existence on testing old laws for their constitutionality  (Furlong 
1988:9, Vanberg 2005). This resulted in courts that were heavily  backlogged for years (and the 
incredible amount of cases reaching the courts in Germany and Austria is another factor here) 
but it also defined the way the judges saw themselves as protectors of the new constitution − 
especially In Italy (Silvestri 2006:586). This concentration on decisions of past  administrations 
has changed dramatically. The average time for a case to reach conclusion was eight months in 
Austria and six months or less in Italy in 2007. The German court managed to catch up with 
its workload in the mid 1990s and has since then completed more cases a year than it receives 
(Santoni 2004:16). The Austrian and Italian constitutional court caught up with their caseload 
in the early 1990s. Therefore all three courts are now deciding recent laws − and for the largest 
part they  make decisions on the laws passed by  those who dominate the political branches and 
have the theoretical power to curtail their actions31. What does all this lead to? The Italian, 
Austrian and German constitutional court are increasingly ruling at least parts of laws 
unconstitutional and are therefore increasingly invalidating laws decided upon by  those who 
appointed them. This test of endurance of a law as a test of independence has been used 
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31 Not necessarily those who appointed them as the term of office of a judge is generally longer than that of a 
politician
routinely as an argument for the insensitivity of the court towards the preferences of the ruling 
elite (Santoni 2004/2006; Spiller and Gely 1990). Therefore it seems to be the case here that 
all three courts display signs of acting in ignorance of the preferences of the political branches. 
Moreover, it appears from this that the change in the attitude to laws by  the current 
administration could be the reason for the increased levels of review. Clearly, all three courts 
have changed their attitudes towards current legislation at approximately the same time as the 
increase in review in abstract norm control. Though, is this change de facto the cause for the 
increase in review or simply a procedural coincidence? To answer this question it is necessary 
to look for actual empirical links between the government and the increase in review.  
7.2 Does a change in the treatment of laws by a party not part of the current administration 
cause the increased level of review?
This is supported when correlating the “origin of the law” concerning the party  origin with the 
current “party in power” and the “decision rendered”. With other words this analysis tests if 
the court is more likely to review a law which was passed by one of the parties not part of the 
CURRENT administration, non regarding which legislative period this law was passed in. The 
results suggest that there is no statistical link between the origin of the law and the decision 
rendered. The court does not seem to be more, or less, likely to review a law passed by the 
current administration. 
Italy: 0.3 = Chi Square (Chi Square significant a a level <0.05)
Austria: 0.7 = Chi Square (Chi Square significant a a level <0.05)
Germany: 0.6 = Chi Square (Chi Square significant a a level <0.05)
Equation 1: Chi Square denotes a measure of deviance - the higher it is the less well the model (the relationship 
between the origin of the plaintiff and the outcome of the case, for example) fits the data. See Appendix 7 for the 
derivation of the formula.  
From this it  seems to be that political considerations based on party origin of the law do not 
cause the increased levels of review. Accounting for the year in which the law was passed, the 
party  in power at that time and the party in power at the time of decision no pattern emerges 
which suggests that considerations of party  politics find their way into the case. The lack of 
pattern is constant over the three decades. 
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It could nevertheless be held that the analysis is skewed by differences between regional and 
national laws, coalition governments on regional levels or the use of the court by  the 
opposition through parliamentary groupings. A change in any  of these circumstances which 
leads to higher levels of review could be seen as a change in the importance of political 
affiliations for the court. 
7.3 Does an increase of regional laws originating with one of the regions not governed by the 
party in government cause the increased levels of review?
As seen in Chapter VI the origin of a law regarding either region or party  does not influence 
the outcome. Germany, Italy  and Austria all have electoral systems based on proportional 
representation. This tends to lead to coalition governments (Lijphart 1991) which explains 
why none of the governments in any country has been formed by  one single party  in the last 
three decades.  Both Germany and Austria have had various grand coalitions in that time 
(Germany: 2005-2009; Austria: 1986-2000, 2006-). It has been argued that in these time 
periods the number of cases which reach the court from parties not in government has to be 
limited (Gamper 2007). Therefore, in these times it should not  even be possible for the court to 
be in a position in which it would have to decide to confront the government or not. When 
both major parties are involved in government the chance of one third (in Germany one fourth 
since December 2009) of parliamentarians to challenge a law is limited. Whilst most of the 
regional units are also governed by  the largest parties, there are regional units which are not. 
For most of the period 1980-2010 the regions of Vienna (Austria), Bavaria (Germany), 
Trentino and the Aosta Valley (Italy) are cases in point. Each of these regions is traditionally 
governed by one of the smaller parties. Furthermore, even if the regions are governed by one 
of the parties in government when they challenge a law it does not mean that the court might 
not be tempted to rule for the governmental party. Coalitions are not necessarily  composed out 
of parties with equal weighting. Therefore, a weaker party has to pick its fights on the national 
level. To analyse in how far the constitutional court tries to avoid confrontation and if a change 
in this attitude affects the levels of review an analysis of the origins of laws needs to be 
adjusted based on the strength of parties within coalition governments (Table 1,2,3). 
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Time Government Parties
December 2008 Fayman SPO-OVP
Jan 2007 Gusenbauer SPO-OVP
Feb 2003 Schuessel OVP-FPO/BZO
Feb 2000 Schuessel OVP-FPO
Jan 1997 Klima SPO-OVP
March 1996 Vranitzky SPO-OVP
Nov 1994 Vranitzky SPO-OVP
Dec 1990 Vranitzky SPO-OVP
Jan 87 Vranitzky SPO-OVP
Jun 86 Vranitzky SPO-FPO
May 83 Sinowatz SPO-FPO
Jun 79 Kreisky SPO
Table 1: Austria governments, coalitions dominated by one party in bold
Time Government Dominating Party
2008 Berlusconi PdL-FI
2006 Prodi PD
2005 Berlusconi FI
2001 Berlusconi FI
2000 Amato PSI
1999 DʼAlema DS
1998 DʼAlema DS
1996 Prodi PDS
1995 Dini N/A
1994 Berlusconi FI
1993 Ciampi N/A
1992 Amato PSI
1991 Andreotti DC
1989 Andreotti DC
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Time Government Dominating Party
1988 De Mita DC
1987 Goria DC
1987 Fanfani DC
1987 Craxi PSI
1983 Craxi PSI
1982 Fanfani DC
1982 Spadolini PRI
1981 Spadolini PRI
1980 Forlani DC
1980 Cossiga DC
1979 Cossiga DC
Table 2: Italy Governments and dominating parties
Time Government Dominating Party
2009 Merkel CDU
2005 Merkel
2002 Schroeder SPD
1998 Schroeder SPD
1994 Kohl CDU
1991 Kohl CDU
1987 Kohl CDU
1983 Kohl CDU
1982 Kohl CDU
1980 Schmitt SPD
Table 3: German governments and dominating party
It is then possible to analyse if the cases brought to the court according to the party 
challenging the law being in the majority  in the government is correlated to the outcome of the 
case. There still is no pattern between the law seeing review and the challenger not being 
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affiliated to the party  in government. From this perspective it therefore also appears that 
change in the court’s adherence to the will of the government is therefore not the cause for 
more laws seeing review. What of the success of groupings of parliamentarians? 
7.4 Does a change in the treatment of groups of parliamentarians with a party affiliation of a 
party not in government cause the increased levels of review?
In Austria and Germany groups of parliamentarians have the right to approach the court  with 
questions of legitimacy, which they often do when they have been defeated in parliament. The 
Italian founding fathers decided against including this power into their constitution. If the 
increased number of review cases in Austria and Germany are related to an increased use of 
parliamentarians of the court then this is interesting in comparison to Italy which does not 
have the same mechanism but shows the same increase of cases seeing review. However, if the 
increased number of unconstitutionality rulings in Austria and Germany are based on 
parliamentarian review then this allows for conclusions to be drawn about the court’s 
adherence to the will of the governing majority. It also might show a major difference to the 
Italian court. 
The question therefore is: What are the success chances of those who are in the minority in 
parliament at the moment? In both countries the appointment rules of judges try to ensure that 
opposition and majority  parties both make some appointments. Each political branch has the 
right to appoint a certain number of judges and within these rules there exists the convention 
that the main parties within the political system take turns in appointing judges (Kommers 
1997:17). Access rules to abstract judicial review in both countries are also stringent. Only  a 
group of parliamentarians which make up one third of parliament’s members is able to ask the 
court for a ruling under abstract judicial review. It is therefore almost necessary  in all cases 
that the major opposition party  is involved and abstract review is very  difficult if the 
government has a greater than two thirds majority (such as is the case in a grand coalition). 
The development of parliamentary minority induced abstract judicial review is as follows in 
Austria:
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Figure 1: Austrian parliamentarian review
It is clearly  visible that the use of the court by parliamentarian groups is on the increase in 
Austria - even if it is a very slow increase. Also, in the case of Austria it needs to be taken into 
account that  the period between 2000-2007 was one of the few times in the history of Austria 
in which there has not been a grand coalition. This therefore might explain the spike in that 
period. Most intriguingly, the group of parliamentarians has a one in three chance to see some 
success in its case in front of the court. This means that it has a one in three chance to see at 
least part of the law in question being ruled unconstitutional. In the period before 1990 the 
chance of success for a group of parliamentarians under abstract judicial review was around 
one case in five (Stone Sweet 1992). Moreover, almost all cases in which the court decides in 
favour of the group of parliamentarians it renders a partial ruling. This still means that the 
majority  of cases brought to the court  by parliamentarians not in power is low, although on the 
increase, and that their chance of success lies below that of other plaintiffs in abstract judicial 
review. The Austrian court  is therefore more likely  to vote with the government than against it. 
When running a simple test of correlation it becomes clear that there is a statistical 
significance between who approaches the court and what kind of ruling is rendered. 
In Germany, on the other hand, the use of the court by  minority groups of parliamentarians has 
become a normal phenomenon with between one and five cases a year (Figure 2). There is no 
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spike in the development of abstract judicial review induced by  groups of parliamentarians in 
the last twenty years, possibly because there have been very few grand coalitions, but rather a 
steady  increase of cases. However, there has been a marked decrease in the last years, since 
Germany has been governed by a grand coalition, however not a decrease to the previous 
levels. Whilst prior to 1980 there five cases a decade were unusual, even in the time of the 
grand coalition, one or two cases a year have become the norm (Figure 2). The last  twenty 
years have seen more cases of parliamentarian judicial review then the forty years following 
the formation of the court. In a simple test of correlation between the variable of “minority 
group parliamentarians” and “review of norm, partial or complete” there seems to be no 
statistical significance. However, when asking if there is a correlation between parliamentary 
minority use of the court and partial ruling, it  appears that there is a strong positive 
relationship  (Chi Square 0.039 and Cramers V at 0.25). In other words, and without statistical 
terms, it is more likely that the court  renders a partial ruling if the case is brought to the court 
by the opposition. Therefore, it seems to be arguable that the court is more willing to appease 
the political majority  if it is their political adversary who brings the case to the court. In these 
instances the German court rules more appeasingly by giving both sides a partial success. So 
this would rather lead to the conclusion that the court does feel a certain dislike towards ruling 
against the poitical elite at the time. 
Figure 2: Germany parliamentarian review
To summarise: The increasing amount of unconstitutionality  rulings, not only partial but also 
complete, indicates an increased independence of the courts from the political branches. Even 
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when splitting this into regional and national laws the trend towards higher unconstitutionaltiy 
rulings stands. However, when looking at national laws challenged by  minority groups in 
parliament, it becomes clear that in these cases there are more concilitory rulings. Not only are 
there more constitutionality rulings but also the cases which see review are more likely  to be 
only partially annulled rather than struck down completely. This on the other hand indicates a 
lesser independence from the political branches at least in the two countries in which 
parliamentarian review is  possible, namely Austria and Germany. The preferences of the 
political branches therefore seem to matter in respect to cases which are brought to the court 
by minority groups in parliament but not in other cases. 
7.5 Does a lower percentage of judges seeking further political office cause higher levels of 
review?
 It has been argued that the future career decisions judges make might also be an indicator. The 
thought behind this is that they are planning on future career moves and therefore act 
strategically  in order not to destroy  that possibility  by acting against the will of the ruling elite, 
those who will be in control of future political appointments. As political appointment I have 
considered here for example being appointed to be elected President, as in the case of Roman 
Herzog in Germany but also becoming the advisor to the President such as Ludwig 
Adamovich in Austria. I do not count professorial appointments to universities, national or 
international. More than 85% of all the judges in the three countries lecture at a university 
after their tenure at  the constitutional court  is over. Also I am considering professorial 
appointments as not being under the control of the ruling elite.        
         
Fiorino, Padovano and Sgarra (2004) have considered the political appointment potential in 
Italy and have shown that the low number of judges seeking further appointment, below 5%, 
indicates that the argument fails. As seen in Table 4 the numbers are slightly higher for 
Germany and Austria, potentially due to the lower number of judges32 appointed to the court 
during the same time, the period 1980 to today (Table 5). 
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32 It is seldom the case in Italy that a judges fulfills his or her 9 year term - many withdraw or die in 
office. In Austria there is an age limit of 70 but no time limit on the period of office of judges and that 
explains the very low number of judges. 
Country No of judges 
seeking further 
political app.
No of judges 
seeking no further 
political app.
Percentage of 
judges seeking 
political app.
Austria 6 12 33.33%
Italy 2 46 4.2%
Germany 4 28 14%
Table 4: political appointments
When comparing the three countries Austria seems exceptional regarding the high number of 
judges seeking further political appointment (Table 4). A consideration in this however has to 
be age as well. When looking at  the current court composition in Austria it  is apparent that the 
age range of judges is very  high. The youngest  judge, Professor Dr Grabenwarter was only  38 
years of age when he was appointed to the court. The oldest judges on the court, Professor 
Spielbuechler and Professor Heller are close to the obligatory retirement age of 70 but the age 
of the others ranges between those two extremes. In Italy, the country with the lowest  number 
of judges seeking further appointment there is no obligatory  retirement age. Judges serve a 
fixed nine year term but must have risen through the ranks of the judiciary before being 
eligible for election. This takes more time than in any other country  and as a result the judges 
are on average much older, with the youngest judges in the current college of judges, Professor 
Cassese and Judge Napolitano only  64 years of age. The oldest judge in Italy  is Chief Justice 
Bile, with 79 years of age. All other judges ages range between these three. The German 
constitutional court lies between the other two concerning age. The age range here varies 
between 45 and 65. 
Time period Austria Italy Germany
1980-1993 1 1 1
1993-2008 5 1 3
Table 5: political appointments over time
It is rational to assume that younger judges appointed to the court are more likely  to seek 
further appointment rather than an older judge. Austria tried to counteract  this by not limiting 
the tenure of its judges in any other way but age. However, it  might still be of interest to 
judges to consider a change in scenery after a certain time and seek further fields of personal 
development. If one considers the possibility  of future appointments as a possible driving 
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force in the decisions a constitutional court  judges makes then the Austrian court  seems most 
likely to be influenced by this and the Italian one least. 
Non regarding all the above, interview data throws doubt on the statistical evidence. Whilst 
the judges deny direct party political influence on decisions the majority admits that political 
considerations matter. It is claimed that “the membership of a political party  does play a 
greater role on the level of high courts”, possibly “due to the influence of presidential 
appointments which are designed to equal out the influence of a single party” (I2). 
“There are hardly any 4/4 decisions which follow the separation of party 
appointment. It is more the fundamental beliefs of the individual which 
influence the court” (G5)
Nevertheless some voices, especially in Austria, warn:
“There are hidden streams of influence between individual judges, they  do 
exist... but only very seldom. It is definitely overestimated. It is not the case that 
the Head of the OEVP or the SPOE (the main parties in Austria) calls and tells 
the court how they want the case to go − no judge would stand for that.” (A5)
In Austria, the court, at least in the past, has been dominated by  one party (Funk 2007:325; 
A5/6). In Italy each of the magistrates, the president and parliament appoint five judges − with 
the presidential appointments traditionally chosen to ensure an equal party distribution among 
the judges (I3). When talking to constitutional court judges from Germany and Austria they 
referred to the past courts as politically dominated by one party  (A5/6, G1) but emphasised 
that the current courts do not suffer from this. 
“You know that our constitutional court is appointed politically. In the past this 
has created a politically motivated court - today that is not anymore the case”33 
A1
All the judges of the German court, judges in Austria prior to 1997 and the majority  of the 
Italian court (I1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) named the political and economic implications of a decision as a 
major influence to be considered when deciding a case. 
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33Sie wissen ja das bei uns der cc ja politisch besetzt wurde. Frueher war es ein 
politische gerichtshof - heute aber nicht mehr
“What plays a role are the implications of a decision ...34The court is very  aware 
of the political implications of a decision. It  is never only  a decision on a single 
case. In Germany the text of the decisions are read as closely as the Bible and 
interpreted accordingly. Every word is taken that seriously that it often is 
astonishing. A side clause is taken out ten years later and everyone will say 
“look the constitutional court has said this already then.” And that is why we 
very carefully consider the long term implications” G1
However, none of the current Austrians mentioned political considerations on their own 
accord. When directly asked about it, two of the Austrian judges (A1,A3) deny explicitly that 
the political and economic implications are of any  significance. The other Austrian judges 
name the economic implications as a potential influence but argue that it  is very seldomly the 
case that it actually  carries any weight. The term “political” seems to be understood differently 
across nations. In conversation the German judges seemed to set economic implications equal 
to political implications. The German case of reparations payments to the dispossed after 
World War II is a case in point. The decision was based on the consideration that the German 
state will not be able to pay reparations to all the dispossed and therefore would break under 
the economic strain. A solution had to be found that was in line with the consitution without 
bankrupting the state. In inteviews it  was clear that these considerations were considered 
political in Germany, whilst Austrian judges called them economic. 
From interviews it is clear that  the influence of the government is considered low in the 
current courts but the influence of political considerations is not. However, these political 
considerations, when questioned further, often appear results of practicability  or philosophy. 
The necessity to defend national unity, economic workability and democratic ideals such as 
the rule of law are the basis for these “political considerations” not an increased or decreased 
willingness to oppose the current government. Therefore whilst there is no empirical evidence 
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34Was natürlich sicher eine Rolle spielt, die Wirkung einer Entscheidung... Das 
Gericht guckt sehr darauf welche Wirkung das haben wird. Und zwar, es ist ja nie, 
also es ist zwar ein Urteil über einen Einzelfall aber das ist ein bisschen schwierig, in 
Deutschland werden die Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts wie die 
Bibel gelesen und ausgelegt. Die werden so wörtlich genommen, dass man sich 
manchmal wundert, da wird ein Nebensatz reingeschrieben den holt einer nachher 
mit spitzen Fingern einer raus 10 Jahre später und sagt die haben es  ja schon 
gesagt. Und so ist das. Und deshalb achtet man da seht drauf was das für eine 
Dauerwirkung haben wird. 
for the court to avoid confronting the government there is empirical evidence for the influence 
of political considerations. 
It would nevertheless be wrong to say  that the court is completly free from a desire to avoid 
confrontation with the ruling government. There is a weak correlation, around 57%, between 
the review of a law resulting in a conflict with the government and the law only seeing partial 
review rather than being declared void in Germany and Italy, In Austria this correlation has 
increased over the last three decades with over 70% of cases avoiding the outright conflict of a 
complete unconstitutionality ruling of a norm. It has often been argued that  the distinction 
between partial and complete unconstitutionality  rulings is used as a tool by the constitutional 
courts to preserve the goodwill of the ruling elites (Koopmans 2003). An uncosntitutionalty 
ruling is a major embarassment for the governement whose law is being declared void. 
Especially if the court in question enjoys high levels of approval in the eyes of the public and 
is seen as the defender of the minorities (Comella 2009:96). Therefore courts only  rule part of 
the norm unconstitutional, thus sparing the government complete loss of face. The more 
established and highly regarded the constitutional court, the more insulated is it from the 
possible repercussions by  the ruling elite. This leads to higher regarded consitutional courts 
making fewer partial and more unconstitutionality  rulings than less well established courts
(Epstein et al. 2001). This theory fits the above pattern of both Italy  and Germany, courts 
which face very little public criticism, showing increased levels of unconstitutionality ruling 
and decreased partial unconstitutionality rulings. The Austrian court also saw increased levels 
of unconstitutionality  rulings in the 1980s. However throughout the late 1990s until today the 
level of unconstitutionality rulings has been falling and the level of partial unonstitutionaliity 
rulings is on the increase. This change in behaviour followed wide spread public criticisms of 
the court as activist and undemocratic (Gamper 2007). 
7.6 Conclusion
The answer to the question if a change in the deferrence to political institutions caused the 
changed pattern in abstract review is mixed. The court does not seem to give preferential 
treatment due to party identity  of either plaintiff or origin of the law. However, when the 
plaintiff is a group of parliamentarians the court tends to partial rulings rather than 
unconstitutionality rulings.  In all cases, the court is marginally less likely to enter in conflict 
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with the ruling government in Italy  and Germany  whilst there is a fairly  strong lilkelihood for 
this in Austria. Moreover, the trend is increasing in Austria whilst  it is decreasing in Italy and 
Germany. Judges admit that political and economical considerations do matter in their 
considerations. Therefore, the influence political instituions, or at least political 
considerations, have on the decision-making patterns seem to present possible explanations for 
the change in the decision-making pattern. However, it needs to be ascertained in what way 
political considerations influence the decision-making pattern. The argument for the power of 
the court  is very dependent on the court preserving the high regard the public has for it. Only 
if the court is in high regard with the public does it matter to the government that the court 
rules against it. However, the assumption that the public image matters to the court and that 
the court  is aware of this is a purely theoretical assumption. No empirical research in this has 
been undertaken in Europe. The next chapter will try  to ascertain the influence the public 
image has on the decisions. One further interesting, and recurring, aspect in the last  three 
chapters is the ocurence of “European” influences. In the style of decisions there is an 
increasing mention of European ideals, obligations and values. The membership of the courts 
increasingly  contain members who have served at an international court or have been affiliated 
to an international academic institution.  The next two chapters will try to explain how 
political considerations have contributed to the change in decision-making patterns by looking 
at the court’s public image and the recurrence of references to the “European”. 
!
! 192
CHAPTER VIII
THE INFLUENCE ON IMPORTANCE OF THE PUBLIC 
IMAGE OF THE COURT
It has been argued that constitutional courts are aware of public opinion and mirror their 
decisions on this. The arguments for this connection are both normative and positive. On the 
normative side it can be argued that because judges represent people they should also 
represent the opinions of the people in their decisions. However, this argument only answers 
the question why judges should follow public opinion in their decisions not if they de facto 
do. The positive argument is based on the rational choice assumptions relating to decision-
making processes in courts. The argument has been discussed in detail in the last chapter but 
can be summarised as follows: political institutions are less likely  to curtail the court’s power 
if it has the public’s approval, therefore judges try to preserve the public’s high opinion 
through their decisions. Whilst this argument makes intuitive sense to many without the 
addition of empirical data it remains an answer to the question why constitutional courts 
should follow public opinion in their decisions not why they do. Or more importantly, if they 
do. Empirical data to answer this question is still limited. 
In order to answer whether the question if the changed decision-making pattern in abstract 
norm control are caused by a change in the influence of public opinion on the decision, it  is 
first necessary  to establish if public opinion influences judicial decisions. To do so requires a 
test which in the case of this chapter is the comparison of survey  data with the outcome of 
decisions. Per force these are decisions that  attract public attention and can be found in all 
three countries. Examples for such cases can be found in the areas pertaining to abortion, 
church/state relations and minority rights. In all of these controversial social areas the 
reliability  of survey data is often bias. It is therefore difficult to establish with absolute 
certainty what exactly the public opinion to each of these topics is. Using polls and data from 
the main daily newspapers it  is still possible to at least ascertain what the approximate public 
stance to these controversial topic is. In none of these cases did the constitutional court decide 
according to public opinion. However, the court’s awareness of public opinion becomes 
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apparent in the interviews. Past incidents in which the German and the Austrian court ran foul 
of public opinion have caused the courts to introduce measures that allow them to make use of 
public opinion rather than being used by it. It is therefore clear that whilst there is the 
possibility that public opinion influences decision making the courts have ensured that this is 
not the case. The increased levels of review in abstract judicial review can therefore not be 
explained with the court increased adherence to public opinion - but possibly to the courts 
increased use of public opinion for their own means.  
8.1 Problems with the research design
There has never been an attempt to empirically test  the question if judges react to public 
opinion. Moreover, the possibility that the court would react to the vagaries of public opinion 
has always been denied vehemently by scholars and judges alike.  The argument reaching back 
to the foundation of the court which sees itself as the protector of minorities. Historically, the 
foundation of all three courts was in part based on the reasoning that there needs to be a 
judicial body able to protect minorities from misuse of power. Three possible ways how to test 
for the influence of popular opinion on decision-making patterns in abstract review can be 
envisaged. Not all three are practicable when taking into account the political and social 
realities in Germany. Austria and Italy. 
The most obvious methods would be the comparison of the decisions taken and the media 
reports and survey data in each case. Both are not practical possibilities as most cases will not 
be reported in the media or be connected to any pre-established surveys. To undertake the 
surveys retrospectively is impossible as few people will remember the cases well enough. This 
is based on a fundamental problem with many abstract review cases. Whilst important, they 
often also are considered boring. Issues like abortion, church/state relations, euthanasia and 
the death penalty all are challenged under abstract review - but more frequently so are tax 
laws, the budget and administrative provisions. Many of these topics are too obscure for the 
general populace to form an opinion about. Therefore a retrospective or current survey does 
not promise to be fruitful. However, there are cases about which everyone has an opinion. 
Abortion, church/state relations and minority  rights are all cases discussed under abstract 
review and, most importantly, by all three courts. The purpose of this section is therefore to 
compare the decisions of these cases with public opinion as expressed through media reports 
and surveys. It then is possible to conclude if the court’s decision was in line with public 
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opinion. This will not allow for an answer to the question if the increased levels of review in 
abstract norm control are de facto caused by a change in the adherence of the court to popular 
opinion. Whereas it will allow for an answer if the decisions of the courts are related to public 
opinion. It therefore will answer the question if it is possible that the increased levels of 
review are based on a shifts in public opinion not if they are necessarily  causing the shift in 
decision-making patterns. 
It needs to be noted here that not all cases below are abstract review cases. Many of these 
topics have been developed through abstract  and direct review and it would be negligent to 
omit the developments through direct review. However, all areas are based on initial and 
seminal decisions in abstract review cases and all the cases analysed are abstract review cases. 
Often there are connected cases in direct review which are referred to. The development of the 
legal principles involved is often based on a mixture of abstract and direct review. In the 
following section I will honour this by noting the cases of direct review, but analysing the 
abstract review cases at the bases of this. 
8.2 Abortion, Church State Relations and Minority Rights 
The three areas which allow for the clearest picture of public opinion are abortion, church/ 
state relations and minority. In all three areas, the courts seems to decide in ignorance to 
current public sentiment. However, these areas are only a small, very select cross section of 
the court’s work and therefore not necessarily  representative. These areas are not without 
importance. These areas create high public emotions. An unpopular court decision has far 
reaching influence on the court’s public image if the public notices the decision. In areas of 
high public emotion the public will notice and therefore are more likely to be influenced by 
considerations of the public image. The court’s stance in these areas might therefore not be 
representative of all cases but it  is a clear indication that the court can and does, if it so wishes, 
act against public opinion.  
8.2.1 Abortion
Abortion legislation has been challenged in front of the court numerous times in all three 
countries. Until the 1970s, abortion was illegal and punishable under the law of Italy, Austria 
and Germany. This changed in 1975 when a trimester solution was introduced in Austria and 
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Italy making it possible to terminate a pregnancy within the first trimester. These laws were 
the direct result  of cases and constitutional court instigated referenda which showed up to 74% 
(Italy) of the population to be in favour of legalised abortion. In these cases the constitutional 
courts indicated to the government that abortion should be revisited as it violates the rights of 
woman. Here it seems that the Austrian and Italian court seem to have been in line with public 
opinion. Not so in Germany. The German constitutional court struck down an abortion law 
allowing for termination in the first trimester in 1975 (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1975). The 
law itself had been lobbied for by increasingly important liberal women’s interest groups and 
was passed under a Christian Democratic government. It  was then taken to the court by the 
Christian Democratic Faction. The court ruled that the right to life of the baby supersedes the 
right of the woman to self-determination. It  would take until 1992 and reunification to 
introduce a trimester solution into abortion laws in Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht 
1992). 
The German court therefore was clearly  voting against public opinion, as perceived at the 
time, evidenced by the number of interest groups that had lobbied for the law in the first place. 
The development since then is just as interesting. In all three countries abortion provisions 
have been challenged repeatedly under abstract as well as direct review. Surveys in 1996, 1998 
and 2006 show decreasing approval for legalised abortion. In the German case surveys in 1996 
after reunification show divide between East and West concerning public opinion (Banaszak 
1998). In West Germany public opinion is in favour (80%) of possible termination if the 
mothers health is at risk or the pregnancy is a result of a rape. Whereas only 40% are in favour 
of the right to termination without regard to any reasons the woman might have. Most judges 
were and still are recruited from West Germany. In East Germany 60% were in favour of the 
woman having the right to choose abortion within the first three months non-regarding the 
reasons for this decision. A second study in 2006 showed that the gap has virtually  disappeared 
with 60% of the population now opposing the right  of the woman to choose if she wants to 
carry  a child (Buder 2008). In Germany therefore, there seems to have been a shift  in opinion 
since 1975 with the majority  of the population now opposing the right to termination of a 
pregnancy. However, the German constitutional court since then decided on the right of states 
to prohibit abortion, on the rights of doctors to be protected from anti-abortion demonstrators, 
on the right of women to claim social support for abortion and on the right of doctors to be 
paid for abortions. In all these cases the constitutional court has decided in favour of the right 
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of the woman to have the abortion paid for by insurance, doctors rights to be protected from 
abuse and rules against the state trying to prohibit abortion. So whilst the popular opinion has 
swung against the right  of a woman to terminate her pregnancy the court has enshrined the 
right in many areas of law. In the case of abortion the German court decisions therefore have 
developed counter to public opinion. 
Similar developments have occurred in the Italian and the Austrian courts. When challenged 
they  declared that the right of life established through the European Court of Human Rights is 
not applicable to a foetus. Their decisions have not  varied from this precept since then, even if 
public opinion has also shifted. In both Austria and Italy recent surveys show that only  40% of 
the population are in favour of the right of the woman to terminate her pregnancy. Whilst  there 
is no constitutional court decision in Austria which establishes the right of a woman to receive 
a termination under health insurance no attempt to change the status quo has been successful 
and abortion remains legal in the first three months. There have been many tries to instigate 
court cases that would change abortion law in Austria. In Italy through court cases not only the 
right to terminate a pregnancy has been established and protected but women can turn to their 
health insurance for the procedure. Therefore, in the case of abortion it can be concluded that 
whilst public opinion has developed away from liberal abortion laws the courts’ decisions 
have further entrenched them. The constitutional courts in all three countries seem to have 
been unaffected by public opinion. 
8.2.2. Relations between Church and State
Church and state relations are also common themes in all three courts. In Italy the right to 
divorce, in Germany the sign of the cross in the schoolroom, and in Austria non-religious 
weddings and religious freedom have all occupied the constitutional courts. 
In Italy  the constitutional court was often seen as the main force pushing for a legally secular 
state (de Franciscis and Zannini 1992). In 1989 the court gave the principle of secularism 
“super-constitutional” meaning and therefore declared it unchangeable even by future 
administrations (203/1989). An article of the criminal code (No 724) was revised because it 
referred to a “state religion” and 1996 and 1997 atheists were declared to be equal to religious 
citizens in their rights of expression and consideration (117/1997, 334/1996). Long before that 
the Italian court had established the right to divorce, abortion and to abstain form religious 
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education. This gives an image of a court ready to defend the separation of church and state. 
However, recent developments are not as clear. In 1996 the court  also declared that ”non-
confessionality  is not possible” (334/1996). It goes on to argue that religion is the basis of 
many of our human moral values and if all things connected to religion were removed 
humanity would lose their moral footing. Most telling however are two cases in 2004 and 
2006. In these the question of Christian symbols (crucifix) in public places such as schools, 
assembly  halls and court rooms was addressed. The constitutional court ruled that the 
plaintiffs had no right to initiate a case. It therefore refused to make a decision on a secular 
question. For a court that has staunchly defended secularism for the last thirty years this is a 
landmark decision and indicates that the courts stance on secularism might be changing. 
The stance of Italy’s public regarding secularism is also changing. The number of practising 
Christians has decreased from 38% to barely  20% in the last twenty years according to surveys 
by the national newspapers. There are no official statistics on the matter as there are no taxes 
or benefits that are only accessible or payable by church members. This is very different in 
Germany and Austria. Here a member of the church has to pay church tax so statistics are 
readily available. According to the German and Austrian statistical office membership of the 
church has been steadily declining over the last two decades in both Germany and Austria. 
However, so have the birth rates in both countries. Possibly  more telling is that the numbers of 
people actively leaving the church each year have started to decline over the last decade and 
an increasing number of re-entries are reported in Austria. Nevertheless, around 70% of the 
population are members of the church today. However the numbers of those indicating that 
they  are active believers is far below that. In 1990s it lay with 22% and was declining to under 
20% by the end of that decade. Although the numbers have increased slightly  over the last two 
years again. This seems to indicate that the importance of religious belief is increasing again in 
both countries relative to the two decades before. 
The Austrian constitutional court has had comparatively  little involvement with the area of 
church/state relations. Nevertheless, when faced with a question of religion it  has favoured the 
religious side more often than not. In 1998 it decided against religious slaughter of animals, in 
1991 for disproportionate funding of religious schools (1275/1991). The court therefore seems 
to be deciding for religion, just as public opinion is turning more religious again as well. 
However, the turn in public opinion is as recent as 2000 with the numbers of church leavers 
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steadily increasing before that. Therefore in the times in which the court decided to favour 
religion, and often Christian, practices, the number of people believing in religion was on the 
decrease. The court therefore did not follow public opinion in its decisions. 
The German constitutional court has had a long and complicated relationship with cases in the 
area of church and state. Prayers in school, religious education, church tax, religious symbols 
in public spaces and especially in Bavaria have occupied the court. For the most part the court 
has been pro secularism. Religious practices outside religious education are banned, religious 
education cannot be obligatory, and crucifixes may  not be displayed in schoolrooms (1436/02, 
1087,92, 67/01, 647/70, 7/74). This is remarkable as the court itself has been regularly 
dominated by openly Christian judges as is the current court. This might be the reason for the 
refusal of the court to engage in a clear decision relating the obligation of a child to attend 
religious education at the moment. One cannot argue that the court is pro-religion in schools in 
its hesitant stance, it is simply not deciding. Therefore the court seems to display a stance 
supporting and protecting secularism, even if it is not as clear in its decisions as the Italian 
court has been. The seeming increase of religious feeling in Germany and the stance of the 
court therefore are not developing in the same direction. 
8.2.3. Minority Rights
Minority  rights are regularly challenged in front of the constitutional courts. The Italian 
Constitutional Court has decided on linguistic rights of minorities, as has the Austrian court. 
The German Constitutional Court is more reticent in the matter as it deals with the question of 
dual nationalities regularly. Both the German and the Austrian court have made abundantly 
clear that dual nationality  is not desirable in either country. In 1974 the German constitutional 
court has called it an “evil” and has since then produced numerous rulings that make clear that 
it considers dual nationality an unconstitutional concept (1339/06). However the court has also 
in these cases made clear that receiving the German nationality  at birth in Germany allows for 
a dual nationality till the age of 21 when a decision has to be made. So the court was staunchly 
against dual nationalities in 1974 but has relented in a small way since then. In surveys the 
general public opposes dual nationalities in all forms. In 1996, 53% of the population were 
against dual nationality, in 1999 52%. For the most part the court’s decision is in line with 
public opinion - but not as strict. The Austrian court on the other hand has shown that whilst it 
opposed dual nationality, an opinion in line with public opinion, it supports the rights of 
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linguistic minorities within its borders. The court decided that the signs in an area dominated 
by a linguistic minority  have to be bilingual. The public outcry  following this decision was 
great but not  unexpected as surveys before had shown that the decision would be more than 
unpopular. Here clearly the Austrian court  disregarded public opinion as evidenced through 
the editorial and interview data in the Austrian newspapers (ORF 2005; Zeitung 2009). 
The Italian court faced similar issues relating to linguistic minorities (28/1982, 62/1992, 
15/1996, 312/1983, 213/1998). In these the court has upheld the rights of the linguistic 
minorities especially regarding South Tyrol. Over the last decade there has been an increasing 
public approval for these measures so in this instance the Italian constitutional court  is ruling 
with public opinion. This was not  always the case as the 1980s presented the court with a 
populace unsympathetic to the rights of linguistic minorities. It has been argued that public 
opinion has furthermore shifted again recently due to the connection with Roma and Sinti 
rights. However, there are no official statistics other than documented increased aversion to 
these peoples. Therefore not even in this can the Italian court be identified as being in line 
with public opinion.
All three areas have shown courts that seem to be in disregard or ignorance of public opinion 
in their decisions. However, per force these are areas of high conflict and high media 
coverage. Moreover, the court is more likely to receive coverage on issues where it voted 
controversially, against public opinion. The fact that the courts in all three countries enjoy  high 
public approval rates indicate that possibly  the above are more exceptions than the rule. The 
interviews suggest an alternative explanation for the high levels of approval of courts in the 
face of decisions made counter to public opinion. 
8.3 Interviews
According to the data drawn from the comparison of court decisions with the available public 
opinion data there seems to be little room to claim that there is a possibility of the courts being 
influenced by public opinion in their decision. The data pertaining to interviews conducted 
support this conclusion in the broadest sense. No judge from either country considered public 
opinion as a legitimate or even probable influence on the decisions of courts. Rather the 
adverse, as they tend to see themselves as protectors of the minorities.  
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“Public opinion has no influence on the single case. And that is good as the 
constitutional court is the last resort for minorities” (G2)
The judges are aware of the power public opinion could have and historically has had.  As a 
result the German and Austrian court  have taken steps to ensure that they are not influenced by 
public opinion but that the courts influence public opinion instead.  
For all judges the mere possibility  of having their decisions influenced by public opinion was 
abhorrent. However voices from both the German and Austrian constitutional court are careful 
to point out  that public opinion is important for the court in general if not  for the single 
decision. 
“We do not pander to public opinion. But if a court constantly is in 
confrontation with public opinion the court will eventually have problems to 
have its rulings accepted35” (G1)
The Austrian court learnt that lesson the hard way in the previously mentioned case on multi-
lingual signs. It was perceived by  members of the court that the political forces motivated and 
“used the media to swing public opinion against the court“ (A2). As a result the Austrian 
constitutional court  decided to employ a media representative who not only  deals with the 
media but who actively tries to shape the public image of the court. The German court has had 
a media representative for decades and has made increasingly  use of the position following an 
experience where the court faced widespread public disapproval following an unpopular 
ruling. In interviews it  is said that the media representative’s duty is to “avoid 
misrepresentation of facts pertaining to cases” (G5, G6, I3, I8,A7,A8). Additionally, to ensure 
that the public receives “balanced and well-informed information about the works of the 
constitutional court”. The importance of the media representative is possibly also underlined 
by the fact that each of my  Italian interviewees argued that the Italian constitutional court 
would be more effective if it  would have a media representative. The Italian judges argued that 
the public is not aware of its actions and therefore the political forces have more opportunity 
to circumvent or try to ignore rulings.  
“We would like to use the media as it is often used against the court...To 
transfer information from the court  to outside - we have no means. But would 
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35Also wir buhlen da jetzt nicht um die Gunst der öffentlichen Meinung. Aber ein Gericht das sich immer 
in Konfrontation mit der öffentlichen Meinung setzt wird irgendwann ein Problem bekommen mit der 
Akzeptanz.
like to have one... We are not good at using the press. It is the administrative 
function - everyday work is reported in an internal newspaper” (I3)
In all courts there were voices that admitted that there are areas of law where the court knows 
that public opinion is on its side (G1, I2, A3). In Germany and Austria environmental cases, in 
Italy in the 1980s and 1990s the European Union are examples of this. In these areas a 
decision that will be unpopular with the ruling elite is less likely  to meet with opposition and 
the courts are aware of this. However, the interviewees in Germany and Italy  strongly stress 
that their duty towards minority protection supersedes all. The situation is possibly  best 
explained with a quote from one of the Italian constitutional court judges:
“ We do not follow public opinion. But our debating chamber has got windows 
- and sometimes we even open them” (I3)
In other words, the courts are aware of public opinion and the importance public opinion can 
have for the court generally. They know when their decision is counter to what public opinion 
expects and are aware of the power the media can play in swaying public opinion their way. 
They  use public opinion but are not used by it. Both Germany and Austria have made 
experiences with public opinion swinging against the court and since then make increasing use 
of their media representative to ensure that the data reaching the public is presented in a way 
the courts approve of. The interviews therefore show that public opinion has the definite 
possibility of influencing the courts - but that the courts have made use of that circumstance to 
their own end and are now influencing public opinion. In other words, the courts are now 
accomplished users of propaganda.
8.4 Conclusions
The above has shown that constitutional courts in Italy, Austria and Germany are aware of 
public opinion and therefore that there is the potential that the increased levels of review in 
abstract review are based on a shift in public opinion.  However, the direction of the shift  is 
unexpected. It seems to be the case that the constitutional courts have become more skilled in 
manipulating and guiding public opinion and have therefore increased their autonomy. The 
courts have learnt that there are areas in which the public supports it and is more insulated 
from political pressures in these areas through this knowledge. This is supported by the fact 
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that in these areas of high public support the Italian and the German constitutional courts are 
more likely to pass historically unusual decisions. For the wider picture of this thesis the clear 
awareness of courts of the public opinion has one main consequences: it is possible that the 
decision-making pattern of the court  are influenced by  considerations of political 
consequences. This is independent of the analysis that a change in public opinion has not 
occurred to cause a change in the decision-making pattern in the court. The court can act more 
freely in those decisions which follow the public opinion. However, the number of cases 
which fall into these areas are limited. Moreover, in most cases public opinion is not that 
clearly dominated by one side of the argument. 
!
! 203
CHAPTER IX
A CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF “EUROPEAN 
CONNECTIONS” AS REASONS FOR THE CHANGE IN 
THE DECISION-MAKING PATTERN
The previous chapters have tried to find an answer to the question what causes the change in 
decision-making patterns in abstract review in Austria, Italy and Germany. It was observed 
that not only the decision-making pattern has changed in the three countries but also the style 
the decisions were written in. Therefore it was concluded that the style as well as the decision 
in the case must be affected by a third variable. The political opinions and the pressures from 
political institutions are found to be possible variables with the power to influence style and 
decision. There is no change in political attitudes or the philosophical background of the 
judges which influences the decision-making pattern. However, political considerations have 
proven to be of some importance in the decision making process. How exactly  political 
considerations affected the decision-making pattern is still unclear. However, in consideration 
of both the political attitudes of judges and the change in style of decisions, there is a regular 
recurrence of concepts, institutions or ideals connected with Europe. This is in line with the 
evidence in the literature. In the last decade the literature has noted that there is an increased 
tendency of courts to refer to legal sources outside their strict jurisdiction. The US Supreme 
Court has begun to refer to other courts’ jurisdictions, the European national courts are forced 
to refer to European Union law and legal principles and all courts are observed to be making 
use of such extralegal concepts as the “rule of law”, “civil rights in Europe” and “European 
values”. It remains to see if this increased use of the term “European” is in any way related to 
the increased levels of review in the three countries.
The statistical analysis indicates that the increased use of the “European” in the arguments is 
linked to the form the decision in a case takes in Germany  and Italy. After asserting this 
through statistical analysis this chapter attempts to explain this connection. Firstly, it is 
necessary  to ascertain that the increased use reference to the “European” is de facto evidence 
for the cause of the changed decision-making pattern and not a result  of it. It  therefore needs to 
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be ascertained that the variable “Europe” is the independent variable, not an intervening 
variable, such as the style of decisions has proven to be. Various possible explanations for this 
link of “Europe” as the independent variable affecting both style and decision-making pattern 
can be found in the data. The analysis suggests that the inclusion of EU law has made it harder 
for policy-makers to ensure that the laws they are proposing are not contravening national or 
European legal provisions. Therefore, the likelihood of a law being unconstitutional is 
increased today  because passing laws which are constitutional is more difficult. With EU law 
and national law to consider, the formulation of legislation has become more complex. The 
courts attempt through their decisions to clarify  terms and legal boundaries, which leads to 
higher levels of review but also to a more interpretative style. The courts also voice a worry 
that the policies passed sometimes intentionally  contravene the legal boundaries leaving it to 
the courts to clean up the legal mess created. 
9.1 Increasing reference to “European” in case materials
In the three courts there is an increasing trend to refer to the “European”, in some form, in 
either the arguments of the plaintiffs or of the court, as noted by many authors (Friedman 
2005; Newell 2005). Relevant empirical data are rare and incomplete. However, the analysis 
below indicates that the argument is not without merit. Furthermore, the way the word 
“European” is used within case materials has changed over time. Originally  it was based on 
direct reference to formalised sources such as the European Treaties, the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice and the European Commission. In Italy and Germany these 
phrasings have changed to more informal aspects such as “European values” and “obligation 
to other European states”. In Austria this development appears to be different becoming rather 
more formal, by concentrating on treaty provisions.  
In Germany there was no mention of Europe in connection to either formal or informal 
sources of law before 1988, but since then most years have contained a substantial percentage 
of cases (Figure 1). In Austria and Italy this development is even more explicit (Figure 2 and 
3). In the case of the Italian court the number of cases with reference to Europe outweigh those 
without in the last decade. This development in abstract review is counter to the general 
development observed. Lucio Pegoraro argues that the Italian constitutional court, contrary to 
other European courts, is less likely to refer to any sources outside its national borders 
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(Pegoraro 2006:3). The same sentiment can be found in German and Austrian literature. The 
results of the analysis of abstract review cases clearly  contradict these findings. This 
discrepancy can be explained with the form the references take over time. In Italy and 
Germany the references have changed from articles of law, directives or European and 
international organisations to more informal forms such as “European values and obligations”.  
Figure 1: Increased percentage of laws seeing a mention of the “European” 
Figure 2: Percentage of cases containing a reference of “European”
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Figure 3: Development of cases containing a reference to EU in Italy
Throughout the 1980s the Italian court cases contain the use of formal sources of European 
law and references to the European Institutions. Over 90% of the case materials containing 
any reference to an extra-national source of legislation or legitimising argument is based on 
articles of law or European institutions. The remaining cases utilise informal concepts such as 
“international and European obligations”. This balance shifts in favour of the informal 
concepts throughout the 1990s. Of the cases containing a reference to extra national concepts 
over 60% now utilise “European values and norms”, “community obligations” and “European 
legal unity” ((103/2008), (134/2006), (206/2001), (356/1998), (94/1995)).  
“… in relation to the period of completion of the process of liberalisation and 
European integration …” (1/2008)
Informal concepts such as European values and obligations have become legitimate arguments 
in front of the courts.
In Austria, on the other hand, the usage of “Europe” is increasingly  formalised and has 
changed over time. In the 1980s and 1990s, this reference to “Europe” is being cited as reason 
for action. This is contrary  to the current decision style which uses the “European” as 
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supporting evidence for a point. The court argues that its decision is the only possible and 
practicable decision in the face of the political situation Austria finds itself in at the time. 
“These arguments as a whole become overwhelmingly convincing in 
connec t ion wi th the t r ea ty  nego t i a t ions w i th the European 
Communities” (G245/89)
In other instances, the plaintiffs have begun to argue that a decision is “an euro-political 
necessity” (388/1996) and in “accordance with the intentions of the European 
Institutions” (189/1990). In these cases the reason given for a decision is connected to the 
“European” in some way. Over the last decade these references have almost entirely 
disappeared and have been replaced with formal references to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice and the European Human Rights Court36. Therefore, according to 
the empirical data, there is an increased use of the word “European” in the case materials of all 
three countries. Furthermore, the use of the word “European” changes from “formal” to 
“informal” in Italy  and from “informal” to “formal” in Austria whilst it remains on an 
“informal” level in Germany. 
9.2 Does the increase in the occurrence of “Europe” cause the change in decision-making 
pattern?
As yet it  still needs to be ascertained if the increased levels of laws seeing review is connected 
to this increased use of “European”. A statistical analysis correlating the cases in which a law 
is reviewed and the usage of the word “European” indicate that there is a link in Germany 
(Cramers V = 0.2) and Italy (Cramers V = 0.2). No such link can be found in Austria. This 
contravenes common assumptions regarding the Austrian court’s supposed closeness to the 
European level. The Austrian court is proud of being the only  well established constitutional 
court which regularly refers cases to the European Court of Justice. The court prizes its ability 
and willingness to employ, defend and support European law (Ohlinger 2007). So the fact that 
there seems to be no link in Austria, in comparison to Italy  and Germany, seems counter 
intuitive. The change in the way the court refers to the “Europe” in Austria, in comparison to 
Germany/Italy, can provide an explanation. The explanatory  strength of the model correlating 
the increased use of the “European” argument with the increased levels of review in abstract 
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36 The dominance of the European Human Rights Court can be explained with the Austrian 
constitutional provision which makes the jurisprudence of the Human rights court part of national law. 
norm control lies at 20% in Austria (RSQ= 0.25). In other words, the use of the “European” 
argument in its more formal expression in Austria is able to explain around 25% of the change 
in the review in abstract norm control. 25% variation in the independent variable is 
approximately the difference between the partial and unconstitutionality rulings. It seems that 
in Austria, if the word “Europe” occurs in the text of the decision, the case is more likely to be 
ruled partially  unconstitutional. If taking the position that partial unconstitutionality rulings are 
less confrontational then it can be concluded that the word “Europe” in decision texts causes 
the court to pass less confrontational rulings. It also means that the variation in the decision-
making pattern in Austria in comparison to Germany and Italy  is explained. It does however 
not explain the higher levels of review in Germany and Italy. Another explanation has be 
found. 
In Germany and Italy a law containing a reference to the “European” leads to a law seeing 
review by the constitutional court in 83% of times. This might be easily explained with the 
position the constitutional courts hold in the European constitutional construct. Their duty lies 
in ensuring the coherency of law. They have to ensure that national laws are coherent and 
harmonised with European law due to the concept of the supremacy of EU law. An increase in 
the quantity of European laws signifies that  more national laws have to be reviewed to fit  into 
the overall construct of European laws. The Austrian exception is harder to explain under this 
theory. The Austrian court does not observe the same increase in review nor does it see a link 
between a law containing the word “European” and it being reviewed. Within the group of 
cases which see review there is a link between the case containing the word “Europe” and the 
decision being a partial unconstitutionality ruling. Just as many laws containing a reference to 
“Europe” are declared constitutional as are unconstitutional. 
A possible explanation for the Austrian exception might be found in its comparative youth as a 
member-state of the EU. Austria is the most recent member state among the three countries 
and it might be argued that the court has to accustom itself to the European sphere before 
making decisions which align the court. However, the Austrian court  has been seen as the 
court with the strongest desire of a relationship with the European level by commentators 
(Hoennige 2007; Kotschy 2006; Ohlinger 2007). Its record of referrals to the European Court 
of Justice is impressive and far outweighs that of the other two courts (Sachs 2004), leading to 
the assumption that the Austrian court is most skilled and able to give European principles of 
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law national expression. In fact, the statistical analysis above suggests the reverse. The 
conclusion drawn from this is that whilst the Austrian court is more likely to refer cases to the 
European courts, the decisions the Austrian constitutional court makes on the national level are 
less influenced by the European dimension then those in Germany and Italy. 
When comparing the form the review takes in all three countries a further pattern becomes 
apparent. In Germany a reference to the “European” correlates to this law being declared 
unconstitutional in its entirety. In Italy  the reference will lead with higher probability to a 
partial ruling. In both countries therefore a reference to the “European” will result in a form of 
ruling traditionally considered “rare” in these courts. Historically the German court has ruled 
the majority  of cases partially unconstitutional, trying to please both the plaintiff and the 
originator of laws (Currie 1994; Dunlop 1963; Kommers 1997; Landfried 1984, 1988, 1992; 
Sachs 2004). As seen in Chapter 1 the increase in cases seeing review in Germany  is based, for 
the most part, on increased levels of unconstitutionality rulings. In Italy  the increase in review 
is based on increased levels of partial rulings. This is remarkable as the Italian constitutional 
court was historically forbidden to declare partially  unconstitutional. The court was designed 
originally  with the powers to declare a law either constitutional or unconstitutional. This was 
to ensure that the court cannot  insert  any  interpretation of its own into laws (Breton and 
Fraschini 2003; Furlong 2001; Furlong 1988, 1990; Giuffre and Nicotra 2008; Guarnieri 2007; 
Volcansek 1990, 1994; Volcansek 2000). In both countries there is a link between the increase 
in cases seeing review as observed in abstract review and the occurrence of the “European” in 
the argument. So whilst in Austria the reference to the word “European” leads to the court 
making less confrontational rulings, in Germany and Italy  the court will make more 
confrontational rulings. Also whilst  the Austrian court  does not see an increase of review 
correlated to an increase in the mention of the word “Europe”, there is a correlation in Italy 
and Germany. Possibly the reasons for these correlations can be found in the form the 
references to “Europe” take in all three countries. This might give an indication why there is 
such a difference between the three courts. Potential explanations can be found in the identity 
of the challenger of the law, the origin of the law and the regional identity of those involved. 
In the end neither can sufficiently explain the importance of the mention of the “European” for 
the outcome of the decision.  
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9.3 Regional identity of a law
If the regional origin of the law, a mention to the “European” and the outcome of the case are 
related, then one can conclude that some regional units are better at using the “European” 
argument than others and therefore have more success in front of the court. It would therefore 
be the identity of the regional unit that is the deciding factor on the outcome of the decision. 
The use of the “European” is simply an intervening variable in that  case. Considering the 
results of Chapter VI and VII it  is already apparent  that there is no relationship between the 
challengers regional identity and the outcome of a law. Nevertheless there is a link between 
the use of the “European” and certain regions.
 
Laws originating from certain regional units which result in an abstract  judicial review case 
are more likely  to contain references to the “European” in Austria and Italy. In Austria cases 
challenging laws originating in the regions of Tirol, Burgenland and Lower Austria are most 
likely to contain a reference to the “European”. Whereas there is no pattern to the decisions 
rendered in these cases. The only remarkable pattern is that these three regions also are the 
origin of the majority of the judges. It could therefore be argued that these judiciaries are more 
versed in the format of arguments that will gain them success in front of the constitutional 
court. Two circumstances speak against this theory. On the one hand there is no significant 
relationship  between cases in Austria containing a reference to the European and the laws 
undergoing no review. Moreover, there is no pattern to the identity  of who used the European 
argument in these cases, if plaintiff, court, or originator of law. It therefore cannot be argued 
that through their connection to the court they  are more skilled in employing extra-national 
arguments. 
This differs from both Germany and Italy. Sicily  is the region most likely to have the argument 
of Europe used against it by  either plaintiff or court. In Germany the low number of cases does 
not allow for a conclusive answer. However, clearly on both instances it is the court using 
“European” in its reasons for decision. Of the cases in question, 70% in Germany and 77% in 
Italy contain a reference to the “European” in their reasoning. The explanation for a 
correlation between a referral to the “European” and the increased levels of review in 
Germany and Italy can therefore not be found in the assumption that some regional units 
employ the argument of “European” more than others. This also applies to the regional units 
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challenging national laws. This is a surprising result as interviews with non-judges indicated 
an increase of national funding for the areas of civil service employed in preparing cases with 
a European connection on a regional level. Other departments have not seen the same increase 
of funding.
To summarise it is therefore possible to say that whilst it  is not possible to identify  the 
“European” argument as simply  an intervening variable in relation to regional units it is 
possible to draw conclusions on who is using the argument in the cases. In both Italy  and 
Germany the constitutional court is more likely to use the “European” argument to support its 
arguments. Austria does not display the same pattern. 
9.4 Parliamentarians and the “European”
However, in Austria there is a definite link between groups of parliamentarians and a case 
containing a reference to the European (Austria: Cramers V = 0.4). This would indicate that 
the party  identity of the challenger or the originator of the law might be the deciding factor 
regarding the outcome of the case. Chapter VII has already indicated that  party identity 
matters in Austria but not in Germany and Italy. This would then make the “European” 
argument an “intervening” variable concerning the outcome of the case. In Austria groups of 
parliamentarians use the “Europe” in their argument frequently and increasingly. As Austria is 
the only country  in which there is no link between the use of “European” in the argument and 
the outcome of the case this cannot explain the increased levels of review. It therefore is not 
possible to assume the “European” argument to be an intervening variable in Austria. In both 
Germany and Italy  it is the central government which sees the “European” used by the court 
against its arguments. However, the law having been challenged by  one of the opposition 
parties does not have any  statistical influence on the outcome of the decision. The explanation 
that the opposition is able to use the “European” against the government therefore does not 
hold. 
9.5 Europe as an intervening variable?
The argument of the “European” is therefore not an intervening variable in respect to either the 
identity  of the plaintiff or the originator of the law. There is no relation between plaintiff or 
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origin of the law, a reference of “Europe” in the case and the law seeing review. However, 
there is a relation between a case seeing review and the reference to “Europe” in Italy and 
Germany (Figure 4,5,6). There is also a correlation between partial rulings and the word 
“Europe”, in any of its variations, within the text of the decision. It is therefore an independent 
variable in its own right. The simple fact that there is a correlation does not explain, as yet, 
why the word “Europe” in the case materials should lead to a change in the decision-making 
pattern. Moreover, it is unclear how the recurrence of the word “Europe” in the case materials 
and the admission that “political considerations” matter in the judges’ decisions. The only 
possible explanation drawn from the statistical data for the connection between the outcome of 
the case and the use of “European” in the argument is that the courts themselves employ the 
argument when they make historically  unusual decisions, such as partial rulings in Italy and 
unconstitutionality rulings in Germany. 
Figure 4: The percentage of cases which see review and in which the “European” 
argument is used by any of the involved parties. 
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Figure 5: Percentage of laws seeing review containing the “European” argument in 
Germany 
Figure 6: Number of cases seeing review in which the “European” argument is employed 
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9.6 Interviews
It may be that interviews with judges involved in abstract judicial review can explain why  a 
reference to the European often leads to review in a case.  Inititally, I asked if membership in 
the European Union influences abstract judicial review. As a whole the answer to this question 
was negative in all three countries. As G1 said: 
“In the case of abstract judicial review which is initiated by a constitutional 
organ, German constitutional organs, they will never engage in conflict with the 
European Union. If there it  is a European Union involvement then they will not 
even start it. That is the reason why it  does not matter in abstract review. In 
concrete review a lot, however37.” 
Another judge explains (I1):
“Questions of conflict of EU law and national law are not a question for the 
constitutional court – any ordinary judge can and has the duty to rule on that. 
The constitutional court remains out of those questions. So I would not say that 
in Italy there are an increasing numbers declared unconstitutional relating to 
European law.”
These opinions are representative of the opinions expressed by the majority of the 
interviewees. None answered the question if European Union membership  has any influence 
on the outcome of an abstract judicial review case in the positive.  When confronted with the 
statistical evidence they appeared surprised by the extent of the use of the European and for 
the most part based it on coincidence. However, they did not deny  that there is a 
“Europeanisation” occurring. “Europeanisation” seemed to mean for them the adjustment of 
national laws and national legal ideals to the wider European provisions and legislation (A1, 
G1, G3, I1).
The interviews allowed a closer look into the areas of potential influence of the European. The 
origin of the cases and the area of law might be reasons for the correlation. Most judges 
argued that they  were not  even aware of the origin of a law and therefore would not be able to 
take this into consideration. However, according to approximately  2/3 of the interviews 
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37 Und zwar die abstrakte Normenkontrolle, weil die von Verfassungsorgane, deutschen Verfassungsorganen, 
eingegeben wird, die werden sich nie mit der EG im Konflikt setzen. Wenn das ein EG Fall ist dann leiern die das 
gar nicht an. Deshalb spielt das bei der abstrakten Normenkontrolle keine Rolle. Bei der konkreten erheblich.
(A1,A2,I1..), there is a visible Europeanisation in the debate of cases. G2 explains it as 
follows:
“ ...the constitutional court still has difficulty to accept the supremacy of EU 
law. But on the other hand it sees the necessity  thereof. So it  will not accept the 
doctrine in its theory  understanding but the necessity in practice is clear. There 
is no alternative.” 
So whilst it is impossible for judges to consider the influence European Union membership 
might have on abstract review in theory when thinking about cases in particular and real life 
situations they identify an EU origin as an influence on the decision they make. 
It is possible that certain areas of law are more likely to result in review of a law and therefore 
must contain, for the correlation to be significant, higher references to Europe. In the areas of 
environment, financial and social law the tests of the decisions contain more references to 
Europe than other areas. Also these areas of law see the highest level of review. The judges 
seemed to be unaware of this overall development. They argued that no area of law is more, or 
less, likely to see review. In relation to special concepts of law, which occur within these areas, 
the answers diverged according to nationality, however. 
The rights of European Union citizens is one such area. In all three countries the consideration 
of rights of European Union citizens in comparison to third country citizens are debated and 
considered. Over half of the Austrian judges seemed to feel that  they are being forced into this 
by the legal surroundings. They feel that the European Treaties force them to act  as they  do but 
also felt  it as an uncomfortable fit with their understanding of law. German and Italian judges 
on the other hand seemed to feel that the protection of the rights of European citizens is a 
positive duty. One judge noting that when he was appointed he inquired into the reasons for 
the appointment and the answer he received was: 
“ ... (there was a feeling) that the European Union needs to be protected through 
the constitutional court”
This illustrates that there is a difference in the motives and reasons differ in the three 
countries for the use of “Europe” in the cases. Germany and Italy see the construction of 
European law containing national law. They therefore decide to increase its coherency in 
letter and spirit through their decisions. In Austria the acceptance of Austrian law as part 
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of European law is just as high but the perception of what this leads to is different. 
Judges make use of the direct letter of the law but do not see it in their remit of power to 
stand for the spirit of that law. 
In all three courts the direct connections between the European Court of Justice and the 
national constitutional courts are manifold. Former members of the Italian, Austrian and 
German constitutional court have been appointed to the European Court of Justice and are 
serving there at  the moment. When asking the question if there is a direct influence or 
connection between the European Court of Justice and the constitutional courts, then at least 
two judges from each country referred to recent meetings with these former members. All 
judges argued that there is no instance in which the ECJ attempts to exert  direct influence on a 
particular case - however, there are informal avenues of connections. When enquiring if there 
are direct questions being asked between the levels in an informal way one judge said:
“I believe you are aware of the co-operation problems between the German 
constitutional court and the ECJ. Co-operation is a declaration of intent and 
works internally very well. The phone was invented a few years back”38
Not only do the national judges in all three countries regularly  meet with judges of the 
European level and exchange personnel with European courts but they also visit judges 
in other countries. Last year the Austrian court was invited to visit the United States 
Supreme Court. In May 2009 the German constitutional court visited the Austrian court. 
It is therefore not the case that some courts have a closer relationship to the European 
level and therefore are more likely to use the “European” as an argument. However, in 
conversation with various Austrian judges an increasing dislike for these meetings was 
made apparent. One argued that he regularly  attended until approximately  a decade ago 
but since then has become “fed up” with these meetings (A3). He clearly felt that the 
“national law is separate from the European level” and these meetings only confuse 
(A3). The sentiments expressed by the German and the Italian court  were widely 
different in that respect. Here these meetings were not only  praised but considered a 
useful and necessary institution. 
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38 Also ich meine Sie kennen ja die Probleme zwischen EuGH und Verfassungsgericht mit diesen 
Kooperationsverhältnissen. Kooperation ist so die Absichtserklärung, diese Kooperation klappt intern 
hervorragend. Also es gibt ja die Erfindung des Telefons ja schon länger.
So, what is the reason for the increase in unconstitutionality  rulings in abstract judicial review 
in Germany, Austria and Italy? All interviewees had argued originally that  European Union 
membership does not influence abstract judicial review - even that according to theory it 
cannot. However, in the interviews they identified the origin of the case as EU related, the 
rights of EU citizens as considerations and admitted to an informal connection with the ECJ 
on a conversational level. Of the twenty judges I talked to 18 argued that the reasons for the 
increased levels of unconstitutionality  rulings can be found in the decreasing clarity  and 
quality of laws being passed. Eleven judges further argued that this decreasing clarity  and 
quality is due to the increasing complexity  of the political framework surroundings the courts 
is caused by European Union membership, or in the words of one judge (A5):
“The playing field has become bigger and more obstacles have been added into 
it. It is not always clear how the obstacles can be climbed and that causes 
confusion.”
Eight of these eleven judges continued to argue that in some cases the confusion is intentional 
and that politicians are not only more willing to push controversial cases to the constitutional 
courts but that they  use this confusion, this bigger playing field, as a smokescreen for their 
action. 
9.7 Conclusion
Three conclusions can be drawn from this chapter:
A) The use of the “European” argument is correlated to the increased levels of review 
B) The use of the “European” argument is correlated to the change in style. The court have 
increased the membership of academics to inrease expertise of European law on the bench . 
Also the increased need to explain and clarify terms has caused the German and the Italian 
courts to break with historical precedent, partial rulings in Italy  and unconstitutional in 
Germany, in respect to the form their decisions take
C) The use of the “European” argument is an indication of a changed legal landscape and an 
attitudinal change in both judges and plaintiffs
The statistical data drawn from the cases decided in all three countries over the last  three 
decades indicates that there is a link between a case seeing review and the use of the 
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“European” argument. In Italy and Germany the connection is strong with over 70% of cases 
in the last decade seeing review also containing the “European” argument (Figure 4,5). In 
Austria the statistical analysis indicated that there is no link between the increased level of 
review and the use of the “European” argument. Figure 6 shows that for the most part less than 
30% of cases that  see review also contain the “European” argument. However, the trend is on 
the increase and it is therefore questionable if Austria will not also display this link in the 
future. 
Moreover the use of the European argument can be linked to the increase of 
unconstitutionaltiy rulings in Germany. The German court has always been known for 
declaring most cases partially unconstitutional if review of a law was undertaken at all. 
Unconstitutionality  rulings were considered rare and too confrontational. This seems to have 
changed in respect to abstract judicial review. According to the interview data judges relate 
this change to an increased awareness of the uncertaintiesin the legal landscape presented to 
the law maker through the inclusion of EU law. However, some also admit that politicians 
make use of this circumstance for their own means. In order to ensure that not more confusion 
reigns, and to discourage the use of the court for political means, the judges are more likely to 
declare a case clearly unconstitutional or constitutional. 
In Italy  the situation is comparable. Historically the court was not allowed to declare cases 
partially unconstitutional so as to avoid “rule-making” by  judges. There is a strong link 
between a law being declared partially unconstitutional and the use of the “European 
argument” in abstract review today. Interview data suggested that the court is aware of the 
difficulty relating to the inclusion of EU law and the confusion it creates. Through their partial 
rulings they attempt to clarify  and simplify the legal landscape and deter politicians from 
taking advantage of the court. Therefore both the German and the Italian court  reacted to the 
same circumstance by using a constroversial method. 
The increased levels of review in Italy and Germany  are linked to the increased use of the 
“European” argument. However, the connection does not lie in the courts being more or less 
European friendly in their judgments. The connection is due to a changed legal landscape in 
which judges and plaintiffs react to an attitudinal change towards the constitutional courts. The 
inclusion of EU law and its increasing predominance has  increased the obstacles the law-
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makers face when designing a law. It is harder to be sure that the proposal does not contravene 
any of the existing laws, nationally or on the European level. The courts react in their own 
means to clarify the terms involved by either declaring each case definitely without leaving 
room for debate (in the German case) or by defining and debating the terms involved in detail 
(in the Italian case). In both countries however there is a worry that especially in financial 
cases politicians are aware of the confused landscape and make use of it  to pass laws that 
clearly  contravene the constitution. For the politician it is a win/win situation as the law will 
remain in power until it is struck down by the constitutional court and the tax proceeds from 
the law remain in the hands of the state thereafter. Chapter VII has corroborated these 
findings. However, what does this actually mean for the whole argument of this thesis?
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has analysed the connection between the commonly known variables influencing 
abstract judicial review and the increasing number of laws being declared unconstitutional in 
any form by the constitutional courts. The different theories on constitutional court decision 
making suggest the Black Letter of the Law, the attitudes of judges, the influence of political 
institutions, changes in public attitudes and the increased importance of European influences 
as possible explanations for the changed review patterns in abstract judicial review. The 
analysis suggests that the increasingly  common use of the word “European” as well as the 
quality of laws and the position of the court within the wider political system have been 
identified as the most likely explanations for the increased levels of review in Austria, German 
and Italy throughout the last thirty years. The argument that presents an answer to the question 
of what causes the increase of review in abstract norm control takes two forms and supports 
the hypothesis posited in the beginning:
 
A) Harmonisation of national law with European law
B) As a result, law-making is more complex. Law-making, within the borders of national 
AND European law, is more complicated than law-making only  within the borders of 
national law. 
AND/OR
C) This complication in combining national and European law allows politicians to force 
courts to make decisions on topics the political institution would prefer not to decide upon
D) The courts try to clarify  the combined rules of national and European law by making 
clearer and more definite laws
THEREFORE: More laws are reviewed and more laws are reviewed in a definite way, 
meaning more unconstitutionality rulings are passed. 
As such this study  opens further avenues of questioning concerning its importance to the 
overall European constitutional culture, the court seen from the political perspective and the 
internal workings of the court. This study also adds to the state of knowledge regarding 
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abstract judicial review in Europe and especially in Austria, Italy and Germany. However, it 
only scratches the surface of what we do not know in respect to abstract judicial review and 
the empirical workings of constitutional courts in this area but it  clarifies through its inquiry 
the areas in need of further research. 
10.1 Harmonisation of national and European law
Throughout the same time period in which there is an increase in laws seeing review in 
Germany, Italy and Austria there is also an increase of decisions which make reference to the 
“European”. Whilst in 1980 there was virtually  no case using the word “European” in the 
arguments underpinning the decisions today that number has risen to over 50% in all three 
countries. Statistical analysis reveals a link between the increased levels of review in abstract 
review and the increased use of the word “European” in the arguments in Germany and Italy 
but not in Austria. The correlation is medium strong and will only account for less than 20% of 
the variation in the dependent variable, the increase of review. However, this would be enough 
to explain the 20-30% increase in laws seeing review. 
Moreover, there is a statistically significant connection between a case in Germany  being ruled 
unconstitutional and this case containing a reference to the “European”. This is remarkable as 
unconstitutionality rulings are historically the most uncommon forms of decision. The same is 
true for the Italian case where there is a statistically significant  correlation between partial 
rulings and the use of the word “European” in the argument. Therefore, the correlation 
between the argument containing a reference to Europe and the law seeing review is able to 
account for the increased levels of unconstitutional and partial unconstitutionality rulings in 
Germany and Italy. The Austrian increase in levels of review however remains unexplained by 
this theory. Also the reasons for the correlation between the increased levels of review in 
abstract norm control remain illusive. 
The research into the various potential influences identified by the literature as having an 
impact on the judges’ decisions has suggested three possible explanations for the link between 
the increased mention of the word “European” in the arguments and the increased levels of 
laws seeing review in Germany and Italy. A longstanding complaint of judges is the 
observation that laws are being passed without sufficient checks and are therefore of worse 
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quality. Also courts point out that in certain areas of law, namely tax law, politicians leave the 
politically  difficult  questions to the courts. When looking at changes at the courts themselves 
an additional reason suggests itself in the increased use of the media to influence public 
opinion in the courts’ favour. All three possible explanations suggest  themselves regarding the 
link between higher levels of review in abstract norm control and the increased mention of the 
word “European” in the arguments. A combination of the three possible explanation promises 
to be most useful in the explanation of the behaviour of the three courts.
10.2 Law-making, within the borders of national AND European law, is more complicated 
than law-making only within the borders of national law.
The first explanation that was suggested in interviews was that due to the decreasing quality of 
the laws there is more need and possibility for review. All but one interviewee suggested this 
as a reason for the increased levels of review in abstract judicial review. This argument was 
supported through data pertaining to the funding of those civil service departments in charge 
of checking new laws for their constitutionality. In all three countries these departments have 
not increased their funding whilst the volume of the laws passed per year has almost  doubled. 
Therefore it  seems to be a reasonable argument to assume that the laws passed today are not 
checked on their constitutionality as thoroughly as thirty years ago. 
In many of the interviews with civil servants they argued that the increase in a connection with 
the word “European” is based on the discrepancy  of funding. Whilst those departments which 
consider the constitutionality of national laws have not seen an increase in funding, laws with 
a connection to the “European” are considered by relatively new departments which have 
enjoyed a steady increase of funding. Whilst this explains an increase in referral to the 
“European” in the arguments of the government when they defend the law’s constitutionality it 
argues against the decrease in quality of laws. If many if the recent laws considered for their 
constitutionality by well funded, separate departments then there is no reason to assume that 
their quality has decreased. 
However, it can be argued that  through the different specialities of the separate departments 
and the lack of interaction among them more laws with unconstitutional aspects slip  through 
the net. Those with the speciality on the national level might miss connections to the European 
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and those with their speciality on the European might miss national implications. This would 
explain why more laws with a mention to the “European” in either the argument of the judges 
or the government see review. It does not explain the divergent development in Austria or the 
increase in historically unusual decisions in Germany and Italy. 
10.3 This complexity of making legislation in the framework of national and European law 
allows politicians to force courts to make decisions on topics the political institution would 
prefer not to decide upon
A further explanation for the increased level of review, and especially the historically 
uncommon decisions in Germany and Italy, was suggested by  approximately two thirds of the 
interviewees as a result of politicians intentionally using the court to avoid political backlash. 
There is a decreasingly important link between a law being declared partially unconstitutional 
and the law being passed by the current government, or ruling elite in Italy and Germany. With 
other words in the 1980s it  was most likely  that  the court would try to appease the government 
of the time and the potential future government by  ruling only partially  against  it. This picture 
has undergone a substantial change with the identity of the challenger and the identity  of the 
originator of the law losing importance. Today, both in Italy and Germany, there is an 
increasing trend to rule unconstitutional also in the face of the government. Interviews 
indicated the reasons for this development to lie in the stance the governments take towards 
the constitutional courts. 
Judges complain about the lack of respect of the constitution and an intentional use of the 
court. Especially concerning tax law they observe that governments intentionally pass laws 
that contravene the constitutional boundaries. In these cases the politician faces a win/win 
scenario, as if the court overrules the law then the proceeds of the law until that moment 
remain in the hands of the state whilst if the law is not challenged or reviewed then the 
proceeds are available indefinitely. Because of the highly technical nature of tax law there is 
no public outcry or even public awareness which would lead to political backlash for the 
government if one of these laws is overturned by the court. The courts themselves however are 
aware of this development and set clear signs through stringent interpretations and 
unconstitutionality rulings. The courts therefore use their divergence from their policy of 
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“appeasement” to the government as a signal that they are aware of what is happening and are 
not in favour of the development. 
Whilst the development is most strongly linked to tax law in the eyes of the judges it is not 
solely  limited to that area of law. Many  interviewees continued to explain that  this 
development of the court being used is on the increase especially in those areas which are 
heavily affected by EU law. These areas are developing highly specified and technical 
characteristics such as tax law has done over the last fifty years. This high level of technicality 
makes it tempting to governments to apply  the same mechanics to these areas of law as they 
have to tax law and therefore avoid many political controversies by  pushing the cases to the 
courts in Italy and Germany. 
Again there is a divergent development in Austria. Here the correlation between partial rulings 
and the law originating with the current ruling elite is on the increase. With other words it is 
more likely now than it was in the 1980s that the court is appeasing the ruling elite. The 
explanation to this development presented through interviews is almost the opposite image 
than in Germany and Italy. Here the court also sees the same development regarding tax law 
but sees its own powers and duties as different from the courts in the other two countries. The 
majority  of interviewees saw their position as guardians of the law, ensuring that there is 
clarity  and coherence. In their eyes whilst they disagreed with the development of using courts 
they  saw no way out of it. Their position was to ensure that the laws passed are coherent, not 
to be concerned with the substance of it. It is the politicians’ power and duty to give the 
direction through the laws he or she passes and the courts’ position to ensure that the whole 
works together. Interviews with Austrian judges, past and present, showed that this very 
mechanical stance was not as prevalent in the 1980s as it is today and therefore the 
increasingly “appeasing” stance of the court can be explained. 
It is therefore the case that the Italian and German judges have increased their levels of review 
as a reaction to politicians taking advantage of the increasingly technical nature of law. The 
Austrian judges see the same development and deplore it  but do not see it in their power to 
react the same way. They see themselves more like the government’s mechanics and try to fix 
the machine they are given as best as they can. The Italian and German courts are more like 
mechanics that are given a machine without all the parts. They turn around and tell the client 
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that he or she better get back and bring all the necessary bits before they ask them to fix the 
motor. 
The courts are clearly aware of the importance of public opinion on their existence and their 
position vis-a-vis the other political powers. In areas where they are aware of public opinion 
being on their side their rulings can be less “appeasing”, which would explain the increasing 
use of historically unwanted forms of decision in Germany and Italy. Also the areas in which 
the courts are aware of public approval are the environment and the European Union and 
therefore the increased levels of review, especially  unconstitutional in Germany and partial in 
Italy, in connection with these can be explained. Also interviews and court  behaviour indicate 
that the courts have become adept over the last three decades to make use of public opinion. 
As a result it can be concluded that public opinion is not of importance to every decision and 
therefore does not influence the single case but is important for the overall success of the 
court. Whereas, as courts influence public opinion it is more correct to say that they  use it to 
bolster their position than are used by it.  
10.4 The courts try to clarify the combined rules of national and European law by making 
clearer and more definite laws
This inquiry  started with the observation that the number of laws seeing review has increased 
all over Europe in the last three decades. Good examples of this phenomenon can be found in 
Austria, Germany and Italy where this number has increased by 20 to 30%. 
Review
(r = p+uc)
Unconstitutional
(uc)
Partial
(p)
Austria
Italy
Germany
+ - +
+ + +
+ + -
 Table 1: increase and decrease of review of laws 
This increase in itself is worth an investigation but the form the decisions take has added a 
further dimension to the study. It has been argued in the past that constitutional courts are 
more likely to rule a law partially unconstitutional in order to mediate between the two 
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opposing parties involved. The development of rulings in Italy and Germany does not follow 
this pattern whilst those in Austrian court do. 
In the German case the number of unconstitutionality rulings has doubled in the period 1980 
to 2008. Additionally, whilst partial rulings increased slightly  throughout the 1990s they  have 
decreased steadily since. In abstract review the German court is more likely to rule a norm 
either constitutional or unconstitutional, rather than the mediatory partial ruling. The Italian 
court on the other hand was never intended to pass partial rulings as its founders wanted to 
avoid a court that can substitute its interpretation of a law for that of the law-maker. Therefore 
the fact that  partial rulings now outstrip  unconstitutional rulings is remarkable. Austria shares 
the increase in partial rulings but it is paired with the decrease in unconstitutionality  rulings. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the development of unconstitutionality rulings. Italy’s (blue) and 
Germany’s (red) unconstitutionality rulings show increasing trends, whereas Austria (black) 
shows a decreasing trend. 
Figure 1: Development of unconstitutionality rulings Austria, Germany and Italy
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Therefore not only is there a need to explain the increasing amount of laws seeing review in 
all three countries but  furthermore the converse development in the kinds of rulings passed in 
Germany, Italy and Austria. 
10.5 The argument summarised
The increased levels of review in abstract  judicial review in Austria, Germany and Italy 
throughout the period 1980-2009 are connected to the increased use of the word “European” in 
the case materials. This is partially due to the increased difficulty to pass laws which are 
within the limits set by both national and European law. National law-makers are often not as 
well versed in the borders and framework EU law presents them with and what these mean for 
national laws. They therefore ignore their implications when passing national laws. However, 
there is also an increasing tendency to make use of the increased technical nature of law to 
pass laws which are known to be potentially unconstitutional. The law-makers make use of the 
confusion surrounding the technical details of EU and national law for their own ends. 
Therefore the courts are presented with either qualitatively worse laws or intentionally  worse 
laws which they have to review. Furthermore, because of the highly technical nature of much 
of the legal areas there is little chance that the public will understand enough, or be willing to 
find out enough, to present the law-maker with any consequences. However, the courts have 
learnt to use public opinion as well and are therefore able to present the law-maker with clear 
legal consequences in certain areas. These consequences take the form of unconstitutionality 
rulings or unfavourable interpretations of the details of the cases in Italy and Germany. In 
Austria the situation has led to a court that is withdrawing further and further from the political 
sphere avoiding any  confrontation with the political branches. Here the court makes no use of 
its possibility to present the political branches with legal consequences. It tries to remove itself 
from the game through “appeasing” positions to both sides, through more partial 
unconstitutionality rulings and a withdrawal from interpretation. 
10.6 Austrian exceptionalism, theory and further avenues of enquiry
Whilst the above presents an explanation for the changed pattern of review across the three 
countries certain aspects still remain to be explained. For once the Austrian exception in the 
review patterns needs to be explained. Why are there more partial rulings in Austria than there 
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are unconstitutionality  rulings. Which of the theories identified in Chapter II explains any of 
the development in the three countries? And what does this development mean for the study of 
constitutional courts? 
10.6.1 Austrian Exceptionalism
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a very active Austrian court. It was a court that argued that 
it has to defend the spirit  of the constitution against a political elite who tries to infringe on it. 
Landmark decisions established the right and duty of the court to rule on the constitutionality 
of all laws, contrary to before when it  was limited to those laws without constitutional rank. It 
was a reaction to a political elite that increasingly  removed laws from the influence of the 
constitutional court through technicalities. The court has then influenced the political 
landscape through its interpretations of minority rights, centre-periphery decisions, abortion 
decisions throughout the 1980s. However, it then withdrew further and further and in 
interviews the current judges seem to feel that  the court had gone too far in its power struggle 
and needed to retrench. Media reports in the mid 1990s detailed the number of laws the court 
ruled unconstitutional and enforced the need to withdraw politically. This would explain why 
the Austrian court reacts differently to the current situation than the Italian and German court. 
The German court has always enjoyed high public approval and its powers are well 
entrenched. There is an almost religious deference to the court in Germany and therefore it  has 
rarely faced criticism. It has also always avoided to be seen as standing in opposition to the 
ruling elite. The increasingly strong tendency to rule unconstitutional has gone unnoticed in 
the public even if the criticism the court faces from the government is becoming stronger. 
However, as yet the outcries against the court are more likely to harm the political branches. 
The court therefore feels in a position of strength and is able to give clear indications to the 
political branches. The Italian court is a fairly unknown entity in the public. However the 
constitutional reform and the increasing complexity of law through the addition of EU law has 
changed its position in the political make-up  of the state. Whilst before it was an intermediary 
between the political branches and the judiciary in questions of corruption it now is an 
intermediary between opposing political branches. It is needed to clarify judicial questions and 
this increase in its position gives it the power to react more decisively. It  can use the political 
confusion and discord in respect to the meaning of provisions for its own means and develop 
its powers vis-a-vis the other political branches.
!
! 229
Therefore whilst the Austrian court is in a position of weakness and withdrawal the German 
and Italian courts are in positions of strength. As a result they react differently to the 
challenges they  are facing from the political branches through qualitatively bad laws, 
intentionally misleading laws and disregard. 
The change in style of decisions had been puzzling when uncovered through the analysis in 
Chapter III. Considering the above theory however the change can be seen as supporting 
evidence. The Austrian cases have become less interpretavist, shorter and their use of EU 
references are more formal. The German and Italian court  on the other hand write decisions 
which are very long, explanatory and full of interpretations of terms and meanings. The use of 
the “European” has changed away from quoting EU legal provisions, cases or guidelines 
towards a discussion of European obligations, values and commonalities. The Italian and 
German court are therefore freer in setting clear legal boundaries and clarifying political 
interpretations contained in laws. The Austrian court withdraws towards political formalities 
allowing the political branches to widely interpret the meaning of guidelines and laws. 
10.6.3 Wider implications
It therefore has been possible to find an explanation for the increased levels of review in 
Austria, Italy  and Germany within an adapted rational choice framework. But there are further 
implications for the European constitutional culture and avenues of further study that  are still 
to be considered.
 
What does it mean for the European constitutional culture?
Wider consequences of the changed behaviour of courts are apparent. European constitutional 
culture has always been seen as based on courts that hold a mediatory and appeasing position. 
It has been argued that this is why European constitutional courts are so successful and the 
results of the Austrian court and its need to retrench after a period of extensive activity  in the 
early 1980s seems to support these findings. However, aspects of the findings pertaining 
especially to Germany and Italy seem to indicate that the inclusion of EU law into national law 
changes aspects of European constitutional culture fundamentally. Courts are more adept at 
using the media, develop higher confidence as their position in the political framework 
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changes and develop extralegal concepts such as European values which they apply to cases 
across borders. 
The use of the media to influence public opinion
It seems that the increased awareness of the possible influence of public opinion on political 
branches, as well as the court, has led to a realisation of public opinion as a tool. The Austrian 
and the German constitutional court both have media representatives since running afoul of 
public opinion at some instances in the past. The Italian court has a desire to have a media 
representative of its own. Constitutional courts developing a media personality such as the one 
portrayed by political branches might have far reaching influences on the way courts behave. 
The increased confidence of courts
An increased confidence of courts might lead to more confrontation with the political branches 
and if conventional theory applies this will lead to political branches constraining courts in the 
future. Alternatively, if the courts can cement their more independent position in the political 
framework the implications for the democratic system are grave. The court nevertheless 
remains an unelected body and therefore if the court grows in confidence enough to substitute 
its own interpretation for that of the elected institutions a gap  of democratic accountability 
opens. However, if the increased confidence is based on the confusion and uncertainty created 
through the inclusion of EU law into national law then there is a natural end to the 
development. Over time the law-makers will be more adept at the still relatively new 
processes of EU law and the increase of laws passed. 
Development of “European” values
Possibly  the most prevalent impact observed is the increase of the utilisation of informal 
concepts, such as European values and obligations, by  the courts. The “rule of law” is a legal 
concept known and defended across national borders in Europe. It  is therefore not an unknown 
development for concepts such as the “rule of law” to be used independently and these 
concepts finding their expression in written form across nations. A development of 
“European” values is potentially a huge and far reaching step  in European integration. Without 
actual legal rules which force the Europeanisation of certain areas of law the assumption that 
there are such concepts as European values will lead to a convergence to legal rules across 
nations. 
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10.7 Possible further avenues of study
Much of the above is pure speculation in its potential relation to other European countries as 
well as Italy, Germany and Austria. Only a study of a broader application of the variable to 
other countries, those with the same constitutional system such as Spain, Portugal or Hungary 
or different systems such as France and the Netherlands can answer the question if there is a 
change in the European constitutional system rather than simply  a change in Germany, Austria 
and Italy. 
Certain aspects of the study also invite further and more thorough study. The use of the media 
by constitutional courts warrants further study. An analysis of the day to day  interactions 
between the media representative, the media and the court promised to be most conclusive in 
examining the relation between court and the public
Furthermore, a study  of the court from the perspective of the political branches is clearly 
necessary  considering the changed position of courts. How do parliamentarians see the court 
over time? Is the way the court and laws are treated changing in the constitutional committee 
in parliament? Interviews as well as analysis of parliamentary transcripts would be able to 
allow for an answer of these questions. 
The make-up of courts in respect  to the identity of judges has changed and diversified over 
time. A study of the interactions of judges and the dynamics at the court is a desirable, if 
possibly unrealisable, study. Participant observation coupled with interviews would be a 
desirable combination of methods to undertake the study. The confidential nature of the work 
undertaken at the court might make such a study  impossible. Also this nature might make the 
constraints on the way  in which results can be reported so stringent that the study  would be of 
little use. 
10.8 Contributions to the field 
This thesis has for the first time analysed abstract judicial review in Europe empirically by 
using a mixture of methods. Yet there has been little consideration of abstract norm control in 
the literature. Moreover, typically  only one variable is tested against the workings of one 
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court. The relative scarcity  of abstract judicial review allows for a comprehensive analysis of 
all variables identified as influencing decision-making at the court  against all cases under the 
remit of abstract review. As such an insight over the relationship  between the court and the 
political branches could be analysed and added to the literature to supplement the existing 
state of knowledge. There is still much that can and should be studied and as such the answers 
provided by this thesis are only scratches on the surface.
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APPENDIX 1
Italy cases
1980,13;1980,101;1980,126;1980,154;1980,179;1980,180;1980,187;1980,191;1980,196;1980
,197;1981,3;1981,70;1981,72;1981,94;1981,95;1981,97;1981,118;1982,36;1982,59; 
1982,65;1982,71;1982,144;1982,162;1982,177;1983,13;1983,14;1983,31;1983,37;1983,47;19
83,54;1983,56;1983,107;1983,111;1983,161;1983,227;1983,228;1983,237;1983,242;1983,243
;1983,253;1983,307;1983,309;1984,81;1984,118;1984,169;1984,188;1984,219; 
1984,245;1985,43;1985,72;1985,84;1985,100;1985,101;1985,106;1985,114;1985,115;1985,11
9;1985,148;1985,149;1985,150;1985,155;1985,182;1985,183;1985,184;1985,195;1985,205;1
985,207;1985,214;1985,215;1985,216;1985,241;1985,242;1985,243;1986,10;1986,70;1986,7
1;1986,95;1986,101;1986,119;1986,127;1986,139;1986,140;1986,151;1986,165;1986,166;198
6,174;1986,177;1986,179;1986,181;1986,191;1986,239;1986,258;1987,13;1987,36;1987,37;1
987,38;1987,39;1987,44;1987,45;1987,46;1987,49;1987,61;1987,62;1987,64;1987,70;1987,8
7;1987,107;1987,121;1987,127;1987,130;1987,131;1987,139;1987,167;1987,182;1987,183;1
987,188;1987,190;1987,192;1987,201;1987,210;1987,217;1987,289;1987,293;1987,433;1988
,1;1988,4;1988,5;1988,10;1988,11;1988,12;1988,13;1988,14;1988,15;1988,16;1988,17;1988,
79;1988,84;1988,85;1988,86;1988,87;1988,124;1988,158;1988,162;1988,163;1988,164;1988,
165;1988,177;1988,191;1988,211;1988,212;1988,213;1988,214;1988,217;1988,224;1988,233;
1988,234;1988,236;1988,238;1988,267;1988,271;1988,272;1988,273;1988,274;1988,302;198
8,305;1988,306;1988,329;1988,400;1988,441;1988,447;1988,451;1988,472;1988,476;1988,4
77;1988,478;1988,480;1988,495;1988,510;1988,523;1988,524;1988,528;1988,532;1988,533;
1988,555;1988,561;1988,562;1988,563;1988,570;1988,610;1988,611;1988,612;1988,617;198
8,628;1988,632;1988,633;1988,642;1988,643;1988,663;1988,664;1988,665;1988,691;1988,6
95;1988,726;1988,728;1988,729;1988,734;1988,735;1988,736;1988,741;1988,742;1988,745;
1988,746;1988,768;1988,774;1988,796;1988,799;1988,829;1988,832;1988,883;1988,921;198
8,924;1988,959;1988,961;1988,962;1988,963;1988,965;1988,966;1988,967;1988,973;1988,9
76;1988,991;1988,997;1988,998;1988,1011;1988,1029;1988,1031;1988,1033;1988,1035;1988
,1042;1988,1044;1989,1;1989,19;1989,20;1989,21;1989,37;1989,38;1989,56;1989,80;1989,8
5;1989,101;1989,102;1989,229;1989,253;1989,321;1989,324;1989,341;1989,342;1989,343;1
989,344;1989,460;1990,2;1990,9;1990,10;1990,24;1990,51;1990,54;1990,68;1990,84;1990,8
5;1990,87;1990,100;1990,122;1990,125;1990,139;1990,154;1990,156;1990,157;1990,159;19
90,161;1990,164;1990,181;1990,186;1990,187;1990,224;1990,227;1990,239;1990,240;1990,
245;1990,260;1990,261;1990,294;1990,295;1990,308;1990,310;1990,311;1990,437;1990,493;
1990,539;1990,545;1991,3;1991,4;1991,21;1991,26;1991,32;1991,37;1991,49;1991,94;1991,
105;1991,116;1991,164;1991,165;1991,191;1991,255;1991,264;1991,276;1991,283;1991,284;
1991,385;1991,386;1991,387;1991,476;1991,482;1991,484;1991,487;1991,493;1992,16;1992
,28;1992,35;1992,36;1992,38;1992,40;1992,54;1992,75;1992,78;1992,123
1992,137;1992,145;1992,188;1992,202;1992,281;1992,392;1992,393;1992,401;1992,406;199
2,407;1992,418;1992,427;1992,461;1992,462;1992,470;1992,488;1992,494;1992,495;1992,4
97;1993,1;1993,2;1993,80;1993,109;1993,115;1993,128;1993,150;1993,173;1993,174;1993,2
06;1993,232;1993,250;1993,251;1993,260;1993,266;1993,370;1993,382;1993,438;1993,449;
1993,470;1993,496;1993,499;1993,501;1993,503;1993,505;1993,506;1993,507;1993,508;199
3,509;1994,32;1994,52;1994,61;1994,84;1994,95;1994,124;1994,128;1994,133;1994,167;199
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4,169;1994,172;1994,186;1994,192;1994,222;1994,224;1994,233;1994,235;1994,256;1994,3
83;1994,384;1994,412;1994,415;1994,421;1994,435;1994,437
1994,441;1994,446;1994,452;1994,464;1994,466;1994,469;1994,470;1994,491;1995,29;1995
,35;1995,63;1995,64;1995,94;1995,115;1995,134;1995,141;1995,146;1995,156;1995,157;199
5,174;1995,175;1995,180;1995,202;1995,217;1995,248;1995,260;1995,261;1995,458;1995,4
62;1995,476;1995,477;1995,478;1995,479;1995,482;1995,486;1995,487;1995,493;1995,517;
1995,520;1995,527;1995,528;1996,25;1996,26;1996,29;1996,53;1996,59;1996,87;1996,93;19
96,126;1996,127;1996,132;1996,134;1996,195;1996,205;1996,342;1996,352;1996,372;1996,
380;1996,381;1996,430;1997,2;1997,50;1997,59;1997,60;1997,82;1997,126;1997,153;1997,1
62;1997,191;1997,194;1997,195;1997,202;1997,320;1997,348;1997,365;1997,373;1997,380;
1997,429;1997,430;1997,444;1998,84;1998,87;1998,201;1998,216;1998,355;1998,356;1998,
398;1998,408;1998,421;1999,85;1999,88;1999,111;1999,138;1999,139;1999,141;1999,168;19
99,171;1999,185;1999,186;1999,198;1999,234;1999,235;1999,240;1999,348;1999,349;1999,
350;1999,352;1999,364;1999,382;1999,384;1999,424;1999,456;1999,465;1999,466;1999,467
;1999,468;2000,6;2000,20;2000,53;2000,63;2000,71;2000,98;2000,99;2000,100;2000,130;20
00,138;2000,162;2000,225;2000,273;2000,284;2000,303;2000,322;2000,333;2000,347;2000,
348;2000,350;2000,377;2000,381;2000,382;2000,405;2000,411;2000,417;2000,422;2000,477;
2000,496;2000,503;2000,507;2000,520;2000,527;2000,569;2001,31;2001,55;2001,66;2001,7
4;2001,84;2001,103;2001,106;2001,110;2001,111;2001,135;2001,159;2001,170;2001,195;200
1,206;2001,208;2001,212;2001,229;2001,230;2001,314;2001,317;2001,325;2001,337;2001,3
40;2001,344;2001,347;2001,353;2001,3732001,389;2001,406;2001,411;2001,412;2001,437;2
001,547;2001,553;2002,17;2002,55;2002,65;2002,141;2002,142;2002,182;2002,189;2002,19
2;2002,228;2002,246;2002,247;2002,248;2002,282;2002,304;2002,341;2002,358;2002,376;2
002,377;2002,382;2002,407;2002,422;2002,438;2002,443;2002,503;2002,510;2002,524;2002
,530;2002,533;2002,536;2003,15;2003,28;2003,37;2003,48;2003,49;2003,67;2003,91;2003,9
2;2003,93;2003,94;2003,96;2003,03;2003,186;2003,196;2003,197;2003,201;2003,213;2003,2
21;2003,222;2003,226;2003,228;2003,230;2003,242;2003,274;2003,281;2003,292;2003,296;
2003,297;2003,300;2003,303;2003,307;2003,308;2003,311;2003,312;2003,313;2003,314;200
3,315;2003,324;2003,327;2003,331;2003,334;2003,338;2003,339;2003,342;2004,1;2004,2;20
04,3;2004,4;2004,6;2004,7;2004,8;2004,12;2004,13;2004,14;2004,15;2004,16;2004,17;2004,
18;2004,26;2004,29;2004,31;2004,32;2004,34;2004,36;2004,37;2004,42;2004,43;2004,48;20
04,49;2004,69;2004,70;2004,71;2004,72;2004,73;2004,74;2004,75;2004,112;2004,116;2004,1
17;2004,118;2004,119;2004,131;2004,134;2004,137;2004,140;2004,162;2004,166;2004,167;2
004,172;2004,173;2004,176;2004,185;2004,196;2004,198;2004,203;2004,205;2004,227;2004
,228;2004,229;2004,236;2004,237;2004,238;2004,239;2004,240;2004,241;2004,243;2004,25
5;2004,259;2004,260;2004,261;2004,272;2004,274;2004,280;2004,286;2004,287;2004,307;2
004,308;2004,320;2004,345;2004,353;2004,354;2004,372;2004,378;2004,379;2004,380;2004
,381;2004,388;2004,390;2004,412;2004,414;2005,6;2005,20;2005,26;2005,30;2005,31;2005,
33;2005,34;2005,35;2005,36;2005,37;2005,40;2005,50;2005,51;2005,62;2005,64;2005,65;20
05,70;2005,71;2005,77;2005,95;2005,103;2005,106;2005,107;2005,108;2005,120;2005,122;2
005,134;2005,145;2005,150;2005,151;2005,159;2005,162;2005,167;2005,168;2005,172;2005
,173;2005,175;2005,190;2005,201;2005,202;2005,203;2005,205;2005,214;2005,219;2005,22
2;2005,231;2005,232;2005,234;2005,242;2005,249;2005,270;2005,271;2005,272;2005,272;2
005,277;2005,279;2005,285;2005,286;2005,286;2005,293;2005,300;2005,304;2005,319;2005
,321;2005,323;2005,329;2005,335;2005,336;2005,344;2005,349;2005,353;2005,355;2005,36
5;2005,378;2005,383;2005,384;2005,387;2005,388;2005,391;2005,393;2005,397;2005,403;2
005,405;2005,406;2005,407;2005,412;2005,417;2005,424;2005,426;2005,428;2006,3;2006,5;
2006,12;2006,20;2006,22;2006,29;2006,30;2006,32;2006,40;2006,42;2006,49;2006,51;2006,
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59;2006,62;2006,63;2006,80;2006,81;2006,82;2006,85;2006,87;2006,88;2006,99;2006,102;2
006,103;2006,105;2006,106;2006,111;2006,116;2006,118;2006,129;2006,132;2006,133;2006,
134;2006,136;2006,139;2006,147;2006,153;2006,155;2006,156;2006,163;2006,171;2006,173
;2006,175;2006,181;2006,182;2006,183;2006,204;2006,205;2006,207;2006,211;2006,212;200
6,213;2006,214;2006,215;2006,216;2006,218;2006,230;2006,231;2006,233;2006,237;2006,2
38;2006,239;2006,245;2006,246;2006,247;2006,248;2006,253;2006,265;2006,267;2006,284;
2006,309;2006,322;2006,323;2006,330;2006,340;2006,344;2006,345;2006,347;2006,348;200
6,349;2006,356;2006,358;2006,363;2006,364;2006,365;2006,365;2006,370;2006,379;2006,3
85;2006,389;2006,391;2006,396;2006,397;2006,398;2006,399;2006,404;2006,405;2006,406;
2006,410;2006,412;2006,413;2006,417;2006,418;2007,21;2007,24;2007,38;2007,40;02007,5
7;2007,64;2007,69;2007,81;2007,82;2007,89;2007,90;2007,94;2007,95;2007,98;2007,105;20
07,110;2007,121;2007,137;2007,141;2007,154;2007,157;2007,159;2007,162;2007,165;2007,1
69;2007,175;2007,178;2007,179;2007,184;2007,188;2007,193;2007,194;2007,201;2007,202;
2007,221;2007,229;2007,238;2007,239;2007,240;2007,256;2007,268;2007,269;2007,275;200
7,286;2007,289;2007,299;2007,300;2007,313;2007,339;2007,346;2007,358;2007,365;2007,3
67;2007,373;2007,375;2007,378;2007,387;2007,398;2007,401;2007,402;2007,430;2008,1;20
08,9;2008,10;2008,24;2008,25;2008,27;2008,42;2008,45;2008,50;2008,51;2008,62;2008,63;2
008,73;2008,75;2008,93;2008,94;2008,95;2008,102;2008,103;2008,104;2008,105;2008,120;2
008,131;2008,133;2008,142;2008,145;2008,159;2008,166;2008,168;2008,180;2008,190;2008
,198;2008,200;2008,201;2008,203;2008,216;2008,220;2008,222;2008,232;2008,250;2008,25
3;2008,255;2008,289;2008,290;2008,304;2008,320;2008,322;2008,326;2008,342;2008,353;2
008,368;2008,371;2008,371;2008,372;2008,386;2008,387;2008,388
List of variables
C - constitutional
Uc - unconstitutional
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Germany cases
2BvF1/81
2BvF1/81
2BvF1/81
2BvF1/81
2BvF1/81
2BvE14/83
2BvF2/84
2BvF2/83
2BvF3/83
2BvF1/84
2BvF4/83
2BvF2/84
2BvF1/83
2BvF5/83
2BvF6/83
2BvF1/85
2BvF1/84
1BvF1/84
2BvF1/85
2BvF2/85
2BvF1/82
2BvF2/89
2BvF3/88
2BvE3/89
2BvE2/90
2BvR3/88
2BvF2/89
2BvF3/89
2BvF3/85
1BvF1/86
1BvF1/85
1BvF1/88
2BvF1/88
2BvF4/89
2BvF5/89
2BvQ16/92
2BvF5/92
2BvF4/92
2BvQ17/92
2BvF1/88
2BvF2/88
2BvF1/89
2BvF1/90
2BvR3/88
2BvE5/93
2BvQ11/93
2BvQ17/93
2BvF2/90
2BvF4/92
2BvF5/92
2BvQ17/92
2BvQ16/92
2BvE3/92
2BvE5/93
2BvE7/93
2BvE8/93
1BvF2/86
1BvF2/87
1BvF3/87
1BvF4/87
1BvF1/90
1BvF1/90
1BvF1/87
2BvF1/92
2BvF2/93
2BvF2/93
2BvF2/95
2BvF1/95
2BvE1/97
2BvE4/95
2BvF3/92
2BvE2/93
2BvF5/95
2BvE1/96
2BvE3/97
1BvF1/91
1BvF1/94
2BvF2/98
2BvF3/98
2BvF1/99
2BvF2/99
2BvF2/99
2BvF2/99
2BvF1/90
1BvF1/94
2BvF1/96
2BvF1/00
2BvF4/98
2BvF3/99
1BvF1/01
1BvF1/01
1BvF2/01
2BvF1/01
2BvF1/02
2BvF1/02
2BvF1/02
2BvF1/02
2BvF1/02
2BvF1/02
2BvF6/98
1BvF1/98
1BvF1/98
1BvF1/98
2BvF2/02
2BvF2/02
2BvF2/02
2BvF3/92
2BvF2/01
2BvF2/01
2BvF2/01
2BvF1/03
2BvF1/03
2BvF1/03
2BvF1/03
2BvF1/03
2BvF1/03
2BvF2/03
2BvF2/03
2BvF3/03
1BvF1/05
2BvF1/04
2BvF3/02
2BvF3/02
1BvF4/05
2BvF4/03
2BvF1/04
1BvF1/05
1BvF3/05
1BvF4/05
2BvF4/05
2BvF2/05
1BvF1/07
!
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APPENDIX 3
Austria cases
1978
117
34
1979
1 
5
11
25
35
41
54
55
56
57
58
59
107
27
48
1980
10
57
109
9
26
28
30
37
2
5
6
11
17
18
49
1
6
7
96
61
1981
2
4
26
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
28
29
30
32
37
38
43
47
50
53
116
67
68
69
85
95
 3
33
34
39
51
64
86
91
92
93
94
95
97
44
98
99
100
121
128
101
102
103
105
106
107
108
110
111
112
114
115
118
119
125
27
104
113
117
60
81
103
1982
8
45
47
54
81
79
67 
44
79
2
94
101
151
1983
66
11
25
28
33
53
90
93
30
7
71
31
40
35
1
34
83
1984
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
155
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
59
68
82
85
102
103
104
105
106
111
112
120
130
131
132
70
78
85
138
147
222
1985
41
68
71
73
86
101
103
108
114
119
151
152
153
157
166
196
202
2
15
18
20
21
30
3
36
44
45
65
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
145
146
147
148
149
150
158
159
161
162
165
229
174
225
232
226
227
228
245
246
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
2
233
234
235
236
237
244
259
260
261
5
1986
16
17
90
128
224
4
114
8
9
10
11
18
80
84
89
91
111
117
119
121
122
123
124
129
140
167
173
178
179
186
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
243
13
35
36
37
71
6
13
112
47
143
147
149
150
151
152
153
!
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154
155
156
157
158
159
160
170
171
178
183
253
255
256
257
258
259
260
269
68
44
45
46
201
1987
101
102
102
103
104
105
106
110
111
112
113
123
124
125
126
142
207
216
217
218
219
220
268
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
31
34
38
69
72
73
74
75
78
5
90
91
93
94
95
11
96
109
134
137
146
147
148
62
172
182
2
43
55
56
57
58
114
121
122
138
139
140
141
161
162
165
166
167
168
169
170
172
173
174
175
176
177
179
180
181
213
227
94
1988
95
144
87
7
8
9
10
10
12
13
14
15
16
18
51
63
66
67
72
82
83
84
85
86
87
89
97
98
99
100
102
103
104
107
108
109
12
123
124
125
126
133
134
136
143
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
1987
158
1988
159
160
164
165
166
173
175
184
1987
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
198
200
224
225
226
228
229
235
238
1988
248
1987
249
253
254
256
1
1988
2
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
1987
65
1988
69
70
71
74
75
76
77
78
79
1987
79
1988
80
81
91
117
118
119
206
251
15
1989
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
138
1988
145
213
6
1989
7
21
22
23
30
32
52
53
54
55
67
80
88
176
1988
226
1989
227
232
1988
233
236
238
239
240
241
3
1989
4
186
1988
218
228
229
1989
233
234
245
246
249
250
261
263
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
164
1990
165
13
14
15
71
83
84
85
86
87
1989
87
1990
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
127
142
172
173
280
1989
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
66
1990
2
3
4
5
6
7
10
11
24
1989
25
26
27
31
31
!
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1990
33
35
36
38
40
41
1989
34
35
37
37
1990
38
89
42
43
44
45
46
1989
47
48
49
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
68
72
81
1990
48
49
89
50
72
78
89
79
82
85
1989
86
106
1990
115
125
126
160
161
162
170
171
230
235
262
276
1989
277
278
310
316
317
318
326
1
1990
70
170
1988
315
1989
85
1991
86
137
157
1990
176
187
1991
269
277
289
1990
319
39
1991
1
3
41
42
76
1990
82
1991
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
112
1990
113
116
1991
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
125
127
128
1990
129
130
132
133
134
1991
135
1990
136
137
138
139
140
141
1991
141
142
143
1990
143
1991
144
145
1990
147
155
1990
167
168
169
1991
168
1991
163
164
165
166
167 
169
170
173
185
1990
186
187
188
1991
189
190
192
1990
195
207
208
213
225
226
240
1991
241
249
250
251
252
1989
253
256
256
1991
257
260
261
262
263
264
267
266
267
290
1990
290
1991
291
1990
292
323
324
325
326
327
1991
328
329
330
331
332
333
337
338
339
340
341
345
1990
37
1991
38
39
40
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
148
1990
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
227
228
229
230
231
232
234
235
236
237
253
254
255
256
257
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
1991
274
1990
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
294
1991
322
1990
323
1991
324
343
1
1992
70
107
1990
255
1991
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307       
326
327
115
1992
231
1991
2
1992
3
10
16
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
42
43
44
45
46
49
50
!
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52
53
54
58
65
88
89
90
91
103
104
105
106
107
112
117
123
124
125
126
127
131
135
1991
136
1992
136
1991
137
1992
138
145
1991
146
147
148
159
1992
160
162
163
177
209
210
217
1990
218
279
1991
293
297
298
299
309
310
311
312
313
314
317
318
330
331
332
333
342
344
142
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
193
1991
200
1992
6
1993
7
8
9
10
35
37
63
65
68
1992
76
86
1993
76
87
95
103
104
108
109
248
1992
252
254
258
266
268
270
272
17
1993
49
212
1992
213
214
215
241
249
255
264
15
1993
16
23
36
64
74
75
80
92
93
96
99
100
101
102
107
114
122
153
224
1992
230
1993
231
232
262
263
273
1992
275
5
1993
130
134
217
1992
218
25
1994
35
85
1993
98
105
145
212
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
166
30
1994
74
75
92
93
97
98
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
116
1993
127
128
129
135
154
1994
155
156
157
158
193
194
195
196
202
203
204
205
206
231
1992
234
1993
236
237
250
251
268
1994
269
270
233
1993
235
261
23
1995
43
80
137
188
1994
198
94
218
94
223
278
298
1248
1995
13
47
64
115
1993
21
1995
22
44
45
50
89
1994
247
248
272
277
296
297
1306
1995
10
191
1994
192
1219
1995
1220
1221
1222
1223
1223
1225
1226
1227
1228
1229
1249
1256
1257
1258
1259
1260
1261
1262
1263
1264
1289
1303
12
184
1996
185
186
1305
1995
11
1996
22
24
25
27
28
50
59
80
1984
81
85
95
87
1996
88
89
91
92
101
104
1981
104
1996
116
117
118
119
121
122
123
127
129
131
132
133
134
138
139
145
1981
145
1996
151
160
161
162
163
174
1981
176
187
1994
189
!
! 241
1996
190
1994
190
1996
191
192
193
194
1981
205
1996
206
207
208
209
211
1995
214
1981
222
1996
250
260
1995
277
1996
278
279
1981
280
281
282
1995
282
1981
283
361
362
363
365
366
367
381
1279
1995
1280
1367
1368
1394
1395
9
1996
83
86
110
136
143
148
159
175
1981
197
1996
1363
1995
1364
1365
130
1996
3
1997
17
18
19
20
217
1995
218
219
220
221
222
225
239
1997
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
355
1995
47
1997
270
1996
271
272
273
288
299
300
304
318
1997
16
21
22
31
39
42
112
1996
113
168
226
279
1997
280
285
1996
287
289
290
294
1997
295
300
301
302
30
304
305
306
307
308
309
313
314
315
329
332
335
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
364
1996
387
396
401
402
404
405
414
1997
430
438
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
1398
1995
1399
23
1997
24
25
26
44
82
1996
213
216
222
1997
223
287
316
388
1996
389
390
391
392
398
399
400
451
1997
23
1998
83
110
115
15
26
51
1997
57
1998
262
1997
297
298
328
3
1998
27
28
45
59
78
1997
94
1998
95
100
117
127
134
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
198
210
213
214
215
217
218
221
222
223
224
225
226
233
234
237
240
244
284
1997
366
367
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
406
409
410
416
418
422
432
433
434
452
455
459
460
462
466
467
1998
469
1997
473
474
479
2
16
1998
17
18
22
25
1997
29
1998
36
41
79
82
108
120
326
1997
357
363
364
365
368
369
370
399
400
404
411
450
463
464
478
484
2
1999
3
1998
16
1999
30
89
90
99
101
102
169
212
1998
427
1997
8
1999
24
39
!
! 242
43
259
1998
262
481
1997
6
1999
17
26
27
31
32
1998
33
1999
34
35
36
57
73
77
85
104
105
106
132
1998
134
1999
140
159
160
161
162
163
164
200
1998
219
220
227
231
232
249
253
255
256
420
1997
42
1999
44
45
46
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
64
1998
65
69
1999
70
135
65
112
1998
206
13
2000
23
1999
47
2000
83
101
1998
113
2000
1
2
7
11
16
18
21
37
41
54
1998
55
2000
86
88
89
91
93
95
97
155
1999
211
1998
312
1997
19
2000
110
1999
172
175
72
2000
129
2001
155
213
267
1999
24
2001
25
1999
91
2001
94
2000
117
5
2001
6
8
10
25
87
2000
107
114
115
118
2001
128
2000
130
141
150
152
159
212
2001
220
309
12
2000
14
43
47
1999
103
2000
146
2001
181
224
269
13
16
2001
142
214
270
2001
275
315
316
322
2002
347
348
2001
45
2002
177
181
211
2001
267
317
2002
333
2001
7
2002
8
11
17
32
85
112
136
194
211
215
217
2001
219
229
2002
278
2001
319
328
342
349
350
351
363
364
42
2002
83
143
227
296
318
322
2001
3
2003
6
13
2002
64
2003
65
304
2001
378
2002
240
298
2003
8
9
10
11
18
19
20
37
39
40
41
45
62
63
118
120
121
122
123
218
2002
219
220
221
248
334
348
356
358
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
5
2003
42
53
54
55
119
208
2002
212
222
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
7
2003
29
30
31
32
33
179
1
2004
66
67
211
2003
212
13
16
2004
17
25
27
32
33
34
35
36
54
55
57
83
89
115
124
2003
!
! 243
204
205
2004
216
2003
217
218
219
220
226
230
231
232
294
2002
333
335
359
2003
4
2004
4
5
6
8
9
10
48
2003
49
2004
50
79
80
81
95
98
140
2003
141
228
237
238
279
2002
363
4
2005
39
40
58
59
60
82
92
2004
104
105
137
150
155
156
158
159
160
163
164
170
171
87
2005
88
89
90
91
92
93
95
99
178
2004
179
180
181
29
2006
105
2005
144
79
85
86
1
2006
9
28
35
48
116
130
2005
131
132
133
134
138
139
140
141
142
143
145
147
151
151
2006
152
2005
153
154
37
2006
39
50
51
52
53
91
2005
96
121
2006
122
123
124
149
150
2005
197
2006
166
167
168
213
147
148
3
2007
4
23
25
27
138
212
2006
235
454
21
2007
179
180
196
203
2006
221
222
223
19
2008
20
2007
27
87
2008
186
2007
265
5
263
11
2008
15
16
39
40
84
273
2007
10
247
254
255
2008
85
86
246
!
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APPENDIX 4
Statistical Formula
1. CHI SQUARE
Chi Square is employed to test the difference between an actual sample and another hypothetical 
or previously established distribution such as that which may be expected due to chance or 
probability. Chi Square can also be used to test differences between two or more actual samples.
2. Cramers V
3. Phi
Value Strength
0 > 0.1 Weak
0.1 > 0.3 Moderate
> 0.3 strong
4. Spearmans Rho
5. Regression
Given a data set  of n statistical units a linear regression model assumes 
that the relationship between the dependent variable yi and the p-vector of regressors xi is approximately linear. 
This approximate relationship is modeled through a so-called “disturbance term” εi — an unobserved random 
variable that adds noise to the linear relationship between the dependent variable and regressors. Thus the model 
takes the form
( )( )1-c 1,-rmin 
2
N
V χ=
N
2χ
φ =
!
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where x′iβ is the inner product between vectors xi and β.
Often these n equations are stacked together and written in vector form as
where
6. T-test
Suppose one is fitting the model
where xi, i = 1, ..., n are known, α and β are unknown, and εi are independent normally distributed random errors 
with expected value 0 and unknown variance σ2, and Yi, i = 1, ..., n are observed. It is desired to test the null 
hypothesis that the slope β is equal to some specified value β0 (often taken to be 0, in which case the hypothesis is 
that x and y are unrelated).
Let
Then
has a t-distribution with n − 2 degrees of freedom if the null hypothesis is true. 
can be written in terms of the residuals. Let
Then tscore is given by:
!
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The t statistic to test whether the means are different can be calculated as follows:
7. Pearsons
!
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APPENDIX 5
Interview Questions
Questions
I. General
a. Welchen Weg geht ein abstraktes Normenkontrollverfahren bis es zur Entscheidung kommt? 
b. Welche Einflüsse wirken sich auf den Ablauf und die Entscheidung dieses Normenkontrollverfahrens 
aus?
c. In wieweit beeinflusst die Mitgliedschaft der EU und die Erweiterung von EC Gesetzen, die konkrete 
und abstrakte Normenkontrolle?
d. Statistiken veranschaulichen/machen deutlich, dass Gruppierungen von Parlamentariern, vor allem 
Oppositions- Parlamentariern, sich immer öfter an das Gericht wenden um eine Norm unter abstrakter 
Normenkontrolle prüfen zu lassen. Was ist ihrer Meinung nach der Grund hierfür?
e. In den wissenschaftlichen Veröffentlichungen zum Thema Normenkontrolle wird die EU immer öfter 
erwähnt. Was ist Ihr Eindruckt zu diesem Thema?
f. Als ich die Urteile der letzten 20 Jahre analysiert habe, erschien es mir als wäre der Anteil an Urteilen, 
die wenigstens Teile des Gesetzes as verfassungswidrige erklärt haben, in die Höhe gestiegen. Welche 
Faktoren könnten diese Entwicklung in Ihrer Meinung erklären
II. Germany
a. Verglichen mit dem österreichischen Gericht, erscheint das Deutsche viel seltener bereit,  Gruppen von 
Parlamentariern recht zu geben wenn es um eine Gesetzesprüfung unter abstrakter Normenkontrolle 
angerufen gebeten wird. Was ist Ihr Eindruck zu diesem Thema? 
b. Im Falle des deutschen Gerichtes ist es schwer eine Erwähnung von EU/ EC Recht zu finden – es ist 
allerdings der Fall,  dass die meisten der Fälle in denen das Gericht Normen als verfassungswidrig/
unkonform erklärt in die gleichen Kategorien (Umwelt/...) fallen und sich auf EU Regulationen 
zurückführen lassen. Warum ist dies der Fall?
c. Welches sind die Motivationen (Absichten) derjenigen, die das Gericht um eine Gesetzesprüfung unter 
abstrakter Normenkontrolle bitten?
III. Austria
a. Die Statistiken für das Jahr 1995 zeigen eine extrem hohe Zahl an abstrakten Normenkontrollverfahren 
in Österreich. Was wäre Ihre Erklärung für diese Zahl?
b. Im Falle des österreichischen Gerichts erscheint es auffällig, dass Gruppierungen von Parlamentariern 
mehr Erfolg vor dem Gericht haben als in den anderen Ländern. Dies scheint vor allem in den letzten 8 
Jahren der Fall gewesen zu sein – während die Literatur für die Zeit vor 1995 noch sagt, dass die 
Möglichkeit das Gericht um eine Prüfung zu bitten völlig unbedeutend ist.   Was hat sich aus Ihrer Sicht 
verändert?  
c. In vielen der Fälle in denen das Gericht eine Norm als verfassungswidrig erklärt bezieht es sich im Text 
des Urteils oder im Hintergrund der Diskussion auf die EU. Jedoch nicht notwendigerweise als seine 
Begründung des Urteils. Wie erklären sie diesen Umstand?
IV. Italy
1. Do you think membership of the EU has had an influence on abstract judicial review in Italy? 
2. The Italian court does not allow groups of parliamentarians to ask for rulings under abstract judicial 
review. What do you think would change if this would be the case?
!
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V. Hungary
1. The Hungarian state abolished the power of parliamentarian groups to ask for rulings under abstract 
review. Why was this the case and what has changed through this in the character of abstract review?
2. The Hungarian court has made open and frequent references to EU/EC law and values. It differs from 
other courts, such as the German and Austrian one, in this respect. What do you feel is the reason for this 
frequent mention of the EU in rulings and arguments and what make the Hungarian court different from 
the other courts in this
!
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APPENDIX 6
Governments, party affiliation
de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Quaranta Gallo Mazella Silvestri
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Quaranta Gallo Mazella Silvestri
de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Quaranta Gallo Mazella Silvestri
de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Quaranta Gallo Mazella Silvestri
de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Quaranta Gallo Mazella Silvestri
de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Quaranta Gallo Mazella Silvestri
de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Quaranta Gallo Mezzanotte Onida
de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Quaranta Zagrebelsky Mezzanotte Onida
de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Zagrebelsky Mezzanotte Onida
Chieppa Ruperto Zagrebelsky Mezzanotte Onida
Chieppa Ruperto Mirabelli Zagrebelsky Mezzanotte Onida
Chieppa Ruperto Granata Mirabelli Zagrebelsky Mezzanotte Onida
Chieppa Ruperto Granata Mirabelli Zagrebelsky Mezzanotte Onida
Chieppa Ruperto Granata Mirabelli Zagrebelsky Mezzanotte Onida
Chieppa Ruperto Granata Mirabelli Zagrebelsky Mezzanotte Onida
Chieppa Ruperto Granata Mirabelli Zagrebelsky Spagnoli Caianiello
Chieppa Ruperto Granata Mirabelli Spagnoli Caianiello
Chieppa Ruperto Granata Mirabelli Spagnoli Caianiello
Corasanti Granata Mirabelli Spagnoli Caianiello
Corasanti Granata Mirabelli Spagnoli Caianiello
Corasanti Granata Gallo Saja Spagnoli Caianiello
Corasanti Gallo Saja Spagnoli Caianiello
Corasanti Gallo Saja Spagnoli Caianiello
Corasanti Gallo Saja Spagnoli Caianiello
Corasanti Gallo Saja Malagugini Caianiello
Corasanti Gallo Saja Malagugini Elia
Corasanti Gallo Saja Malagugini Elia
Maccarone Gallo Saja Malagugini Elia
Maccarone Gallo Saja Malagugini Elia
Amadei Maccarone Saja Malagugini Elia
Amadei Maccarone Malagugini Elia
Amadei Maccarone Malagugini Elia
Amadei Maccarone Malagugini Elia
!
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de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Quaranta Gallo Mazella Silvestri
1977
1976
Amadei Maccarone Malagugini Elia
Amadei Elia
de Siervo Maddalena Finocchiaro Quaranta Gallo Mazella Silvestri
0
2.75
5.5
8.25
11
2009 2005 2001 1997 1993 1989 1985 1981 1977
Membership of Academics of the Italian Court
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Cassesse Saulle Tesauro Napolitano Frigo Criscuolo Grossi
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
Cassesse Saulle Tesauro Napolitano Frigo Criscuolo Grossi
Cassesse Saulle Tesauro Napolitano Frigo Criscuolo Flick
Cassesse Saulle Tesauro Napolitano Vaccarella Bile Flick
Cassesse Saulle Tesauro Napolitano Vaccarella Bile Flick
Cassesse Saulle Tesauro Marini Vaccarella Bile Flick
Neppi Modona Capotosti Marini Vaccarella Bile Flick
Neppi Modona Capotosti Marini Vaccarella Bile Flick
Neppi Modona Capotosti Marini Vaccarella Bile Flick
Neppi Modona Capotosti Marini Bile Flick
Vassalli Neppi Modona Capotosti Marini Guizzi Bile Flick
Vassalli Neppi Modona Capotosti Marini Guizzi Bile
Vassalli Neppi Modona Capotosti Marini Guizzi
Vassalli Neppi Modona Capotosti Marini Guizzi
Vassalli Neppi Modona Capotosti Guizzi Cheli
Vassalli Baldassare Ferri Casavola Guizzi Cheli
Vassalli Mengoni Ferri Casavola Guizzi Cheli
Vassalli Mengoni Ferri Casavola Guizzi Greco Cheli
Vassalli Mengoni Ferri Casavola Guizzi Greco Cheli
Vassalli Mengoni Ferri Casavola Guizzi Greco Cheli
Conso Mengoni Ferri Casavola Dell’Andro Greco Cheli
Conso Mengoni Ferri Casavola Dell’Andro Greco Cheli
Conso Mengoni Ferri Casavola Dell’Andro Greco Cheli
Conso Mengoni Ferri Casavola Dell’Andro Greco Ferrari
Conso Paladin La Pergola Casavola Dell’Andro Greco Ferrari
Conso Paladin La Pergola Reale Bucciarelli Ducci Greco Ferrari
Conso Paladin La Pergola Reale Bucciarelli Ducci Greco Ferrari
Conso Paladin La Pergola Reale Bucciarelli Ducci Ferrari
Conso Paladin La Pergola Reale Bucciarelli Ducci Ferrari
Volterra Paladin La Pergola Reale Bucciarelli Ducci Giorfrida Ferrari
Volterra Paladin La Pergola Reale Bucciarelli Ducci Giorfrida Ferrari
Volterra Paladin La Pergola Reale Bucciarelli Ducci Giorfrida
Volterra Paladin La Pergola Reale Bucciarelli Ducci Giorfrida
Cassesse Saulle Tesauro Napolitano Frigo Criscuolo Grossi
1977
1976
Volterra Paladin Reale Bucciarelli Ducci Giorfrida
Volterra Giorfrida
Volterra Giorfrida
Volterra Giorfrida
Volterra Giorfrida
Volterra Giorfrida
Volterra Giorfrida
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Cassesse Saulle Tesauro Napolitano Frigo Criscuolo Grossi
Amirante No of Ac
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
Amirante 9
Amirante 9
Amirante 10
Amirante 10
Amirante 11
Amirante 11
Amirante 11
Amirante 11
Amirante 11
11
10
10
10
10
Pescatore 8
Pescatore 8
Borzellino Pescatore 8
Borzellino Pescatore 8
Borzellino Pescatore 8
Borzellino Pescatore 8
Borzellino Pescatore 8
Borzellino Pescatore 7
Borzellino Pescatore Andrioli 7
Borzellino Pescatore Andrioli Roehrssen 8
Borzellino Pescatore Andrioli Roehrssen 8
Borzellino Andrioli Roehrssen de Stefano 8
Andrioli Roehrssen de Stefano 8
Andrioli Roehrssen de Stefano 8
Andrioli Roehrssen de Stefano 8
Andrioli Roehrssen de Stefano 8
Andrioli Roehrssen de Stefano 8
Andrioli Roehrssen de Stefano 8
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Amirante No of Ac
1977
1976
Roehrssen de Stefano 8
de Stefano 8
de Stefano 8
Amirante No of Ac
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BR NR BR
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
Holzinger Bierlein Haller Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Bierlein Haller Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Bierlein Haller Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Bierlein Haller Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Bierlein Haller Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Bierlein Haller Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Bierlein Haller Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Gottlich Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Gottlich Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Gottlich Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Gottlich Lass Liehr Ruppe Oberndorfer
Holzinger Gottlich Lass Liehr Oberndorfer
Holzinger Gottlich Lass Liehr Oberndorfer
Holzinger Gottlich Lass Liehr Roessler Oberndorfer
Holzinger Gottlich Lass kienberger Roessler Oberndorfer
Jann Gottlich Lass kienberger Roessler Oberndorfer
Jann Gottlich kienberger Roessler Oberndorfer
Jann Gottlich kienberger Roessler Oberndorfer
Jann Gottlich kienberger Roessler Oberndorfer
Jann Gottlich kienberger Roessler Oberndorfer
Jann Gottlich kienberger Roessler Oberndorfer
Jann Gottlich kienberger Roessler Oberndorfer
Jann Gottlich kienberger Roessler Oberndorfer
Jann Gottlich Saxer Roessler hinterauer
Jann Gottlich Saxer Roessler hinterauer
Jann Gottlich Saxer Roessler hinterauer
Jann Gottlich Saxer Roessler hinterauer
Jann Gottlich Saxer Roessler hinterauer
Jann Gottlich Saxer Roessler hinterauer
Jann Gottlich Saxer Roessler hinterauer
Jann Gottlich Saxer Roessler hinterauer
BR NR BR
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
Jann Gottlich Saxer Roessler
Gottlich Saxer Roessler
Gottlich Saxer Roessler
Gottlich Saxer Roessler
Gottlich Saxer Roessler
Gottlich Roessler
Gottlich Roessler
Gottlich Roessler
Roessler
Roessler
Roessler
Roessler
Roessler
0
1.75
3.5
5.25
7
2009 2006 2003 2000 1997 1994 1991 1988 1985 1982 1979 1976
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No of Ac
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2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
Schnizer Gahleitner
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Hoertenhuber
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Hoertenhuber
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Korinek
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Korinek
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Korinek
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Korinek
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Korinek
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Korinek
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Korinek
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Korinek
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Kahr heller Korinek
Mueller Brechthold-Ostermann Fessler heller
Piska Brechthold-Ostermann Fessler heller
Piska Machacek Fessler heller
Piska Machacek Fessler heller
Piska Machacek Fessler heller
Piska Machacek Fessler heller
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller melichar
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller melichar
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller melichar
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller melichar
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller melichar
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller melichar
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller melichar
Ringhofer Machacek Fessler heller melichar
Machacek Fessler heller melichar
Machacek Fessler heller melichar
Machacek melichar
Machacek melichar
melichar
melichar
melichar
melichar
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No of Ac
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
Grabenwarter 6
Grabenwarter 4
Grabenwarter 4
Grabenwarter 4
Grabenwarter 4
Grabenwarter 4
Morsscher 4
Morsscher 4
Morsscher 4
Morsscher 4
Morsscher 4
Morsscher 4
Morsscher 5
Morsscher 5
Morsscher 5
Morsscher 5
Morsscher 6
Morsscher 6
Morsscher 6
Morsscher 6
Morsscher 6
Morsscher 6
Morsscher 6
Quell 5
Quell 4
Quell 4
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell 6
No of Ac
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell 6
Quell
Quell
Quell
Quell
Quell
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APPENDIX 7
Legal Provisions
Appendix 7
National Definitions of abstract norm control
In Germany abstract review is defined in Article 93 of the basic law:
“(1) The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule:
1. on the interpretation of this Basic Law in the event of disputes concerning the extent of the rights 
and duties of a supreme federal body or of other parties vested with rights of their own by this Basic 
Law or by the rules of procedure of a supreme federal body;
2. in the event of disagreements or doubts concerning the formal or substantive compatibility of federal law or 
Land law with this Basic Law, or the compatibility of Land law with other federal law, on application of the 
Federal Government, of a Land government, or of one third of the Members of the Bundestag;
2 a. in the event of disagreements whether a law meets the requirements of paragraph (2) of Article 72, 
on application of the Bundesrat or of the government or legislature of a Land;
3. in the event of disagreements concerning the rights and duties of the Federation and the Länder, 
especially in the execution of federal law by the Länder and in the exercise of federal oversight;
4. on other disputes involving public law between the Federation and the Länder, between different 
Länder, or within a Land, unless there is recourse to another court;
4 a.  on constitutional complaints, which may be filed by any person alleging that one of his basic rights 
or one of his rights under paragraph (4) of Article 20 or under Article 33, 38, 101, 103 or 104 has been 
infringed by public authority;
4 b. on constitutional complaints filed by municipalities or associations of municipalities on the ground 
that their right to self-government under Article 28 has been infringed by a law; in the case of 
infringement by a Land law, however, only if the law cannot be challenged in the constitutional
court of the Land;
5. in the other instances provided for in this Basic Law.”
Only Paragraph 2 is seen as abstract review, in the strictest sense, in Germany. Austria’s definition of 
what constitutes abstract review is less well defined. In Article 140 of the constitution it reads:
“Article 140
(1) The Constitutional Court pronounces on application by the Administrative Court, the 
Supreme Court, or a competent appellate court whether a Federal or State law is 
unconstitutional,  but ex officio in so far as the Court would have to apply such a law in a 
pending suit.  It pronounces also on application by the Federal Government whether State laws are 
unconstitutional and likewise on application by a State Government or by one third of the House of 
Representatives' members whether Federal laws are unconstitutional.  A State constitutional law can 
provide that such a right of application as regards the unconstitutionality of State laws lies with one 
third of the State Parliament's members.   The Court also pronounces whether laws are 
unconstitutional when an application alleges direct infringement of personal rights through 
such unconstitutionality in so far as the law has become operative for the applicant without 
!
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the delivery of a judicial decision or the issue of a ruling.   Article 89 (3) applies analogously 
to such applications.”
The Italian constitutions is even broader in its definition. It defines the powers of the court in Article 
127:
1. Whenever the government regards a regional law as exceeding the powers of the region, it 
may raise the question of its constitutionality before the constitutional court within sixty 
days of the publication of the law.
2. Whenever a region regards a state law, another act of the state having the force of law, or a 
law of another region as infringing on its own sphere of powers, it may raise the question of 
its constitutionality before the constitutional court within sixty days of the publication of 
said law or act.”
And in Article 134 it defines the power of the constitutional court as:
“The constitutional court decides:
- disputes concerning the constitutionality of laws and acts with the force of law adopted by 
state or regions;
- conflicts arising over the allocation of powers between branches of government within the 
state, between the state and the regions, and between regions;
- on accusations raised against the president in accordance with the constitution.”
!
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